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ART. I.—CHRISTIANITY AND THE WAR POWER.

THE times in which we live naturally suggest inquiries relative to the lawfulness and morality of war. Taught as we are, and rightfully too, that the tendency of Christianity is to produce "peace on earth and good-will toward men," there will arise unbidden the doubtings of a tender conscience, and the fear lest in grasping the "carnal weapon" at the call of his government a man should be doing violence to the principles of that "holy evangel," in whose provisions and precepts he hopes to find "the way of life," and to secure endless felicity. Opinions on this subject greatly vary. With reference thereto, men of equal conscientiousness have assumed antagonistic positions. In the same community, and oftentimes in the same family, from whence will go forth with brave heart the men of stalwart frame to do battle even to the death against armed foemen, there may be found those who, while sympathizing with the objects to be accomplished, will by no means voluntarily enter upon active warfare, nor suffer their resources, except under restraint, to be applied to the support of the Government in its struggle to maintain "by force and arms" its legitimate authority, its national status, or the integrity of its domain. Now, by whatsoever number of such men there may be in any country, by so much is the military arm of the nation weakened. And this weakness consists not merely in the

abstraction of that number from military duty, but in the moral influence which such may exert upon the minds of others who go forth to the combat. For, claiming to be actuated wholly by considerations of a moral and religious nature, and being chiefly men of real worth and integrity, sincere and honest in their profession and belief, it cannot but be that with reference to those who are cognizant of their opinions, and have respect for their persons and character, the influence exerted will be calculated to fill the mind with doubt, and by so much unnerve the arm as it would strike the blow for the vindication of national right and honor, even though it may not avail to prevent their going into the service of their country. Every doubt of right is traitor to the accomplishment of an intended purpose. It may, therefore, be subserving a purpose of value—"opere pretium"—to our struggling nationality, if we calmly examine the question as to the rightfulness of the claim of a government to declare and wage a war, to use the military force of its people in defense of its rights and honor, or for the suppression of a rebellion against its legitimate authority.

By those who contend against the lawfulness of war, it is alleged that *absolute non-resistance is the doctrine of Holy Scripture*. And this it is said is the rule for both the nationality and the individual; both for the authorities of a civil government acting in their official capacity, and the individual subjects of those authorities. But we apprehend that this is not a correct presentment of Scripture doctrine. The "non-resistance" of Scripture applies *not*, as may be shown, to the *government*, but is strictly *personal*, applies simply to the *individual*. It may be at once admitted that "resistance" is forbidden to the individual under certain circumstances and conditions. Thus, for example, it is doubtless prohibited when by such resistance there could not be secured personal safety, or could not be obtained deliverance from impending evils, or could not be prevented a repetition or aggravation of personal injury. Whenever the objects proposed to be accomplished by such resistance as we can offer are beyond the bounds of human probability or possibility of attainment, then resistance being vain may well be conceived to be forbidden. Hence there is no difficulty whatever in accounting for Christ's prohibition of



any attempt on the part of Peter to prevent, by violence, his own arrest by the Jewish authorities; even though we leave out of view the obvious principle to which it may be referred, of our constant duty to submit to the constituted civil authorities, acting in accordance with recognized law, to resist whom it is to resist the ordinance of God. For, humanly speaking, contravention of the purpose of the authorities was in that case improbable, if not impossible, and the result must have been an aggravation of the injury, and perhaps the involving of the entire discipleship in destruction and ruin. True, if Jesus had chosen to use his own supernatural power, and called for the "legions of angels," his arrest might have been prevented; but in that case the swords of his terrestrial adherents would have been unnecessary, wholly useless. In the view now presented there is seen also the force of the reason which Jesus gave for the prohibition: "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." For it cannot be that Christ intended to say that all who in any circumstances should take up the sword should perish by the sword, since such an interpretation is forbidden by the facts of history, and would imply ignorance or falsehood on the part of Christ. It must be interpreted with reference to the particular case, and is applicable only to similar occurrences. We must understand him simply to mean that they who, in such cases as this, and against the legitimately constituted authorities in the full and untrammelled exercise of the powers accorded them, shall attempt resistance, shall perish by the sword of its power, that such resistance is helpless and vain, and can but result in the destruction of those who enter upon it. Thus this prohibition is defended as well on the principles of religion as upon the ground of common sense and common prudence.

It may be further admitted that resistance is forbidden when such resistance would partake rather of the nature of revenge than of simple self-protection and defense, or the assertion and vindication of legitimate right. As a rule for judicial action and decision the doctrine "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," may perhaps be admitted. But as a rule for private life and for personal individual action, it is distinctly repudiated by the author of our religion. It was to the abuse of the "public law," in its illegitimate application and indiscriminate

use "by private" parties, that Christ was directing attention when he uttered the injunction, "Resist not (*ἀντιστῆναι*, that is, retaliate not upon the) evil" (person). Matt. v, 39, etc. The several illustrations of the doctrine thus enounced show that it was intended only for matters which affected solely the personal feelings and property of the individual. To make this clear, we have only to advert to each of the instances which he proceeds to cite, not one of which seems to be a case which could permanently affect the well-being of the individual, much less his life; and by no fair interpretation can any of them be made to apply to the affairs of a government or a state. His first instance is that of a personal insult and indignity: the "smiting (*παίζει*, a quick smart slap upon) the cheek," in which case, rather than get into a personal brawl in the effort to retaliate or avenge ourselves, we are taught to endure even a repetition of the injury or insult as a matter of but trivial importance and affecting only ourselves. But in proof that such acts are not to be suffered to pass without rebuke, we have the example of Jesus, who, when struck by the officer near him, because of the supposed rudeness of his response to the high priest, answered with sufficient curtness and spirit: "If I have spoken evil, then bear witness of that evil; but if well, why smitest thou me?" John xviii, 22, 23. The same spirit was also manifested by Paul when smitten by command of the high priest, and in this instance there is also inculcated the lesson that expressions of rebuke and severity which may be proper in response to indignity or suffering put upon us by a private individual, are not so proper when that individual is fully understood to be "a ruler of the people." Acts xxii, 2, 3. The second instance is the case of a private lawsuit, the evil which may be done us by a litigious or quarrelsome person. The instance implies at least dispute, and on the one side or other doubt as to how the matter might be determined in a court of law. In such cases the teaching is that it is better to give to the litigious person the benefit of his doubt. The subject of dispute, it is to be noted, "a coat," indicates a matter of comparatively trivial importance, affecting only for the moment the well-being of the injured party. There is further inculcated also a disposition to even do more than is demanded to satisfy the asserted claim, if that be necessary

to restore amity and good will. The third instance is the case of a compulsory exaction of service by one in authority; needlessly it may be, and working temporary and personal injury, yet the service is to be performed not grudgingly, and with intent of vexatiously annoying the authorities in retaliation by a niggardly and rigid interpretation according to its letter rather than its spirit, but with the manifestation of a willingness to do with alacrity not only the literally demanded service, but a much greater one if required to accomplish the purpose of the demand. "If compelled to go a mile" with the intent of accomplishing a certain end, "go with him twain," if by the one mile the end is not attained. It may receive passing illustration in the noble and generous spirit of the mass of the American people, who, compelled to bear the burdens of a heavy taxation and the drain of men for the prosecution of the purpose of the Government, the suppression of the cruel rebellion, not only do this, but with cheerfulness and unexampled patriotic devotion are contributing of their wealth in such benevolent enterprises as those of the Christian and Sanitary Commissions; and by private and munificent bounties relieving the necessitous, and encouraging those who are engaged in the actual conflict. The fourth illustration is drawn from private and personal charity, and teaches that it is better to relieve the alleged wants of those who apply to us, even though thus we are sometimes imposed upon by the unworthy, than to demand that every one who shall appeal to us for our benevolence shall be rigidly compelled to show that he possesses all the characteristics by which he would be entitled to relief on principles as strict as those involved in the precept "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth:" the exact measure of relief to be in the exact and rigid measure of the characteristic and necessity. The evident design was to teach that a rule which was intended for judicial cases must not be made the absolute rule of private life, and that the disposition of benevolent love, the charity that "thinketh no evil and worketh no ill to one's neighbor," is a better guide for individual life and personal intercourse, than the determination and effort in every case unfeelingly to exact the demands of a rigid and unbending justice.

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not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath," (*δοτε τονον τῇ ὀργῇ*), to the wrath, that is, of God, or the constituted authorities, who are God's ministers, and by whom vengeance will be executed as far as is consistent with the true interests of the individual and the purposes of good government. "For vengeance is mine, I will repay it, saith the Lord." It is simply a prohibition of all private and personal revenge, and the direction to transfer the vindication of private and personal right to God and his authoritative representatives upon earth, which right is indeed pre-existent in God, and the transfer is implied in the very organization of all governments; and thus there is also intimated the ground for such non-resistance as is taught in Scripture, namely: the existence of God, in whom by original sovereignty inheres the right of vengeance and protection, and the existence of government, his representative on earth, in which, subordinately to himself, he has vested this right.

In cases dissimilar and other than those which come under the principles now named, it is apprehended that resistance is not disapproved. This, indeed, seems to be intimated in the declaration of Jesus, "I came not to send peace on earth, but a sword." Matt. xx, 34. For in the conflicts and variances which were to arise by reason of the introduction of the Gospel kingdom, it can hardly be supposed that its promulgators and professors were always to yield their rights without an assertion of them by such means as were in their power; and, indeed, somewhat of right to appeal to the sword seems implied in the instruction which he gave his disciples just before he was betrayed: "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one." Luke xxii, 36. The additional remark may here also be made, that on a comparison of the narratives of the different evangelists it will be found that Peter was prohibited the use of the sword, not from the consideration of the sinfulness of such use, but simply from the inappositeness of time and circumstances, and the necessity for his arrest and death to fulfill prophecy, and accomplish to the full "love's redeeming work."

It is clear, then, that these passages and those of like character are not applicable to the authorities of a nation acting for it in their official capacity. There is, therefore, nothing in them nor in the true scriptural notion of non-resistance



which can interfere with the right of a government to wage and conduct war.

As confirmatory of this right we have absolute authority and warrant of Scripture for saying that THE WAR POWER WAS ANCIENTLY AN ATTRIBUTE OF GOVERNMENTS. Whence it came, by whom it was given, and by whom it was first exercised, may be matters concerning which there may be differences of opinion. But as to the *fact* of its exercise, and rightfully too, since it was exercised with the approbation of Jehovah himself, there cannot by any possibility be ground for dispute. It was indeed exercised by government in its rudest and most elementary forms, and by governors who were not supreme but subordinate authorities in their land. Thus to instance one case: Abraham, arming his household servants and retainers, pursued after the confederate kings, who, flushed with victory, and laden with the spoils and encumbered with the prisoners taken in their raid upon the Pentapolis, had now ceased from their warring, and were peacefully returning to their own dominions. If let alone they would soon have been out of his country and in their own, and the war would have been over. But Abraham was not disposed to let them alone, so arranging his forces for a night attack, "he smote them and pursued them even unto Hobah," rescuing their prisoners and recapturing the spoil. So far as Abraham was concerned, this action of his in his circumstances would seem to have been an aggressive war, since the incursion of these kings had not affected himself or his immediate subjects in person or property. And yet a priest of the most high God met him on his return, "red-handed" from "the *slaughter* of the kings," pronounced him blessed in the name of Jehovah, and not a solitary indication is there given of anything but approval on the part of God and his minister. (See Gen. xiv, and Heb. vii, 1.)

In a later age it was exercised not only with the approbation of God, but by his absolute and unequivocal command, and this not simply for the defense of the nation, but for the conquest of a country which for ages had been in the possession of a people of diverse language and lineage, and who most strenuously resisted the encroachments and irruption of the Israelites. Under his express direction the war was waged,



and it was carried on not merely for the purpose of subjugation to the government of the Israelitish authorities. It was a war of utter extermination, so that in many instances "not a hoof was to be left." We need but instance in their early history the case of Jericho, which, in accordance with the divine command, they utterly destroyed, saving but a single family, destroying man and woman, young and old, and all their cattle, with the edge of the sword. In a later age we have the case of Saul, who was commanded to go "and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." And because Saul saved Agag the king alive and the best of the cattle, which was contrary to the word of God, therefore the kingdom was "rent" from him and transferred to David. (1 Sam. xv, 3, *et seq.*) And this power was not exercised merely against foreign foes, and in aggressive and defensive warfare with other nations, but an illustrious instance, and one somewhat parallel with the circumstances of our own nationality, is afforded us of its exercise against those of their own blood and kin, and for the suppression of a domestic insurrection and resistance of the civil power. In their appeal to arms "against the children of Benjamin their brother," they went not forth without the divine counsel and approbation, and three several times there came from him the command to go up against them; the last command being conjoined with the absolute assurance, "to-morrow I will deliver them into your hands." Judges xx, *passim*.

As further sustaining this declaration, "*that the war power was anciently an attribute of governments,*" it is, perhaps, needless for us to appeal to the multitudinous wars of other realms, and to the patent fact that all history is in the main but a narration of the sanguinary conflicts of the nations on battle fields; their victories and defeats, and consequent rise and fall. We press not upon these wars, nor attempt to found any argument thereupon, because for them we cannot plead express warrant and command of God, and, therefore, from them nothing can positively be determined as to the question of this war power being to them granted by divine authority. We adduce those of the Old Testament, simply as indisputably proving that under its *régime* this power existed in governments divinely

appointed and directed, and thus to prepare our way for a further use and a better understanding of the teachings of the holy evangel of the blessed Christ.

We aver now that this attribute of human civil government divinely appointed, namely, the *war power*, has never by *express unequivocal precept or prohibition been taken away from it*. Christianity, indeed, made no change in the powers of civil government. The powers which it found existent therein were left untouched by prohibitions to their exercise. The primary object of Christianity was not the change and reformation of political institutions, and it did not, therefore, act directly upon them. "The usual system of our Lord himself was to avoid interference in the civil or political institutions of the world."\* "Christianity, soliciting admission into all the nations of the world, abstained as behoved it from interference with the civil institutions of any."† No passage indeed directly and explicitly to this purport of prohibiting the exercise of this power, or taking it away, has ever been adduced from either the Old or the New Testament. Passages have been sometimes wrested from their connection, and forcibly applied to this subject, and made to countenance the idea of a withdrawal of this power, which, when properly examined and interpreted, are found wholly irrelevant to the subject, and can by no fair possibility be made to sustain a declaration against the continued exercise and existence of this attribute of human civil governments.

Many of the passages attempted to be so applied are, as we have seen, precepts intended only for the individual, and the effort is made to transfer their application to the government and nationality upon the plea that *nations have no power to do what may not be done by the individual*. But this is manifestly untrue. There can be no question but that nations may, in perfect accord with Christianity, levy a tribute or tax upon its subjects, as our Saviour himself, by his payment of tribute, abundantly confirms. They may enact laws which are absolutely binding upon those whom they govern, and for the infraction of these laws may exact or inflict penalties, fines, forfeitures, imprisonments, and we aver also death itself. But these things by common consent are admitted to be unlawful,

\* Dymond's Essays, p. 543.

† Id., quoted from Paley, 542.

if not impossible, by the individual. We may hereafter exhibit the grounds upon which a nation may claim to do what cannot be done by the individual, but for the present content ourself with this statement of actual existing fact and practice.

If any one allege, in opposition to the existence and exercise of the "war power," that we are "to love" our "enemies," "to do good to them that hate us and despitefully use us and persecute us," the proper and only necessary answer has already been given, namely: that these precepts are intended only for the individual, and for the regulation of private and personal conduct and relations. If any one, however, insists that they are of national application, we aver that even on this false view of them they are not of the contended-for force. For a parent must love his child. No wickedness or insubordination of the child must be allowed to lessen or do away with that love. Yet the child must not, therefore, be suffered to be without restraint. Chastisement may become not merely a proof of love, but the absolute necessary result thereof. And so, if it be so that a government is to love its enemies, it may be absolutely necessary to use this strong arm in chastisement of the wicked and rebellious, in asserting its right and authority, and for the preventing of other nationalities from having the temptation to violate the benevolent and merciful principles of Christianity by trampling upon and robbing and harassing the unresisting and weak, and by acts of violence and rapine, and finally of successful invasion and conquest, absorbing the entire government and nation.

There is sometimes also quoted in opposition to our view the language of St. James: "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence of your lusts which war among your members?" Clearly, however, this refers not to governments, but may be referred to quarreling and dissensions too often existent among Christian people, the members of the same "household of faith," and also, perhaps, to that inward conflict of which Christian men are cognizant in their own personal experience. Certain it is that the context and the entire connection forbid the supposition of an intention on the part of the apostle to utter any precept, or give an opinion in any way directed to the powers and operations of civil governments.

But it is said that the voice of prophecy declares that wars shall cease; that Christianity, the peaceable kingdom of "the Branch," shall at last so prevail that "the nations shall learn war no more;" that the "lion" of strife and violence shall ultimately "lie down with the lamb" of peace and love; that they "shall not hurt nor destroy in all" the "Holy Mountain" of the Lord. So let it be. To the prayer that this good time may soon come, "let all the people say Amen." O blessed day, speed thy coming! Bring on, O King eternal, this peaceful golden age! But, alas! that day is not yet. Bear witness, Sumter and Manassas, Antietam and Vicksburg, Richmond and Atlanta; ye burning cities and territories devastated, bereft wives and children orphaned; ye slaughtered tens of thousands, and ye heroic myriads in camp or field, with strong arm and valiant hearts waiting for the fray, with the crushing tramp of destiny driving rebellious hosts, and sweeping down upon the fair fields of the haughty Southron! Bear witness, O nation—in thy leniency despised, in thy forbearance accounted weak, in thy reluctance deemed timid; insulted, robbed, hated—as, with thy gathering and marching hosts, thou proclaimest liberty to the bound and oppressed, peace and protection to the obedient and law-abiding, death to armed traitors! The ages are passing, and the day will come; but these respond that it is not yet.

And clearly the period of its coming is dependent upon the passing away of the causes which are provocative of wars, and which seem to make them necessary. When these have ceased, then and not until then can it rationally be expected that wars will cease. When the principles of the Gospel of Christ shall be accepted by every individual, and shall become the universally-obeyed rule of action, then violations of rights will no longer occur, and there will no longer exist the manifestations of inordinate and grasping evil ambition. But there is in all this no valid objection against war now, while confessedly disobedience to the principles of the Gospel is so widely prevalent, and mad ambition "like an untamed tiger wildly rages." It forms no objection to the present use of remedial agents, while human beings are liable to the attacks of disease, to say that there cometh a time when one shall not say to another, "I am sick." And so a time will come when righteousness

will be everywhere prevalent; but this by no means precludes the present necessity of resisting "the devil," and of "fighting the good fight," but rather implies it, since it is thus that this prevalency is to be secured. And so the fact that hereafter the lion and the lamb shall be on terms of intimacy does not necessitate the inference that it is now wrong for the lamb to be afraid of the lion, and to avoid him by every means in his power, but the intimacy shall hereafter take place by reason of a change wrought in the disposition of the lion. And so in the good time predicted wars shall have ceased, not because they are in themselves necessarily sinful, in the present condition of the nations, but because of the change which has taken place in and among men. The application of force, moreover, may be one of the great instrumentalities which Providence may employ for the removal of the causes of war, since by its waste and loss, its miseries and privations, its uncertainties and disappointments, men may be brought to reflection and repentance, and may be speedily convinced of the impolicy and folly, as well as the unrighteousness of all disobedience to the laws of God, and the beneficent and just principles of the Gospel of Christ. The more violently the storm rages, the sooner it is spent; the more swiftly the clouds are driven, in all the more brief time are they dissipated, and all the more quickly does the bright and peaceful sunshine irradiate earth.

In the attempt to prove the position that Christianity has abrogated the "war power," the statement is made that the primitive Christians would not serve as soldiers in the Roman armies. In this statement there is some color of truth. It cannot be doubted that there were many *individuals* in the early ages of the Church who held the view of the incompatibility of warfare with the doctrines of Christianity. But there is an utter failure in the attempt to show that this opinion is sustained by a right interpretation of any Scripture, or by any Scripture at all other than those which we have shown to be in that view misinterpreted and misapplied. It is, moreover, a misrepresentation of the status of the Church upon this question to say that it wholly ignored the claim of the state for military service; and it is taking individual and exceptional cases as the rule, rather than as proofs by their notoriety of the existence of an opposite principle as the one generally

accepted, and to which the general practice conformed. For while it is true that some did refuse to serve in the army, it is also true (as is abundantly proved by Tertullian, notwithstanding his personal leaning to the "non-resistant" doctrine) that Christians took part in all the affairs of the empire, as far as could be done without compromising their religion by the observance of pagan rites and worship, so that, "though of yesterday, they filled" all places, even "the very camps," and "were engaged in navigation and in military service."\* And this testimony of Tertullian is all the more valuable on this point from his well-known leaning to the errors of the "non-resistant" heretic, Montanus. Indeed, arguments drawn from his statements of Christian doctrine must be greatly damaged, if not invalidated by this fact, and especially so as to the point before us, from the further fact that the prevalent practice of the masses of the Church who were called being in the occupation of the soldier, was to continue therein; and his Montanistic non-resistant teachings are based, not upon the practice of the Church, which was clearly against him, but upon erroneous expositions of passages already herein discussed, such as that prohibiting Peter from the vain and unauthorized use of the sword in Christ's defense; upon which he grounds the false assertion that "the Lord had disarmed every soldier in disarming Peter."† And this "fiery African," "the warm opponent of the profession of arms among Christians," may not be depended upon as supporting the notion of the absolute and necessary sinfulness of military service, and by consequence of the invalidity of the right claimed for governments of waging war, since "he did not feel himself authorized altogether to condemn those who continued in their old profession as soldiers, provided it was unattended with anything which caused them to violate their fidelity as Christians."‡

Since, then, there is found no withdrawal of the war power from civil governments, as might be expected, it is found that

\* His words are: "Hesterni sumus et vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castellas, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa. (Apol., c. 37.) Navigamus et nos vobiscum et militamus." (c. 42.)

† Omnem postea militem Dominus in Petro exarmando discinxit. Tert., De Idol., c. xix.

‡ Tert., De Cor. Mil., c. xi. Neander, History Christian Religion and Church, part i, section iii, p. 169. Ed. Philadelphia, 1843.



*incidental allusions thereto in the New Testament imply its continued existence, and, for the subsisting state of things, its approval.*

Thus we are taught that *the vocation of a soldier is not in itself ("per se") sinful*. Hence Christ approves of the centurion, declaring that he "had not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." And as showing that he referred not simply to the specific act of his faith in his healing power, but to his entire religious character, we have the statement added: "For many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven." Matt. viii, 10, 11.\* So, too, there is the case of Cornelius, who, without the most distant intimation of his vocation being evil, was the first of the Gentiles to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.†

\* The contortions and "masterly strategy" of the "non-resistants" in their efforts to break the force of this incident are somewhat amusing. We instance Dymond (Essays, iii, chapter xix, p. 542) only as a specimen. The argument deduced from it, he writes, "is founded not upon approval but upon silence." But it must be noted in reply that it is silence in the *moral teacher, lawgiver, and judge*, who was accustomed to seize upon incidental occurrences to enforce and teach general truths. "Approbation is, indeed, expressed, but it is directed not to his arms but to his faith; and those who will read the narrative will find that no occasion was given for noticing his profession." Now this is wonderful in the face of the fact that the centurion expressly mentions his "having soldiers under him," thus not only presenting the required opportunity, but suggesting the introduction of the topic for condemnation if sinful, and in circumstances which are usually considered eminently favorable for religious reformation. But "he came to Christ not as a military officer, but as a deserving man." Still he did not conceal his being a military officer, but openly avowed it, and it may fairly be queried how one could continue in a sinful occupation and yet in Christ's view be "a deserving man." At least, one would have expected him to say, "Go and sin no more." "But," says Dymond, "how happens it that Christ did not notice the centurion's religion? He surely was an idolater. And is there not as good reason for maintaining that Christ approved idolatry because he did not condemn it?" Certainly not, for elsewhere idolatry is explicitly and emphatically condemned, and had never in any possible way received the divine sanction or approval. No power or right to worship idols had ever been allowed, while the contrary is true of "war and the war power." Moreover this centurion was *not* then "surely an idolater," but a lover of the Jewish nation, for whom he had built a synagogue, and was by the testimony of the Jews "a worthy man:" a term which they would by no means have applied to a heathen and idolatrous officer of the hated Romans.

† It may be noted also as a pregnant fact that one of the messengers sent by Cornelius to call Peter is termed a "devout soldier of them that waited on him continually." Acts x, 8. It may be queried whether this *σπαρτάριον ἐνδεσθῆ* was not a Christian. At least we must believe him to be even now in his military service approved of God.



We are taught also that *continuance in that vocation is not of itself sinful*. This clearly is the doctrine of the incidental case of the soldiers coming to John the Baptist with the inquiry "What should they do?" in order to fit themselves for the coming kingdom of heaven. In the reply there is no condemnation of their profession, but rather a commendation of their continuing therein, since abstaining from unlawful violence, rapine, and false accusations they were "to be content with their wages;" and this contentment with their wages certainly implies continuance in that for which the wages were paid. (Luke iii, 14.)

It is also evident that *being under the protection of a military force is not of itself sinful*. Neither is there anything sinful in *availing one's self of its aid and assistance as against the designs of others*. For clearly Paul, with his own consent, if not at his own request, was placed under a military escort from Jerusalem to Cæsarea, and relied upon the military for his protection against the violence of his persecutors; and when shipwrecked did not scruple to avail himself of the authority of the soldiers in preventing the mariners from abandoning the ship. (Acts xxiii, and xxviii, 31, 32.)

Moreover, Christ himself expressly declares that if "his kingdom were of this world, then would his servants fight, that he should not be delivered to the Jews." John xviii, 36. That is to say, if his kingdom had had in view the same objects, ends, and purposes, which are rightfully had in view by earthly kingdoms, then the usual course would have been pursued, an appeal to arms been made, and his followers been aroused and prepared for battle. He surely did not mean to assert that for the purpose of carrying out the designs of a kingdom of this world, if it had been his intention to establish such a one, he would have done what was in itself sinful, or permitted his servants so to do; and he certainly does not intend to teach that an earthly or human government is necessarily sinful or wicked, or is an institution contrary to God's law and the principles of Christianity, else the master and the "chiefest of the apostles" are at variance, since the latter declares that they are "the ordinance of God," and that "the powers are ordained of God."

These incidental allusions, therefore, are found to imply and assume the existence of this attribute of human governments,

and by no means suggest disapproval, but rather manifest approval.

The ground upon which this power rests is to be found in the simple proposition that GOVERNMENTS ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF A TWOFOLD AUTHORITY. They are in their appropriate functions, and for the accomplishment of their true objects, *representative on the one hand of "God as supreme."* In this respect their position is somewhat analogous to that of a parent, who in a certain sense and to a limited extent is also representative of God, and may, therefore, with respect to his child, exercise an authority and perform acts, the right to do which is not in another, except as that other may have from him a delegated authority. Hence also governments are vested with the right to do acts and exercise authority not proper to the individual man. This fact, that "*governments are representative of God,*" is, perhaps, too much overlooked. It is, indeed, by certain classes of "Humanitarians" and "Liberals," almost wholly kept out of sight; and the ignoring of it has doubtless been the occasion of much error and misconception in the views of men with respect to the rights and powers of the civil state. Christianity certainly teaches this doctrine. Thus its authoritative "word" declares that, "There is no power (*ἐξουσία*) but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. It (namely, *ἐξουσία*, the power) is the minister of God." (Rom. xiii, 1-4.) As "the minister (*διακονος*) of God," as "ordained of God," it (namely, the power, that is, the governmental authority) is representative of God, and in him and his law must be found the exemplar and the directory for the exercise of its functions as a ruling and governing authority, since he is the supreme ruler and lawgiver. It is not of course intended by these passages or these statements to intimate that every civil government must have its organization specifically dictated as was that of Israel, and that every ruler must be personally designated by God as were Saul and David; for such demand and interpretation would have denied the legitimacy of every government on earth at the time when Paul wrote, and to illegitimate governments he could hardly have counseled submission. It is intended simply that every

government having an actual and legitimate existence, has from God, under certain limitations and restrictions, delegated authority to do such acts as may be necessary to the maintenance of its powers and the performance of its appropriate functions as a government; he being, indeed, the chief and primary source whence emanate its rights. According therefore precedency to this source of its authority, and claiming for this department of its representative character the greatest weight and importance, we may not be forgetful that every truly legitimate government is also on the other hand *representative of the people over whom it exercises its sway*. As a consequence of this, it is bound to act in the interest and "for the benefit of the governed." And this consequential fact is not, we apprehend, obscurely hinted at in the statement that "it (the power) is the minister of God *to thee* (that is, the subject) (*εἰς το ἀγαθόν*) for good," (advantage, benefit.) It is not to be understood that a government represents the opinions and desires, the will, of every particular individual that lives under its authority or within its realm; for there may be those who in public as well as private sentiment may differ from it and would desire its overthrow. But every legitimate government must be *representative of the influential and predominating will of the people its constituents*, and must rule by their consent, either tacitly in passivity given, or actively expressed, according to such laws and regulations, and under such limitations and restrictions, as receive in some way a mutual sanction and acceptance on the part of both governed and governing. Thus acting, it is the representative of the people. It may, indeed, be considered but the people in collective mass by their and God's minister acting in accordance with divine law and exemplar, and subordinate to these, in accordance with principles, customs, forms, laws, and regulations which they accept, submit to, or authorize as those by which they will or consent to be governed. It may be possible that under other circumstances the will of the people might be different, and might, indeed, be wholly opposed to the now existent government; and that in some cases the predominant will of the people is simply a choice of submission and support of the state of things then in being in preference to the suffering, danger, and evil which might be the consequence of the effort to throw

off the then ruling authority, or to change the character of the government. This twofold representative character is, as we conceive, necessary to the legitimacy as well as the stability of every government, and this representative character absolutely requires that it should possess the war-making power. Without it, a government could have no power to make its authority respected and feared, and no means for the enforcing of its laws and the punishing of offenders, the disobedient, and the rebellious, and it could in no complete sense be a representative of God. Without power to do for its people what each individual in the absence of all government has a right to do for himself, namely, protect its subjects, individually and collectively, and secure to them their persons and possessions, and the enjoyment of their rights, privileges, and immunities, it could in no proper sort be the representative of the people; and yet we know that the performance of these functions is largely dependent upon the certainty which men have that the government "beareth not the sword in vain;" that underlying whatsoever of moral influence it may have, there is the power and right, as well as the will, to use the sword in sustaining its authority and vindicating its laws, and securing the integrity of its domain. Indeed, without this power in the present state of moral and intellectual culture of the human race, no government could long exist. We say not what may be the case hereafter under a different and higher culture or status, and it matters not for our present purpose; for as we have seen, what may be hereafter under a wholly different moral and mental status cannot be used as an argument against what may be needful in the present existent circumstances, no more than the state of heavenly rest and peace, yet future to the believer, can be an argument to prove that he need not now in his militant pilgrimage "watch, and fight, and pray." Let a nation lay aside this right; let it be understood that in no case, under no possible provocation, would it appeal to the military arm and venture the wager of either offensive or defensive battle, and its nationality must speedily disappear. It could not long be safe as against its own people or subjects. It might, perhaps, answer where every subject was a member of some religious organization, whose authority he recognized under the influence of religious and moral principle, and whose authority

was identical or closely connected with the civil state, as in the partial instance of Pennsylvania; but if any one chose to throw from him the authority and sanctions of religion, and betake himself to violence under the strong temptations which non-resistance would offer, it does not appear how such a case could well be met. Hence a change in the character of its citizens did at length necessitate a change in the "peace platform" of Pennsylvania. Such a government would, indeed, be at the mercy of a bold, reckless, and lawless few. Any small and otherwise contemptible number could perpetually, and with comparative impunity, without damage to themselves, disturb, embroil, rob, and pillage an entire nation. Resistance to authority must in the nature of things become common. Government officers would become objects of mockery and contempt. It would be in such a country as in Canaan when there was "no king in Israel." Predatory, roving bands, anarchy, dismay, and confusion, must speedily bear destructive sway. Nor could it be safe as against foreign nations. It is possible that a nation of savages—where the desire for conquest and rule, ambition, is not so much the impelling or motive power as is that of revenge for injury and the desire for plunder—might abstain from warfare with a people situated as were the colonists under Penn, where they received pay for everything which they transferred to the colonists, and were not resisted in any demands which they made upon them; and such a people might, perhaps, for a time have exercised over them a civil government, at least while protected, by the military power of the nation of which they formed a part, from the aggression of nations existent and acting under the influence of our civilization; but the maintaining of this subordinate nationality must be attributed rather to their identification with a supreme government which had given incontestible proofs of its willingness to fight, and emphatic demonstrations of its power to defend its subjects from all outside or foreign aggressors. So long as there is ambition among men, so long as the "lust of power" exists, so long as selfishness and passion may subordinate right and moral principle, in brief, so long as sin rules and reigns, so long will nations require this "war power," and find occasions for its rightful exercise.

Thus, then, a government recognizing Christianity as the

religion of the land, and "Holy Scripture" as the real and ultimate rule of its proceedings, may rightfully wage a warfare for just cause. True, reason as well as Christianity demand that nations as well as individuals should "live peaceably with all men, as much as lieth in them," "*if it be possible*," since peace is the normal and proper condition of man, and wars should be a means to that end; but reason surely does not require that to secure peace and avoid war, every principle of right and justice shall be held in abeyance, or be abandoned, or be trampled under foot of the wicked and lawless; and that every species of indignity should be endured. Christianity, by her own express hypothesis "if it be possible," more than intimates her conviction that after all our effort, peace with "all men" cannot be maintained, and by her own express limitation, "as much as lieth in you" (*τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν*) may be supposed to suggest the employment of whatsoever means may lie within reach, not for purposes of vengeance—that she expressly forbids—but to secure peace and quietness, attaining thereto by moral dissuasives and influence such as it possesses, if thus it may be attained; but if not, by the use of such other means as may "lie in them," as may belong unto them. And it "lieth not" in any nation to be an unresisting and unassisting spectator of the invasion of the rights and the compulsory subjugation of those who rely upon it for protection and have committed themselves and their interests to its care. Compulsory process and military force, "as much as lieth in her," all she may possess, may be the only means whereby a stable peace can be obtained. Thus when causeless, unjust, persistent, and otherwise invincible rebellion shall occur; a rebellion in the interest of barbarism, servitude, degradation, and sin, for the support and maintenance of the mother of harlots and abominations; shall it be admitted that Christianity, the religion of a true civilization, the assertor of human equality, the elevator, the antagonist of sin, the unyielding foe to whatsoever is abominable or maketh a lie, gives no power for its suppression, no authority to "crush it out," withholds its consent to the use of means which God and man place at its disposal applicable for this purpose, and trammels or renders futile thus the effort to defeat the nefarious designs of wicked or mistaken men? And shall we suppose that when nothing



else will answer, where rebel hands have already begun the combat and struck the blow; where the power at the disposal of the government is in all human judgment sufficient, and the resources ample for the emergency and to compel the restoration of the peace which rebellion has disturbed, that Christian principle will not allow this power and these resources to be employed? This would be for God in his providence to put into our hands means to no purpose. This would be emphatically "to bear the sword in vain." We may not teach thus. The necessities of our national existence to-day forbid such teaching. Patriotism demands that the sanctions of our holy religion shall be given to its combat for humanity, freedom, unity, and stable peace; and the strong and vigorous arms of its soldiery must not be palsied, their earnest hearts must not be chilled with doubts as to the religiousness of their vocation. Let us gratefully record, that the multitudes of heroic slain, whose blood flowed so freely on every battle-field of our present struggle, by their gallant uprising and their noble daring in grasping the weapons of the carnal warfare at their country's call, were not obeying commands which the nation might not rightfully issue by authority of the religion of our hope and joy. To these heroic dead—PEACE! If in the good "fight of faith," they have acquitted themselves with as much of manliness, if in other respects they have "warred as good a warfare," then for the wearing and wielding of the carnal weapon in this contest, and their standing up for the mastery on these fields reddening with the blood of humanity's martyrs, under the call of their sorrowing country, the voice of "the man of sorrows" will utter no word of condemnation. Even from fields of gore and of carnage the peans of another triumph shall ascend, and from fields of disaster there shall go up the victorious warrior. Accessions shall be received from among earth's soldiers slain to the hosts of the robed and glorified who people Heaven's bloodless homes, and shout glad jubilees in the streets of the city of the King Invisible. To the marshaled hosts living, success! For the rebellious, even for "the children of Benjamin our brother," in the "sin which they have sinned," pleadings, supplications to THEE MOST HIGH, that their hearts "may be turned as the streams of the south," to repentance of their iniquity, to submission to their true rulers,



to obedience and unity under legitimate authority, lest they be utterly destroyed. For the earth, "let" it "be filled with the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters fill the great deep." Then shall "the nations learn war no more."

"Then shall PEACE wreath her chain  
Round us forever."

Happy day! Jesus, master, onward speed its coming glory!

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## ART. II.—GERMAN MATERIALISM—THE NATURALISTIC SCHOOL.

[FROM THE FRENCH OF THE REVUE DES DEUX MONDES—PART SECOND.]

### III.

EVERY philosophic mind, in reading the above exposition of the system of Dr. Büchner, has doubtless noticed a strange gap: the author, who explains everything by matter, has entirely forgotten to tell us what matter is, and what he understands by the word. That, however, is not a question of slight importance, and it has for centuries busied men who were neither fools nor children. Is it not known that into the idea of what we call matter and body two very different elements enter: one which comes from our sensations, and is nothing but the totality of the diverse modifications of our organs; the other comes from without, and is really distinct and independent of our impressions? Now when it is said that matter is the original of things, this is evidently spoken of matter as it is in itself, and not as it appears to us; for if an analysis should prove that matter is composed only of our sensations, and includes nothing external, matter itself would thereby disappear, being but a modification of our minds, and materialism would change into idealism. It is therefore fully evident that the first obligation of a materialistic system is to distinguish what comes from ourselves from what comes from without in the notion of body or matter; but this distinction is difficult, as the history of science shows. Mr. Büchner has wholly neglected it; his system is defective, therefore, in its basis.

Let us try to do what he has not done; let us show by analy-

sis how obscure and imperfect is the notion of matter ; how far from self-sufficient it is ; how it vanishes and disperses on examination. "It is an intangible something," says Fenelon, "which melts in my hands when I press it."

We must first ask what a body is, vulgarly understood. A body is a solid, colored, resisting, extended, mobile, odorous, warm or cold mass. In a word, it is an object which strikes my senses, and I am so habituated to living among such objects, to using, enjoying, hoping for, and fearing them, that they seem to me the most real things in the world. I laugh at those who bring them in question, and, if I wish to imagine my own mind, I give it the form of a body. What is there solid and faithful in this kind of representation of matter? Philosophy to answer this question begins by distinguishing the apparent from the real. This distinction the most positive and exact sciences have made familiar to us. In astronomy everything depends upon the distinction of real from apparent movements. If we consult appearances the sun seems to move from east to west, drawing with him the planets. In reality the earth moves and has two motions, of which we feel neither ; the one a rotation on its axis, the other a revolution about the sun. We must likewise distinguish in the stars apparent from real size, apparent from real position. To get the true height of a star in space, astronomers are obliged to allow for the deviation of luminous rays through the atmosphere, that is, for refraction. Optics in general teach us not to confound visible appearances with the true form, true size, true position, true movement of objects.

We are authorized by all these facts, and by many others well known, to ask ourselves whether, in the notion that we form of bodies, there is not a part, which must be attributed to the observer himself, which comes from and disappears with him. Among the qualities that we attribute to matter there are two especially which appear to us to animate nature, and wanting which she would seem to us delivered to death : light and sound. Well, let us ask physicists what is sound and what is light. Here is their response : Sound and light are vibrations, that is, movements. Let us pause a moment upon this fine theory of physics, which has shed so much light upon the question of external perception.

If we strike a cord drawn taut, we impart to it a vibratory go-and-come movement, which our senses can seize; the touch feels it shiver under the thumb; the sight, in place of a very distinct line, perceives a cord swollen toward the middle and much less luminous, whose swelling goes on decreasing till it returns to a state of rest. This kind of movement is what we call a vibration, and it is from this simple elementary fact that the whole vibratory theory has sprung, so important in modern physics, and whose vocation is to so grand a future. Now, while the vibration lasts, while the finger feels the cord shiver, we hear a sound. The sound begins and ends with the vibration. Furthermore, the most exact experiments and the most precise calculations establish a rigorous relation between the pitch of the sounds produced and the number of vibrations, a number which is in constant relation with the length, tension, etc., of the cords. It is, therefore, proper to affirm, that the sole cause of the sound, or sonorous sensation, is a movement. This movement is communicated by the air, which is itself a vibratory body, to the ear, a mechanical instrument arranged to collect and transmit aerial vibrations to the acoustic nerve. It is there, there only, that the mechanical sound ceases and is replaced by a sensational sound. There motion is transformed into sensation, an unexplained and perhaps absolutely inexplicable phenomenon.

What is certain is, that until the moment when the acoustic nerve comes into play, there is absolutely nothing without ourselves but a vibratory motion, such that if we suppose for a moment the auditor to disappear, the nerve capable of perceiving sound paralyzed or destroyed, no animal on the earth or in space able to hear, then there will be absolutely nothing without us which resembles, in any respect whatever, what we call a sound.

Much time, many experiments, and many reasonings were required to apply to light this theory of vibrations. Sonorous vibrations may be perceived by the senses, luminous vibrations cannot; the elastic medium which transmits sounds may be perceived by the senses, it is the air; the elastic medium which is thought to transmit light is apparent to no sense, it is the ether. It follows that, as to sound, the vibratory theory is a result of experiment, it is merely a summary of the facts; as

to light, on the contrary, the vibratory theory is a hypothesis conceived by the mind, which may be more or less verified by experiment: thence the tardiness with which the theory was introduced and the difficulties it has encountered. However, to-day, it is definitively allowed by physicists, and here also they have been bold to say: Considered apart from ourselves, apart from the sensitive subject, apart from the seeing eye, light is only motion. The luminous sensation is a phenomenon proper to the living eye, which can take place only in and by it.

But here is something much more extraordinary, which proves in a decisive manner to what a degree our sensations are subjective and dependent upon our organs, and how greatly our ideas of matter as the senses present it to us should be rectified by the mind, namely, the identity nearly admitted to-day by all physicists between light and heat. What is more different, from the sensation point of view, than these two orders of phenomena? They seem even very often separate. I can be warm in darkness, for instance in mines, and cold amid flashing light. Despite these superficial and apparent contradictions, the experiments of Melloni have so multiplied the analogies between the two agents that science hardly hesitates in affirming their identity. Heat, like light, moves in straight lines and with the same speed; it is reflected like light; like light it is refracted and by the same laws; it is transmitted through bodies, like light itself; finally, it is known that by combining two lights we may produce darkness. Well, by combining two sources of heat we may produce cold: this a remarkable experiment of Mr. Foucault's has proved. To conclude with a remarkable and recent treatise of physics: "Never, when we address ourselves to a simple ray, do we find a variation of light without a corresponding variation of heat. Such an agreement in results gives ground for the belief that heat and light are perchance only different manifestations of one and the same radiation; the difference would result only from the kind of modification which the object struck may undergo. Upon the sight, this radiation would give the impression of light; upon the touch, the impression would be wholly different."

Outside ourselves, outside the sensitive subject, there are not

these two things, light and heat, but only one, which is diversified in our organs of sensation. Heat is light perceived by the tactile nerves, and light is heat perceived by the optic nerve. Finally, as we have seen that light is merely a motion, so heat is a mere motion. Thus, to sum up the whole theory, the sensitive or living subject, in a word, the animal, being abstracted, there is in nature neither heat nor cold, light nor darkness, noise nor silence; there are only varied motions, whose laws and conditions are determined by mechanics.

Physiology comes to the support of physics in demonstrating the subjectivity of our sensations. This is the fundamental law of our sensations according to Müller, the great German physiologist: "The same cause may produce different sensations in different species of nerves; the most different causes may produce the same sensation in every category of nerves. Thus electricity brought into contact with each of our senses produces in each of them special sensations: in the eye luminous phenomena, in the ear sounds, in the mouth savors, in the tactile nerves pricklings. Narcotics likewise produce internal phenomena of hearing and vision, buzzing in the ears, scintillation in the eyes, stinging in the nerves of touch. Reciprocally the luminous sensation is produced in the eye by ethereal vibrations, by mechanical action, by a shock, a blow, electricity, and by chemical operations. It is the same with the other senses." Müller concludes from these facts that the senses have each their distinct, determinate energies, which are, as it were, vital qualities, and he approves that beautiful theory of Aristotle, an anticipation of all that we have just said, to wit, that "Sensation is the common act of the object and subject of sensation."

I am far from affirming that there is nothing external and, as it is called, objective in our perceptions, and that everything is reducible to diverse states of the sensitive subject. Nothing is further from my belief than such a supposition. Excellent reasons may doubtless be given to establish the reality of the outward world, and the best is that we cannot help admitting it. There is then no room for doubting the reality of external things, and such a doubt will ever be frivolous; but what is not frivolous is the difficulty we experience in determining

what is external and what is not, a difficulty upon which the whole materialistic hypothesis is suspended.

Not to prolong this debate too far, I suppose it has been demonstrated by analysis and argument, that what is external in matter is all that we conceive can exist in the absence of the sensitive subject, for instance, extension, motion, impenetrability. Here the difficulties cease to be psychologic; they become metaphysical. I will mark but two of the highest importance: infinite divisibility and the coexistence of force and extension. Mr. Büchner, abandoning on this point the materialistic tradition, renounces the atomic hypothesis and admits the infinite divisibility of matter, but thereby, it seems to me, lets go whatever is positive and clear in the conception of matter. Through the infinite divisibility of matter, it vanishes and disperses, without our being able for a moment to seize and retain its image. Imagine a compound; for instance, a heap of sand: what is there real in this object? Plainly the grains of sand of which it is composed, for the compound itself is something only to the mind: it is only the sum of the parts; if there were no parts it would not exist. We may therefore say in strictness that a compound has no reality save that which it owes to its integral particles: it is a form which is nothing without the matter to which it applies. The sand heap having no reality, save that it owes to the sand grains which compose it, let us now suppose the grain of sand itself to be a compound: this sand grain, like the heap itself, will only have a provisional and relative reality, subordinated to the reality of its constituent particles. Suppose the same thing of the same parts: they themselves will not yet be the reality, and pushing this research to infinity, since there are no last terms, we shall never learn what constitutes the reality of matter. We will therefore say of matter in general, what we say of each particular compound, that it is only a provisional and relative thing, subordinated to some absolute condition to us unknown.

The same reasoning will apply to force as to matter, the two things being inseparable, according to Messrs. Moleschott and Büchner. If matter is infinitely divisible, equally so is force; but we shall say, as before, that a compound force has no reality other than that of its component forces. The force of a two-horse team is only the sum of the two forces inherent in those



horses. In reality, what exists is not the resultant which the mathematician considers, but two distinct, associated forces. If this is so, the general force spread through a heap of matter must be reduced to the elementary forces inherent in the particles of the whole; but if these particles are themselves compounds, the forces belonging to them are no less so, and consequently are not as yet the forces we seek. Finally, if all force is infinitely divisible, we shall never find the last force, that atom of force without which compound force is nothing real. Thus force vanishes like matter.

Strive now to conceive of this divisible infinite (matter and force) as an absolute, self-subsisting; you will not succeed. What is there, what can there be absolute in a compound? Obviously the elements, for no one will say, for example, that this tree, this stone, possesses absolute existence. These things are only accidental forms produced by the encounter of elements. The whole itself, the *cosmos*, is but the form of forms, the sum of all anterior forms. The absolute necessity of matter can then only reside in the elements of matter, and there materialists have always placed it. But if there are no elements, where then resides absolute necessity? And how could matter be conceived as self-existent?

Thus the infinite divisibility of matter, if it was allowed as true, would bring the German school to admit some principles different from matter, which, giving consistency to this absolute fluidity, should permit it to exist. In a word, a more profound study would bring back the new school from materialism to idealism.

This is not all. Messrs. Moleschott and Büchner have set forth, as a self-evident principle, the necessary coexistence of matter and force; but if from bodies you abstract force, from what now do motion and impenetrability arise, what remains to constitute matter? Nothing but extension. Matter is then an extended thing endowed with force. This extended thing moves, that is, changes its place in space: it is then distinct from the space which contains it. Now exactly here materialism has ever been greatly embarrassed, for how shall we distinguish this extended particle from the corresponding particle of space which it fills? Imagination, assuming here the place of the understanding, represents to us a kind of dustlike grains



floating in the air. So the Epicurean atoms floated in the void. But begin by stripping this dustlike grain of all that sight and the other senses make known concerning it, reduce it to extension and force, do not forget that force is a property of matter and consequently of extension, and say to yourself that this atom, considered in itself, is nothing but a portion of extension. It has, then, no mark by which it can be distinguished from the corresponding portion of space which it is thought to inhabit. Do not say that it is distinguished by the force which animates it, for then it would be force which would constitute matter; matter would be lost in force, which is the opposite of your system and the giving up of the materialistic principle. If, on the contrary, you admit a matter essentially extended, you will confound it, like Descartes, with space, and then try to conceive motion, figure, diversity, in this space infinite, homogeneous, and full.

But such a discussion is of too abstract and delicate a nature to be long continued. I have said enough to prove that the new German materialism has shown from the start ignorance enough of discussion in setting up as a principle the coexistence of force and matter, without giving any definition of either, and without showing what bonds unite them. The demonstrated insufficiency of the principle appears in all the consequences which can be drawn from it. Two examples will suffice for proof: they are the ideas of materialists upon the principle of life, and the principle of thought.

#### IV.

One of the most obscure problems of human science, before which a circumspect philosophy will ever prefer maintaining silence to proposing hypotheses so difficult to verify, is the problem of the origin of life upon the terrestrial globe. If there is a demonstrated truth in geology, it is that life has not always existed in the world, and that it has appeared here on a given day, doubtless under its most elementary form, for everything inclines us to believe that nature in her development follows the law of gradation and progress; but at length, on a given day, life appeared. How? Whence came it? By what miracle did inert matter become living and animated?

That, I repeat, is a great mystery, and every sage will prefer silence to affirmation of he knows not what.

To Mr. Büchner there is no difficulty. Life is a certain combination of matter, which became possible the day when it first encountered favorable circumstances. If he limited himself to these terms it would be hard to refute him, for who can know what is possible and what is not. But the German author goes much further. According to him, nature has never seen the appearance of a new force. All that was produced in the past must have been produced by forces similar to those which, to-day, we perceive. Thereby he pledges himself to maintain that to-day even, we witness the miracle of the origin of life, that matter is fitted to spontaneously produce living organisms. Bringing the question upon this ground, he furnishes a solid basis for discussion, for we can then ask what science teaches us about the actual origin of living beings; in a word, what is to-day the position of science upon the old and celebrated question of spontaneous generation.

By spontaneous generation, or *heterogeny*, is meant the formation of certain living beings, without preexisting germs, by the sole play of the physical and chemical forces of matter. From the highest antiquity, people have believed in spontaneous generation. "We see" (says Lucretius) "worms all alive start from fetid clay, when the earth, softened by rain, has gained a sufficient degree of putrefaction. The elements set in motion, and brought together in new conditions, give birth to animals." This belief lasted even to the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Von Helmont describes the method of producing mice, frogs, and eels. A decisive experiment of Redi gave a deadly blow to all these ridiculous superstitions. He showed that the worms which come from meat are the larvæ of flies' eggs, that, by enveloping the meat with a light varnish, the birth of these larva may be prevented; still later, the eggs were detected and the mystery was explained. However, the discovery of the microscope opened a new path to the partisans of spontaneous generation. The microscopic animals which appear in infusions of animal and vegetable matter seemed to be produced apart from sexual conditions and without pre-existing germs. The fine experiments of Needham seemed to decide in favor of this opinion; those of Spallanzani made it give

way, without overcoming it decisively. In the beginning of the present century, the capital experiment of Schwann gave the finishing stroke to the question, against spontaneous generation. Science seemed to have abandoned this question, when Mr. Pouchet brought it into fashion again, by experiments which made a stir, and which, to his mind, were decisive for generation without germs. The antivitalists were still rejoicing, when another *savan*, one of our most eminent chemists, Mr. Pasteur, took up the question, and carried it nearly as far as we can to-day go: by the most delicate, ingenious, and solid experiments, he has refuted all the arguments of the heterogenists, and I believe we can say that, in this great debate, the Academy of Sciences and the great majority of *savans* think him right.

It would be difficult here to enter into the details of the experimental discussions that have taken place. Let us be content to give a general and philosophical idea of the question. It is now a remarkable fact, a presumption unfavorable to spontaneous generation, that the partisans of this theory have been gradually crowded back into the domain of the infinitely small, into the sphere of the invisible, so to say, where experiments are so difficult and the eye is so easily deceived. If such a mode of generation were possible, we do not see why it should not take place in other departments of animal life, and why it should be precisely reduced to the microscopic world.

Mr. Büchner says, to be sure, that those are the most imperfect organisms, and that consequently it is thought that they may be produced by the simplest and most elementary mode of generation; but it is still to be demanded whether the perfection of organisms bears a direct ratio to their dimensions, and whether the smallest are always the most imperfect. Now this is certainly not true. If we admit, with Mr. Milne Edwards, that the perfection of the animal is in proportion to what he calls the *division of labor*, that is, the division of organs and functions, it is easy to see that this division is wholly independent of the stature of the animal. Thus insects, for example, though generally very small, are very superior as animals to molluscs, in the number and division of functions, and yet greatly their inferiors in dimensions. Man, the most perfect of animals, is not the largest. We cannot, therefore,

argue from minuteness to imperfection, and consequently the pretended imperfection of infusoria does not explain why spontaneous generation should take place only in the world of the infinitely small. I add that the organization of the infusoria is not at all, as we have been tempted to believe, a simple organization: is on the contrary very complex, and the illustrious micrographist, Ehrenberg, has proved that these little, almost invisible animals are as perfect and as richly organized as many animals of far higher rank. Mr. Büchner tells us that the rotifer, which is only the twentieth of a line in length, has a mouth, teeth, stomach, intestinal glands, vessels and nerves.

The following reasoning is invoked in behalf of spontaneous generation: "If there was," say they, "only one mode of generation, generation by sex, we could understand the disposition to reject production in certain species as a pure illusion contrary to general law; but experience tells us that there are very diversified modes of generation; why then should not one of these modes, in the lowest rank of animal life, be *heterogeny*?" The great works of modern science upon the generation of the inferior animals have answered this objection; and the opinion which seems to prevail to-day in the natural sciences, the arguments, the researches upon which it rests, have been more than once set forth in this Review by Mr. Quatrefages. He it is who summed up in a few lines of rigorous distinctness the data acquired on this point by modern science. "Mediately or immediately," said he, "every animal goes back to a father and a mother, (male and female apparatus.) And what we are now saying applies also to vegetables. . . . A father and a mother, that is, a male and a female, such is the origin of every living thing. The existence of the sexes, of which inorganic nature offers not a trace, appears as the distinctive mark of organized matter, as one of those primordial laws whose ground we should not seek to know."

This reinstatement of the sexual element in the generation of animals is evidently a fatal blow to spontaneous generation. This theory has suffered other checks not less curious. For a long time it could cite in its favor a fact truly strange and inexplicable in appearance; this was the existence of intestinal worms. "To-day," said J. Müller, "it is by the consideration of intestinal worms that it is most permissible to maintain the

hypothesis of the conversion of an unorganized animal matter into living animals." The existence of these worms, which are born in the most secret tissues, in the interior of the muscles, in the interior of the brain, seemed a real mystery; ah well! that is to-day explained, and the origin of these strange beings is brought back to the ordinary laws of reproduction, only it presents one of the most strange and marvelous cases of the theory of metamorphosis. This is decidedly established by the fine labors of Mr. Van Beneden. Who would have suspected, before this learned man, that a parasite worm was destined to pass a part of his life in one animal, and another part in another? that it was to live at the fetal stage in a herbivorous animal, and at the adult stage in a carnivorous animal? This, however, is what happens. These animals, after a sort, change their *hotels*. Thus the hare lodges and nourishes a parasite worm which will become adult only in the dog. The sheep nourishes the *cœnure*, which in the wolf becomes a tape worm. Every parasite worm passes three stages: the first is the egg laid in the intestine of the carnivorous animal and rejected by it; the second, that of the embryo: the egg is swallowed by the herbivorous animal with the herb it browses, and it hatches in its stomach; the third is that of the adult. This takes place in the body of the carnivorous animal which feeds on herbivorous ones. The whole mystery is explained without spontaneous generation. Moreover, the discovery of sex and eggs in entozoa plainly cuts the question short.

After having shown the state of the debate upon spontaneous generation, it would suffice to win the reader's suffrage to set forth with some detail the beautiful and luminous experiments of Mr. Pasteur on this difficult subject; but how can we sum up experiments whose art lies wholly in extreme precision of detail, and a sagacity which admits no cause for error? Let us be content with indicating three main points of the works of Mr. Pasteur. He has shown, first, that the air contains in suspension organized corpuscles wholly similar to germs, and he succeeded in collecting them in abundance by a method peculiar to himself; he has proved that the number of these corpuscles diminishes as we rise in the air, by virtue of the law of gravity which draws them toward the earth, and in fact, exposing divers liquids to the open air, at different heights in the atmos-

phere, he obtained just so many less of the so-called spontaneous generations as he ascended higher: facts perfectly conformable to the theory of the dissemination of germs. The second series of his experiments consisted in preventing spontaneous generation by removing every exterior germ and burning by heat the germs that may exist in a fermentable liquid: this second series of experiments is the least original thing in the works of Mr. Pasteur; it is at bottom the celebrated experiment of Schwann under more perfect conditions for its execution. Finally, the third and most interesting series of experiments consists in obtaining, at will, the production of *infusoria*, and reintroducing the germs, that is, the organized corpuscles already collected by the first method.

However, in experimental sciences, no demonstration ever has an absolute value, and the authority of a conclusion can only be relative to the number of facts observed. Further, we need not say that spontaneous generation is impossible; we need but to say that, in the present state of science, there exists no clear case of spontaneous generation; we may say that whenever we have taken the necessary precautions, such facts have not been forthcoming; we may say that all the arguments used to favor this theory have succumbed before experiments. Limited as are these affirmations, they are nevertheless very important, for they condemn those who deny them to defend a gratuitous hypothesis. Theory is doubtless permissible in the speculative sciences, where it is impossible to put your finger upon facts themselves; but hypothesis ought never to be gratuitous and repose upon a desire and a need of our mind. Now materialism, in affirming spontaneous generation for the sole reason that it has need of it to stay up its system, forms a wholly gratuitous hypothesis, for which the facts, as they are, do not furnish proof.

To escape the foregoing difficulties, Mr. Büchner proposes a conjecture: "We might suppose that germs of every living thing, *endowed with the idea of space*, have existed from all eternity." But who will fail to see in this supposition a manifest contradiction of the general system of the author? How were these germs formed? By what force were the elements of matter united to form a germ, and a germ that potentially contains a species? That is a completely idealist point of view.



Remark that we cannot conceive two kinds of matter, of which one should be vital the other inert. The theory of Buffon on a kind of matter suited for organized being has been exploded by the discoveries of organic chemistry. The matter which enters into the human body is the same as that of minerals and brute bodies. It is not, therefore, by its elements that the human is distinguished from the brute body, it is by its form. Now this form, if you do not allow spontaneous generation, supposes a special force distinct from matter. Moreover the notion of a species inherent in a germ, is a principle which exceeds all the data of materialism. The new system is, therefore, convicted of impotence in its propositions upon the origin of life. Is it happier when it essays to explain thought?

#### V.

At first glance, the theory which reduces thought to a mere function of the brain, seems to present itself with certain advantages, and to be but a rigorous application of the scientific method; for, see upon what it rests. Wherever we observe a brain, it is said we encounter a thinking, or at least, in some degree, intelligent being; wherever the brain is wanting, intelligence and thought are likewise wanting; finally, intelligence and the brain increase and decrease in the same proportion; what affects one, affects the other at the same time. Age, disease, and sex have quite a similar effect upon the brain and upon intelligence. Now, according to the Baconian method, when a circumstance produces an effect by its presence which is suppressed by its absence or modified by its changes, it may be considered as the true cause of that effect. The brain unites these three conditions in its relations with thought: it is then the cause of thought.

But I should first remark that science has still much to do before it will have rigidly demonstrated the three propositions I have just mentioned. Without speaking of the two first, which are not absolutely indisputable, it is the last particularly whose proof is desirable. Before establishing that changes in thought are proportioned to changes in the brain, we should know upon exactly what circumstance in the brain the fact of thought depends. This is yet unknown, for some cite size, others weight, others the convolutions, others the chemical composi-

tion, other some a certain invisible dynamic action, which it is always facile to suppose. Now, according to the most eminent physiologists, the physiology of the brain is still in its infancy, and the relations of the brain and thought are profoundly unknown. For example, the condition of the brain in lunacy is one of the most redoubtable stones of stumbling in pathological anatomy. Some find something, and others find nothing, absolutely nothing, altered. According to Mr. Leuret, one of the most eminent practitioners in insanity, we find a change in the brain of the insane only when madness is connected with some other malady, such as general paralysis. Further, the changes found are so different from one another, are so seldom constant and regular, that there is no reason to consider them as the true causes. We may just as well deem them effects as causes, since insanity may at length bring on these changes. In this case they would be, to speak like the physicians, merely consecutive and not essential. A final difficulty is drawn from the difference between man and animals. Is this difference sufficiently explained by the difference in the brain? It seems not, since certain naturalists insist on the identity of the brain of man with the brain of the monkey to prove that man may have been a monkey, or, at least, may have sprung from a common stock with the monkey. Here materialists are sufficiently embarrassed, for now they are interested to prove that man differs from the animal, and now that he does not differ. Would they show that man is not a separate class in nature, and that, at the origin, he might be confounded with the inferior classes? they present the analogies. Would they show the indisputable difference which exists between the actual man and the actual monkey? they insist on the differences. But the analogies, the differences, over which the dispute rages, are they sufficiently great to explain the abyss that separates the two classes? Intermediates are invoked; on the one hand negroes, on the other gorillas, very popular since the travels of Mr. Du Chaillu. Now, I ask, would the gorillas be capable of founding the republic of Hayti or of Liberia? Could they ever replace the negro in the culture of the sugar-cane? Propose this to the American planters, they would, indeed, be forced to confess that the negroes are not wholly animals. The more analogy there is between the constitution of their

brain and that of the monkey, the more it is demonstrated that difference in intelligence depends upon some condition which the senses do not show us.

I add that if these proportions were demonstrated, materialism would gain nothing, for it is enough to admit that the brain is the condition of thought without being its cause, to explain the facts named, by one hypothesis as by the other. Indeed suppose, for an instant, that human thought is of such a nature that it cannot exist without sensations, without images, without signs, (it is not proved that there can be no thought save this;) suppose, I say, that such is the condition of human thought; do we not understand that then a nervous system would be needed to render sensation possible, and a nervous center to render possible the concentration of sensations, the formation of images and signs? The brain would be, in this theory, the organ of imagination and language, without which there would be no thought for the human soul. It would result that, as a blind man wants one source of impressions, and consequently one source of ideas, so the mind that should want a certain part of the brain, or that should be attained in the cerebral conditions necessary to the formation of images and signs, would become incapable of thinking, since pure thought without connection with what comes through sensation seems impossible in the actual conditions of our finite being. We perceive that the relations of the brain to thought are quite as conceivable under the spiritualistic theory as under the materialistic, and even that difficulties which the latter presents would vanish before the former. For instance, what would become of the difference between man and brutes? It would have its cause no longer in the difference of brains, but in the difference of the internal force, the thinking force, which in the animal can combine only a small number of images, and which cannot transform natural into artificial signs. The physical conditions of thought would be identical in both cases; the entirely non-material conditions of the thinking power alone would be modified. It would be the same in cases of lunacy which might have as causes, now organic changes which would affect the organ of imagination and of signs, now changes wholly moral which would unfit the soul to govern its sensations, to combine images and signs,

which would make it pass from the active to the passive condition. If we admit with certain physiologists a cerebral dynamics, and if we explain insanity or imbecility by the variations of intensity in the cerebral forces, why may I not admit an intellectual and moral dynamics resident in an elementary and indivisible substance, which is equally susceptible of certain variations of intensity, of which the cause is now within now without itself? It was then only by taking a wholly superficial point of view, and by not sufficiently examining all the aspects of the question, that materialism believed itself authorized, from the fact that the brain is indispensable to the production of thought, to conclude that the brain is itself the thinking subject.

But it is not enough to show that the facts cited by materialists are explained also, and perhaps better, by the contrary hypothesis, for it would only result that the mind ought to remain indifferent and in suspense between the two theories. There is something further: there are certain decisive facts, we think, certain eminent characteristics of thought, which seem absolutely irreconcilable with materialism. These facts are well known. Whoever has studied this subject a little, divines that we are thinking of personal identity and the unity of thought. I shall insist principally upon personal identity, striving to push its consequences somewhat further than is usually done.

We do not define personal identity, but we feel it. Each one of us knows that he continues to be himself at every moment of the duration which composes his being, and this is what we call identity. It manifests itself very clearly in three principal facts, thought, memory, and responsibility. The simplest fact of thought supposes that he who thinks abides the same at two different moments. All thought is successive; if this is questioned in judgment it will not be questioned in reasoning; if it is questioned in the simplest form of reasoning it will not be questioned in demonstration, which consists of a series of reasonings. We must admit that it is the same mind which continues through all the moments of a demonstration. Conceive three persons of whom one thinks a major, another a minor, the third a conclusion; will you have a common thought, a common demonstration? No, the three elements must unite

in one and the same mind. Memory brings us to the same conclusion. I remember only of myself, M. Royer Collard very justly said: exterior things and other persons enter into my memory only through having passed into my cognitive powers, and it is this cognition that I remember, not the thing itself. I could not, then, remember what another than I did, said, or thought. Memory supposes a continued bond between the *I* of the past and the *I* of the present. Finally no one is responsible save for himself; if one is so for others it is only as he can act upon or by them. How could I answer for what another did before I was born? Thus thought, memory, responsibility are startling witnesses to our identity. That is one of the capital facts which characterize our mind. There is likewise in the human body a capital and characteristic fact, but it is the opposite of the preceding; this is what has been called the vital vortex, or the perpetual exchange of matter which goes on between living animals and the exterior world. We know that organized bodies have need of nutrition, that is, of borrowing from foreign bodies a certain quantity of matter to repair the losses that they continually suffer. If, indeed, living bodies preserved all acquired matter and incessantly introduced new, we ought to see their size constantly growing. This is what we do see up to a certain age; but this increase of size stops, and the body remains stationary in its dimensions. It is thereby evident that the body loses as much as it gains, and that life is a circulation. Further, the greatest naturalists have acknowledged the fact. I will above all cite the fine words of Cuvier. "In living bodies," says he, "no particle keeps its place; all enter and depart in succession; life is a continual whirlpool, whose direction, all complicated as it is, remains constant, as well as the kind of particles which are drawn into it, but not the individual particles themselves. The present matter of the living body, on the contrary, will soon be no longer in it, and yet it is the depository of a force which will constrain the future matter to move in the same path as itself. So the form of these bodies is more essential to them than their matter, since this constantly changes while that is preserved."

Without insisting upon a fact whose confirmation will be found in all physiologists, let us say that the problem for

materialists is to conciliate the personal identity of the mind with the perpetual mutability of the organized body. Now we must admit that materialists have not taken much pains to solve this problem, and Dr. Büchner does not even mention it. It does not depend upon him, however, that the identic should result from change, or unity from composition. If that is so, it must still be explained how it can be. The first explanation which might be given, is that indicated in the passage from Cuvier cited above. The vital whirlpool, it is said, has a constant direction; in the change of matter, there is always something left, form. The materials are displaced and replaced, but always in the same order and in the same relations. Thus the features of the face remain ever nearly the same, despite the change of the parts; the scar always remains, though the wounded particles have long ago disappeared. The living body has a historic oneness, which results from the persistence of relations, and which is the foundation of the identity of the *I*.

Such an explanation, however, can only satisfy those who do not take good account of the conditions of the problem, for in supposing that we may explain this fixity of the type, whether individual or generic, by a simple play of matter, by chemical or mechanical action, it must not be forgotten that an identity so produced will ever be only an apparent and wholly external identity, like that of those petrifications in which vegetable molecules have been gradually replaced by mineral molecules, without the form of the object's experiencing any change. I say that such an object is not really identical, and especially that it is not so to itself, and that in such a theory you will find no foundation for the consciousness and the memory of identity, for I demand, where will you place memory in this ever-moving object? Shall it be in the elements, in the molecules themselves? But as they disappear, those which enter cannot remember those that depart. Shall it be in the relation of the particles? It must be, for that is the only thing that truly continues; but what is a relation which itself thinks, remembers, and is responsible? These are so many unintelligible abstractions to which our readers are welcome.

One might turn to the following hypothesis. It might be said: In proportion as the molecules enter into the body, for



instance into the brain, they place themselves where the preceding ones were; there they are found in the same relation with the neighboring particles, they are drawn into the same vortex as those they replace. Ah well? so, by hypothesis, thought is a vibration of the cerebral fibers; since to-day everything is explained by vibrations, each new molecule will come in its turn to vibrate exactly as the preceding; it will give the same note, and you will believe you hear the same sound; this then will be the same thought, though the molecule has changed. Having the same thought, the man will be the same individual. Such an explanation, however, is nowise satisfactory, for identity of persons is not attached to identity of thoughts. I may vacillate between the most opposite ideas and feelings without ceasing to be myself; two men thinking of the same thing at once, the series of numbers for example, will not therefore become one and the same man; several cords emitting the same sound are not one cord. Thus identity of vibrations, no more than persistence in form, explains the consciousness of personal identity.

It may be rejoined: You reason upon a false theory. You seem to believe that the human brain totally changes from moment to moment, from second to second. This is not so; the brain only changes in succession. On the other hand is the *I* then immobile? Does it not change also from moment to moment? Is the youth the same as the mature man, the mature as the aged man? So neither is change absolute in the body, nor immobility in the soul. Could we not come into harmony? The consciousness of identity in us would correspond to the durable part of the brain, the consciousness of change to the changing part. So that, in man, would be united, according to the expression of Plato, the *one* and the *many*, the *same* and *another*. That is, I think, the profoundest thing that can be said in favor of materialism; but I do not believe it has ever taken the trouble to go so far in its defense: we take pains to furnish it with arms. However that may be, this last turn no more satisfies me than the preceding. At the outset it is something strange that man should every moment lose a part of himself, and that he should recomplete himself every moment. At the end of a certain time I should have but three fourths of myself, then a half, then a fourth,

then nothing. Is that a faithful picture of what we experience when we feel ourselves change? Phenomena change, but we attribute them always to the same individual; there are variations in the consciousness of this permanent *I*, overturnings, revolutions, a thousand accidents, but the being continues and recovers itself always after faintings, excitements, and troubles of every kind to which it is a prey.

And, moreover, these organic changes, though working more slowly, none the less produce in the end the same effects. After some years, a new *I* would have succeeded the preceding. Let us suppose the renewal to occur four times, corresponding to the four ages of life: there will then be an infant *I*, a youthful *I*, a mature *I*, an aged *I*! But these are four different men, who somehow are heirs one of another. How are they united to form one, and one possessing himself, and having a consciousness and memory of his identity? Still that will be only an apparent identity, like that of a public function filled successively by men following the same routine as their predecessors, but at bottom different from them. I grow weary of following out frivolous and subtile consequences which are repugnant to good sense.

After this exposition and discussion of the new German doctrines, it only remains to ask what scientific cause can explain this relapse to materialism already so striking in Germany, and whose advance is so startling among ourselves. Shall we say with Dr. Büchner that the cause is a return to experience, and the observation of facts, in a word, to the true scientific method?

No, doubtless, for immediate experiment pronounces nothing upon materialism; it is not for it to sound first principles; and to affirm materialism, we must employ reasoning, hypothesis, and induction at least quite as much as in the contrary theory. No, what explains materialism is a tendency natural to the human soul, and one that to-day is very potent over men's minds: the tendency to unity. We wish to explain everything by a single law, a single phenomenon, a single cause. This is no doubt a useful and necessary tendency, without which there would be no science; but of how many errors has it not been the cause! How many imaginary analogies, how many capital omissions, how many chimerical creations, has a love of vain simplicity produced in philosophy!

Who can deny without any doubt that unity is at the very bottom of things, at the beginning and at the end? Who can deny that the same harmony governs the visible and the invisible world, bodies and minds? But who tells us that the harmonies, the analogies, which unite the two worlds, belong to those which we can imagine? Upon what do we found to force nature to nothing but an eternal repetition of herself, and as Diderot says, the same phenomenon indefinitely diversified? Illusion and pride! Things have greater deeps than our minds possess. Doubtless matter and mind must have a common cause in the thought of God; there we should seek their ultimate unity, but what eye has penetrated them? Who can think that he has been enabled to explain this common origin of every created thing? Who could do this, save He who is the cause of all? But especially what weakness and what ignorance to limit the real existence of things to those fugitive appearances which our senses grasp, to make our imagination the measure of all things, and to adore, like the new materialists, not even the atom which had, at least, some appearance of solidity, but an inexpressible somewhat that has no name in any tongue, and which we might call *infinite dust*!

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### ART. III.—CREATION A SERIES OF SUPERNATURAL GROWTHS.

And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.—GENESIS ii, 7.

No objection need be taken to this rendering in respect to verbal accuracy. Any attempt at a stricter conformity to the original would only have given it a stiff and pedantic appearance, without yielding any clearer understanding of the general idea. Of this general *idea* we may say that while it is the same, essentially, for all minds, the *conception* accompanying it may vary indefinitely, in manner and extent, for different intelligences. Perhaps it is not too much to say that since it was first put upon record, hardly any two readers have had precisely the same *conceptual image* of the *great fact*

announced, and yet all have received the same *truth*, and the truth, too, which the divine Author of the passage intended it should convey. This distinction between the *idea* and the *conception*, between the truth and the image under which it is conveyed, is not a vain one. It is an essential distinction we must be ever ready to make in all efforts to interpret the language of men to each other, much more the language of God to man. In most cases there may be no urgent need for making it. No question is affected by it. We take the thought, each of us, in our own way; and it is the same *thought*, we say again, although the *way of conceiving* be very different for different minds.

"Our Father who art *in heaven!*" Among the millions who have repeated these words how varying the imagery accompanying the great idea. It is very possible for men to say the pater noster without having anything in the mind at all. There may have been neither *idea* nor *conception*. To others there may have been presented the image of a vast and lofty abode in the sky immediately above us. The word *heavens* (the plural, it should be remembered, in Hebrew, and so transferred to the New Testament Greek) may have had to different minds immensely varying degrees of number and of altitude. With others, all such conceptions have vanished. It is simply the thought of something above us. In another mental stage this too departs. The mind has become too scientific to think of God or his divine abode as any more in the one direction than in the other; or if it hold to some locality as matter of fact, the conception of it is severed as much as possible from any relative images of up and down that come from the constantly changing position of our own place in the universe. "He is the Father of lights, to whom there is no *parallax*," (*παράλλαξις*.) And yet Newton and the newly-converted Australian may each have uttered the words of this invocation with the same simple reverence of feeling and idea. They have each had in their souls the same two truths, that suggested by the words "our Father," and the fact expressed by the phrase "in the heavens." The latter words are not surplusage, notwithstanding this great diversity of conception attending them. It is a divine paternity, and that paternity *unearthly*, reigning throughout all that is comprehended or

can be comprehended, in the word heavens, according to the most limited or the most extensive, the most nearly superterrene, or the most widely cosmical *conception*, with which the mind's knowledge or the mind's thinking can clothe it.

We have dwelt upon this illustration in the start, because if fairly presented and received by the reader it will dispense with the necessity of much argument that might otherwise be needed. To fortify it, however, take another, Philippians ii, 10: "That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those in heaven, or upon the earth, or under the earth." There has been much discussion here as to what is meant by the word *καταχθόνιοι*. Some would prove from it the apostle's belief in antipodes. Others interpret it of a supposed subterranean world. What was the exact conception present to the apostle, or common to the imagination of the age, we may not precisely know, nor would we be limited by it if we did. The *conception* is in fact a part of the language. It is representative of the thought or truth, even as it is itself represented by the bare words. The *idea*, to which the words and the image raised by them in the mind are both subservient, is that of universality—the same, as a truth, for all minds, however diversely imaged by the sense. The apostle might have used general terms for this. But he wished to carry vividness and emotion along with the thought, and by such use of conceptual terms there is gained far more in respect to strength than is lost in logical correctness. "*All intelligent beings in the universe*"—whatever may be our attending conception or the science whence such conception arises—this is what is meant, although such conception may be very imperfect; it ever must be very imperfect; in its best state it is a very partial thing, ever defective, ever small in comparison with that of some science yet to come. We cannot think without images any more than we can discourse without words conveying to others, not our thought directly, but the image of our thought. Jesus shall be the *universal sovereign*; he shall be Lord of *all*. We may express this abstractly or in general terms; but if we wish power to accompany it we make a picture. This picture may be general; all above, around, beneath us. Or we may give it more locality and precision, "all in heaven, and on the earth, and below the earth;" the latter term denoting extent

unbounded in one direction, even as the first expresses what is limitless in another.

"He knoweth our frame; he remembereth that we are dust." What is meant here by the words *frame* and *dust*? The question, it may be said, is out of place; this is poetical language, and requires a peculiar style of interpretation. It is, however, not so easy to fix the bounds of what is called poetry in the Scriptures. Everything in the divine book is so high, so earnest, so full of life and emotion, that the ordinary critical and rhetorical divisions cannot be carried out. Figures are not used in the Bible for embellishment; the plainest narrative carries with it something more than bare fact, or truth of thought and conception. One department of style runs into another, and this in every section of the superhuman volume. Strong phenomenal language, or word-painting as we may call it, is everywhere; and oftentimes we cannot distinguish between it and the predominantly poetical. This latter character would be ascribed to the thirty-eighth chapter of Job, while the creative account would be called plain history or narration. But let the reader compare the two by taking them in immediate connection, and he must be struck by the resemblance both in thought and imagery. In the one, the waters are gathered together, and the dry land appears; in the other the sea has bars and doors; limits are assigned to it which it must not pass. In the one, "darkness rests upon the formless abyss" out of which earth and seas are *born*. In the other, ocean "breaks forth as if it issued from the womb;" a prominence is given to the image of *birth*; and yet this same conception is presented in the Hebrew of Genesis. It is contained in the verb *וַיֵּצֵא*, as used repeatedly in the creative account. The earth brings forth. It is a coming forth from something which precedes it, as a ground, in the order of process. There is the same conception in the Hebrew *דְּלִילוֹת*, *generationes*, *natura*, where it is used of "the generations of the heavens and the earth." So again in Job, the darkness is earth's swaddling band; in the plain Mosaic narrative, as some would call it, there is the same imagery, though it is not made predominant, as in the other, by that express presentation of the figure which brings upon language the name of the poetical. There is, however, in Genesis, an image connected with the idea of birth, exceeding in



the vastness of its sublimity anything to be found in Job. It is "the Spirit brooding on the waters." It is the origin of life. Poetry we may call it; but it is that poetry that transcends philosophy, and whose aid is sought when all other forms of language fail in adequateness of conception as well as of idea. There is vivid imagery in both cases. We have no right, in dealing with the one, to call it hyperbole, nor to interpret it as we would dry skeleton facts in the other. In truth, ineffable ideas are struggling for utterance; every power of language and conception, of thought and imagery, are employed to set forth the wondrousness of the earthly and the human origin. In both, to the thoughtful mind, there is prominent the idea of *process*—of going forth—of one thing coming out of another; in other words, of a *nature*, (*natura*), a being born, and an ever being about to be born, and to give birth to something else. *Natura* in Latin, *φύσις* and *γένεσις* in Greek, are no more poetical, and no less poetical, than *יָלַד* and *הוֹלִידָה* in Hebrew. They all have one radical conception; they all have the germ of a thought, expressed in Job by extended and particular images of birth, infancy, growth, nurture, etc., which, on account of their greater extent and particularity, making the conception more prominent and pictorial, we call poetry. Had we been ever accustomed to read in our Bibles, (Gen. ii, 4,) "These are the *natures* (*births, growths*) of the heavens and the earth, in their being created (*בְּהִבְרָאָה*, Septuagint, *ὅτε ἐγένετο*), in the day of the Lord's *making* them," it would doubtless have greatly modified our thinking, and given a different aspect to the whole account; but the meaning would have been precisely the same, etymologically, conceptionally, and ideally. We should not in that case have wondered that the orthodox Augustine, who had none of our modern notions, or narrow prejudgments of time, should have called the creative days *nature*, or a series of "ineffable" successions in the divine working.

To call it poetry amounts to nothing. In the same way the language of our most abstract philosophy, all our physics and metaphysics, are poetical when the terms they employ, and are compelled to employ, are reduced to their etymological and primary images. In other writings, the poetical form is expressly designed as poetry; the figures are clearly rhetorical. In the Scriptures, the rhetorical effect, though designed, is

never proposed as the aim, or it is kept wholly in the background. "I am but dust and ashes," says the patriarch. This may be called poetry, indeed; but Abraham no more thought of speaking poetically, according to our modern definitions, than when he uttered the abstract ethical question, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" Again: "Dust thou art;" *pulvis et umbra sumus*; "He formed man of the dust of the earth." Why should it be thought that this is any more the language of particularity (or of thought limited to the narrowest conception) than the other? Lowliness of origin and of physical constitution is the idea in the one case; why seek to narrow it in the other, or to make it an *outward plastic* formation from the ground as the immediate material of the first human effigies? Do we not, in fact, by such interpretation impair that most significant moral idea of which this language is the vehicle, and which its imagery was designed most vividly to express? "The first man is ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, from the earth, earthy;" there is little ground for dispute about the meaning here. It is an expression for the physical life; it is the same as the σῶμα ψυχικόν, the animal body, or the body in which sense and nature rule, in distinction from the σῶμα πνευματικόν, the spiritual body, or the body in which the spirit, the divine reason, the heavenly life, reign supreme; whether we regard it as the heavenly life first given when God stamped upon man his own immortal image, or that same life restored by Christ, "the second man, the Lord from heaven," after it had been sunk in earthliness and animality. The allusion in 1 Corinthians xv, 47, is evidently to Genesis ii, 7, only χοϊκός is a still lower word, still more significant of humble origin, and more closely allying man with those lowest natures that came out of the χόος, the *fusile*, moist, *alluvial* earth, or the slimy waters. No word could have been better adapted to this conception; and yet who would quote it in favor of an outward plastic formation, unless he had previously from some source acquired a prejudice, a prejudgment to that effect? We could no more draw from it a scientific or matter-of-fact conclusion, than from the etymology of *homo* from *humus*, (if that be correct philology,) or of *Adam* from *adama*, the earth.

There are two modes of interpreting the Scriptures, and especially the creative account, that are at war with the views

here suggested. The one is the attempt at scientific accommodation, making science the interpreting oracle, and the Scriptures a nose of wax, to be formed into any shape that this higher authority may dictate, and without regard to any method of exegesis having its rule and sanction in itself. It is a favorite in platform speeches, and in ambitious sermons and treatises that have so much to say about "the harmonies of science and revelation"—ever glorifying the latter in words, but making science the true *regula fidei*, "the pillar and ground of the faith." Of this easily-assuming and faith-destroying tendency there may be something said, if space permits, in another part of these remarks. We have called it a mode of interpretation; but, in fact, it does not pretend to *interpret* at all, only to *reconcile*, to use its favorite word, or to give the Scriptures that meaning which is demanded by some scientific hypothesis, without ever waiting to see how soon such hypothesis may be superseded by something else equally clamorous in demanding recognition. Seemingly in wide opposition to this, but equally opposed to the spirit of the Bible and of antiquity, is that mode of interpretation which boasts of its *literalness*, or close fidelity to the very words of Scripture. It contains a fallacy in its very start. It is illogical and unphilological in the use of the very term which it so exclusively claims. The *literal* interpretation in a proper sense is the *true* interpretation, giving that which the language, regarded in all its idiomatic and historical aspects, was designed to convey, or which lies most interior in its words and sentences. Thus we interpret the words, "Our Father who art in the heavens," most *truly*, and in that sense most *literally*, when we interpret them most widely. We would therefore prefer to call it the *narrow* interpretation, especially in giving the meaning to Genesis i. It is marked by an utter insensibility to the grandeur of the account. Everything is taken on the most reduced scale of conception the language will possibly bear. Inches and barleycorns are preferred, when the due proportion of the events narrated would not only allow, but even demand, the remotest degrees of longitude, and that too as reckoned on the vast celestial equator. It is not simply that such interpreters are insensible to the grandeur of the language, the awe of its conciseness, its mysterious reserve of reduplications and minute

particularities that would only belittle the immensity it aims to set forth, but they seem to take no heed of the difficulties and inconsistencies which spring up in the literal account itself, (according to their notion of literalness,) and as a necessary consequence of such abnormal crowding. Thus the Hebrew *yom* must be twenty-four solar hours exactly, in the face of the fact that it is predicated of phenomena and events antecedent to any time-measures having any connection with the sun, or astronomical movements as now existing. This very first step brings them into difficulties—most *literal* difficulties—which have to be obviated by guesses and crude scientific hypotheses, having no ground in the language, introducing still more crowding and inconsistency, and giving rise to more objections than any of those accommodations to science at which they so loudly rail. Moses must have understood these difficulties of a solar day without a visible sun, and of a morning without a sunrise, as well as Mr. Lord; yet he makes no provision for them; and this is the clearest evidence that the great facts of his account lay in a plane transcending such collision, and altogether superseding the necessity of any such hypothetical explanations. And so with all the times and successions that follow. Throughout, it should be remembered, creation begins with the night. The first morning is that ineffable command, “Let there be light!” whether it mean light generally, in its first and essential being, or light as then commanded to shine on that dark abyss of waters; “Let there be light *there*.” In either case it is the *first morning* which this narration takes into view. And now, to accommodate it to the twenty-four-hour hypothesis, there must be a reckoning back of just twelve hours to get our principium principiorum, which must either be an arbitrary starting-point taken out of an indefinitely preceding darkness, and having nothing to distinguish it from anything before or after, or else we utterly mar the chronological consistency of this nicely-adjusted calendar. But how inconceivably narrow is all this! How utterly different the impression that must be made upon a thoughtful mind that, casting aside all prejudgments, lets this sublime language have its due emotional effect. Let such a one slowly and seriously read these majestic opening verses, and carry with him this diminutive ephemeris, this frigid almanac calcula-

tion, if he can: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth; and the earth was formless and void; there was darkness upon the face of the deep; the Spirit of God was brooding upon the waters. And God said, Let there be light, and there was light; and God saw the light that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness; and God called the light day, and the darkness he called night; and there was an evening and a morning—one day." Who shall measure this? On what scale of current chronology shall it be counted?

"And the earth *was* formless and void." The tense form of the Hebrew verb *וַיְהִי* denotes cotemporaneousness with the principium mentioned in the first verse. Such was its *state* when the creative work *began*; the creative work, we mean, set forth in this Mosaic account, without reference to any other works that might have been beside it, or before it, in the eternities of God. Had it been not cotemporaneous, or the state in which the work commences, but a *succeeding* state or act, it would have required the *vau* conversive form, *וַיֵּרָא*, according to a rule which is one of the most fixed things in the Hebrew language. We need not stop to prove this if the reader will only take his Hebrew Bible and observe how constantly this successive form—ever denoting one event following after another—is used in all the subsequent steps of the process. "And God said," *וַיֹּאמֶר*; "Let there be," *וַיְהִי*; and there was, *וַיְהִי*. Again, "And God saw," *וַיֵּרָא*; "and God divided," *וַיַּבְדֵּל*; "and God called," *וַיִּקְרָא*; and so throughout, until "the earth and heavens are finished." This invariable and unbroken sequence makes it certain that the great things mentioned in verses first and second are not successive, but cotemporaneous and initial. They all belong to the *beginning*. Then was the formless earth and heavens—for the heavens here mentioned are the heavens of our earth—then was the darkness resting; then was the Spirit brooding; and then went forth the Word, and light and life began. There had been a night; who shall tell us how long it was? And now the day is dawning; by what method shall be computed its beginning or its duration? God calls it Day. The name is not given to it as a measure of extent—that is a later and a subordinate idea—but as denoting a wondrous phenomenon, marking the first great transition, and calling up the dual contrast which

has entered into the corresponding name ever since "God called the light day, and the darkness he called night"—that same darkness that wrapped the formless earth while the Spirit was brooding o'er the chaotic deep. We are in the midst of the vast, the shapeless, the undefined; who shall talk of twenty-four hours? Who shall give us the watches of that night, or the dial-plate of that ineffable period which "God divided?" He called it yom, the day, and from that has come the lesser naming. All words for periods, or cycles of time, being radically grounded on this primitive conception of duality, and corresponding to it, even as the reduced scale corresponds in every division and in every point to the greater measurement.

Such an impression of the first great day once fixed in the mind, it goes with us readily through all the rest. "Let there be a firmament"—an atmosphere is formed; a sky appears; God calls it heavens; this is the second morning; and so there is a second day. This must have borne some analogy to the wondrous first, or all harmony and proportion in the account are lost. Again: "Let the waters be gathered together; let the dry land appear." Here is process; how long or how short we cannot know. We have nothing to measure them by. God might have brought forth all these phenomena in twenty-four hours, or twenty-four seconds; but why then a process at all? Why is so orderly a succession presented, unless it is meant to be a succession according to the then nature of the things succeeding, whatever that nature might be, or however it had been given to them. It must have been a movement according to the properties then existing in earth and water, and which we have no reason, from the account, to regard as essentially different from those that belong to them now. Oceans are formed; lands are dried; they *appear* as something emerging from the deep. It is the very language in which the same or similar phenomena would be described now. Here is order, and order suggests time. Why such appearings? why such statements, if there is no reality corresponding to them? The whole might have been instantaneous—sky, earth, and seas in a moment assuming the form and state they now possess. That we could readily have believed had it been told us; but why then this orderly chronology of cause and effect in just such order as nature employs, and would be expected to employ, in



a similar process? There is a settling, a gathering, a drying, and an appearing. Was this all crowded into the compass of a few hours, as our hours are now measured by the sun? It does not look so on the face of the account, and we would not think of it if we did not regard ourselves as shut up by this narrow conception of the word *yom*. We could have believed in the direct and instantaneous supernatural, but this has the appearance of something like a nature without that other idea of time-succession which is demanded as a necessary correspondence to make the conception harmonious. It seems magical rather than supernatural; that is, it is a process without any reason; it is an appearance of successive causation without any corresponding successive causality. When we attempt to regard it as supernatural, purely and throughout, the conception is impeded by this appearance of a nature; and when we would view it as a nature, we find no law, or an unnatural law of succession. Harmony of thought is only found when we regard it as a process supernaturally originated by "the going forth" of the divine Word, and then carried on in perfect accordance with the previous nature, or natures, given by the same Word to the substances so affected.

"Let the earth bring forth grass," Gen. i, 11, **הָרִשָּׁא הָאֲדָמָה דִּשְׂא** —literally, "Let the earth *grow* grass," *βλαστήσάτω ἡ γῆ βοτάνην*, *germinet terra herbam*. Here is process again; here is something which looks like a nature, a *generatio*, or **תולדה**. There is an inward energizing power in the verb **הָרִשָּׁא**. It is in the Hiphil or causative conjugation. The grammatical subject is the earth, and it denotes an agency *in* the earth. It brings forth according to a law; the things brought forth come forth with their law *in* them, "the herb seeding seed, each after its *kind*, (**מין**), or species."

The supernatural Word goes forth again, and again is there something which looks wondrously like a process or nature. There is another **תולדה**, or generation, to take its place among "the generations of the heavens and the earth." And God said, "Let the waters bring forth abundantly (literally, let them *swarm with*, **יִסְרְצוּ**) the swarming, or moving creature of life, and birds that may fly," etc. Here is a higher nature, but still a nature. It is strange that commentators should not have been more struck with this language. It can only be accounted

for on the part of the modern, (for some of the ancient had more freedom,) by their having been bound up in a preconceived notion at war with its plain and *literal* import. Had it been stated, as an independent hypothesis, that the waters ever could originate life, by any power, however given to them, some good people, and some learned people, and even some scientific people, might have been startled with it as naturalistic and even atheistic. But here it is in the Scriptures. It is the naturalism of the Bible that does not hesitate to ascribe to the waters a life-giving power, (even of the birds ultimately,) and we may see in it, very evidently, the origin of that idea, very conspicuous in the ancient mythologies, (and even entering into the earliest philosophy of the Ionic school,) that water was the first material principle, and Oceanus and Tethys the parents of all things that have life.

"The waters bring forth," not only the substances that form the lowest stratum, or seem to make the transition from the vegetable to the animal, such as the zoophytes, the mollusks, (if the writer makes no blunder here in his terminology,) or the shell-fish immovable, but the moving creature (reptile) the creeping thing, or swimming thing—the serpent and the fish. We have nothing to do with the science of this; in our present business of interpretation we care nothing about it; but here is naturalism of a certain kind taught in the Scriptures, and why should it alarm us? It is the word of our God, and should we find it connecting man's physical with the waters or the earth, it should cause no fear to a true faith. On any hypothesis, we are sufficiently allied to all below us, so that we may say, literally, "to corruption, Thou art my father: to the worm, Thou art my mother, and my sister." Job xvii, 14; xxv, 6. It is the lowliness of our physical that exalts our spiritual. There is nothing here to prevent our truly believing, or our truly hearing the voice so near and yet so far—the voice that says unto us, "Fear not, thou worm\* Jacob, I have redeemed thee, saith the Lord, I hold thee by thy hand, thou art mine."

Here is a nature supernaturally called out from the waters by the Omnific Word, and that ineffable thing Life (as ineffable in the mollusk as in the archangel) is the product. There is a process, a going on of cause and effect, a law in the waters.

\* Isaiah xli, 14; Psalm xxii, 7.

How long or how short this process was we know not, we have no means of knowing. It looks very much like a process through a series of gradations. It must have been by many steps that the bird nature brings its origin from the waters.\* It says, collectively, "the moving thing that hath life," "let it swarm with them;" as though it began with the lowest and most prolific forms. It looks somewhat as though the higher came from these, through progression of species born of species. So say some scientific men. The writer has not science enough to give any scientific decision in the matter; but this occasions very little concern for the honor of the Scriptures one way or the other. Generic or specific generation is, in itself, no greater mystery, no further from or nearer to the recognition of science, than individual generation, or one individual life coming out of another; and as for any inductive testimony in the case, time is too long, and we are too brief, to arrive at any firm conclusion. "As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit (of the life) or how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, even so thou knowest not the *work* of God who maketh all." Ecclesiastes xi, 5. It is his *working*, in either way. On proper testimony we can believe one as well as the other, and there need be no fear about its possibly linking us *physically* (although the Bible necessitates no such conclusion) with the animal races below us, as long as we believe aright in respect to our more divine spiritual origin. We need to elevate this side of man; we need a more spiritual philosophy of the human soul. With a low psychology, we may well be afraid of the scientific naturalism. With a

\* Genesis i, 20. עֲרֹף יְעֹרֵף There has been an attempt on the part of some modern commentators to correct this passage, in order to divest it of its seemingly gross naturalism. They have made it a clause by itself, "And let the birds fly," etc., as though it were a separate thing in the creative process. This, however, even if it were critically allowable, would not help the matter. It is further off, indeed, but no more strange, essentially, that the waters should produce the bird life than the reptile life. It is that wondrous thing life, in both cases. We cannot take up our space here in dwelling on the exegesis, except to say, very confidently, that our common translation is right, favored by the ancient versions, and strictly agreeable to the idiom of the Hebrew. יְעֹרֵף here is the descriptive future, quite common in the Hebrew, and still more common in the Arabic. The very expression occurs in the Koran with the same subject, and in precisely the same way. The true rendering is, "Let the waters bring forth the *creeping* thing and the birds that *fly* in the heavens."

higher doctrine of the spirit than is taught in our most common text-books, we may laugh to scorn all physical theories, whether of the regular scientific or of the new development school, that find in the physical man types or antique remains of everything below. They touch not the divine breath, they reach not the divine image, which spiritually and specifically constituted the *primus homo*, the species *man*.

What does the language really mean in the passages we have quoted? It is not too much to say, that most readers, even among the biblically learned, have been content with a hazy, unsteady view of some kind of mechanical formation, without troubling themselves with the strange and perplexing conclusions to which they must inevitably be brought if such view is subjected to strict examination. The most common notion has been that of a direct outward *making*, by an outward divine power, and then an arbitrary connection, in some way, of this outward mechanical product with the earth and waters; for, after the express language of the Scriptures, it would not do to deny to these all place in the process. Let us look steadily at the thing and see where it leads. When it takes the poetical form, the mind feels less revulsion in following it to its extreme, and it is carried out in all its grotesque unreasonableness. Milton, for example, represents the animals, behemoth and all, as some way made full formed, in the earth, and then, each one finding its own way out when the earth is commanded to bring them forth. With all respect and reverence be it said, that even Milton's genius, with all the poetical embellishments he has employed, can hardly save it from the aspect of the ludicrous.

*Out of the ground uprose,*  
As from his lair the wild beast where he wons.  
The grassy clods now calved; now half appeared  
The tawny lion, pawing to get free  
His hinder parts.

The tiger and the mole  
Rising, the crumbled earth above them threw.  
From under ground, the stag  
Bore up his branching head; scarce from the mould  
Behemoth, biggest born of earth, upheaved  
His vastness.

“Let the waters bring forth abundantly,” “Let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind.” This is the

brief record that Scripture gives us of these ineffable processes. Which is the more sublime view, the more pious, the more worthy of God, a power given to the earth, a nature working after its laws and ideas as constituted by the in-forming Logos, or such a grotesque, mechanical, idealess operation as Milton poetically sets forth, though it is the same conception that is commonly and prosaically held? Let the thoughtful reader judge.

But our dread of naturalism, even though a naturalism revealed in the Bible, will force us to go much beyond this, if we adhere rigidly to that so-called orthodox notion which would utterly exclude every thought of a physical process in the origin and early growth, either of vegetable or animal existence. It will lead us to regard some of the most striking words of the account—the words of generation—as mere surplusage. “Let the waters swarm a swarm of life,” which is the most literal rendering, “let the earth germinate;” we slip over them as though they had hardly any place, or we regard them as rhetorical (thus insensibly falling away from our confident literalness) and find ourselves coming back to the unwarranted notion of God’s directly making, and at once, or in the space of a few hours, all the varying kinds of grass, herbs, trees, etc., “from the hyssop that cometh up by the wall unto the cedar of Lebanon,” and all the varieties of animal life, in their full and perfect growth, as individuals of each species, from the invisible animalcule to the lion or the elephant. He fabricates them of some outward material. He gives, in this way, to each its outward form and inward difference, not as the product of a law, or force, invisible and immaterial, working after an idea, (thus constituting an inward natural ground of species,) but by an arbitrary outward force determining the quantity, the quality, and the constituent elements of each. The *נר*, or species, does not work *out*, making, or building out, the organization, but is put *into* it, or made by it. To use the language of Cudworth and Aristotle, the artificer stands outside of his work, and introduces his idea into it by outside means. Thus viewed, there is no essential difference between the divine and human workman in the manner of working, but only in the degree of force or strength employed. Though more elaborately finished, perhaps,

inwardly and outwardly, than similar human fabrications, the first tree, thus made, is just as arbitrary and as artificial a thing as a toy tree, or a waxen rose. The organization is independent of the life. It is its antecedent instead of its effect. The material, the artificial, is first, and afterward there somehow springs up in it a motion, force, or nature, that works according to the mechanical conditions in which it is placed, instead of such nature, or force, as a pre-existent thing, having determined such a mechanism, such a selection of material, and such an out-building of the material through which it is manifested in the sensible or phenomenal world. In any way we can conceive it on such hypothesis, the material organization is first; the nature, the law, or the force acting according to a law, is a consequent, whether springing out of the organization (a doctrine which would be very dark and dangerous to faith if traced to its ultimates) or created by God as a separate thing, and then arbitrarily connected with the organization and made to dwell in it. There would have been some relief from these difficulties had it been revealed to us that God made every particular thing directly, just as he made the first matter of the universe; or that each thing, each first plant, tree, fish, reptile, man, had been brought into being directly out of non-being by an immediate fiat making each thing just what it was, both in respect to matter and organization, without any becoming, or any creative connection with any previous force or material. Then there would be no first or last, no order of priority about it, either in time or nature. Mohammed is very fond of this notion of the making of each individual thing wholly and directly from nothing, or non-existence. Hence the formula so oft repeated in the Koran, in which God is represented as saying to each thing, *kun fayakun*, "Be, and it was."\* The Arabian prophet affects a hyper piety here. He was determined that there should be no

\* See Koran, Surat ii, 111; iii, 42-52, where he represents man as created in this way, vi, 72, where it is applied to the earth, xvi, 42; xix, 36; xxxvi, 82; xl, 70, in which places it is spoken of every particular thing that is said to be created.

There is similar language in Psalm xxxiii, 9, "He spake and it was, he commanded and it stood," but that is spoken of creation generally, as being all by the word of God, as more particularly recounted in Genesis, the first part referring, probably, to the primal origination of worlds, and the second to the standing or permanent order, the work of subsequent mediate creations.



naturalism charged upon him, such as some might impute to Moses if they judged him strictly by his language. But nothing is more clear than that our Scriptures take a different course. There is no new material for the first plants, the first animals, or the first man. And so in respect to all the works after the first day. They are invariably connected with a pre-existing material, and with something which may be regarded as a pre-existent nature, existing generally, or in the particular material in which and through which the life is to be manifested.

What is the next step in the conception, as defended by the so-called literalist? Let us carry it steadily out; for there is but one way to do this without getting involved, somewhere, in this dreaded naturalism. These mechanically formed products, grasses, plants, trees, in their numberless varieties, are planted, or rather set out in the earth to grow. Now nature may come in. But why not sooner if God had so willed? Why not in the first as well as in the second generation? The first tree had, doubtless, all the appearances of growth and succession that marked the second, and which have appeared in all subsequent trees of that species, denoting a causality of some kind, working in the most interior nature. Were these appearances unreal in the first tree? Did they tell a false story? Did they indicate no real process, no actual corresponding causality? If they did, then this first tree was a *growth* just as much as any subsequent one from that time to this. The causality thus indicated (unless it was a magical causality without its true successions in time, which is an absurd contradiction) must have had a duration equal to that of the second, if not vastly longer, unless we suppose nature to have had her motion retarded after the first birth, of which, in this case, there is no evidence. The first tree was to be the model, the paradigm, the representative of the idea, for all subsequent trees. Was it to be so in appearance only, or in the very things that appeared through such appearances, and of which they were the representative? Was it the model simply in the quantity, the figure, the mechanical arrangement of the matter, or in the law process also, the *actual working* through which that quantity of material was gathered, that figure brought out, and that organization received its peculiar struc-

ture, differing from every other? But this is all speculation, it may be said, about birth and growth. No, it is not so. It is the very language of Scripture. "Let the earth *bring* forth, Let the earth *grow* grass, Let the waters *swarm*,"\* be prolific, "bring forth abundantly." If Mr. Lord had been making a Bible, with his views of time and creative causation, he would never have used such language.

We must have the supernatural; the writer holds it as firmly as any other; but this is not inconsistent with the idea of a nature, and that, too, from the very start. The tree is not a real tree until it has a nature, and that nature is in act. Before this, or without this, it is only an image of a tree, however elaborately wrought, both in its inward and its outward construction. It is still an image, as much as the figure in the toy shop. Unless we arbitrarily limit the power we call creation to a point short of the perfect work, we must have a nature in it. Why not then from the beginning, or a nature supernaturally started, but working, immediately, as a nature, and making its first production a birth, a growth, a time growth, having its seed, or the envelope of its law, growing in it as much as any subsequent one; we might even say more so, inasmuch as it is to be, in all things, a model or pattern to the rest. Why not recognize an immaterial power (if we shrink from the word spiritual) which God originates, a great host of such immaterial powers, having their species, their varying ideas, each working according to a law, (which is an idea in action,) and all as real, in one sense, as the outward material manifestations with which, in God's time, and with God's permission, they clothe themselves when made to work in the earth, the air, and the waters? This looks very suspicious, some might say, besides being very unintelligible; it is the old dream of Origen and Plato about an ideal world; we are afraid of it; it requires us to think of forces, powers, laws, as

\* The Arabic translation of this passage, in the version called Arabs Erpenianus, is very remarkable. We attach great value to this version, as made by one of those learned Arabian Jews who were distinguished in the ninth and tenth centuries, and as being, in itself, marked by the closest fidelity to the Hebrew. For the Hebrew *וַיִּצְמַח*, he uses a denominative Arabic verb made from the noun for lizard, as being, or supposed to be, one of the earliest and most swarming productions of the slimy earth and waters. *Dhababa*, scatuitt lacertis. It shows clearly his view of the passage.

somehow antecedent to matter, (in the order of nature at least, if not of time,) shaping and organizing matter: as causes in truth, instead of *effects* of such organization or material arrangement. But what if matter, itself, be force? Some of our scientific men seem to be approaching that idea. They have already resolved heat into an immaterial force; it would not be taking a very great leap to hold it true of all those other sensible or phenomenal manifestations by which matter is made known to us, leaving only a dark residuum, to which we should find it very difficult to apply either name, conception, or idea.

The mere *conception*, we admit, or sense image, here, may not be quite so easy and simple as the other which we have called the mechanical one, but *ideally* it is more easy. *Conceptually* it gives us some trouble, because it takes us into a higher sphere than the conceptual or imaging world. But still, we say, we must take it, or something like it; we must hold to natures, forces, etc., as something separate from matter, (somewhere at least in the producing processes,) or we must unshrinkingly carry out the other view with all its crudities, and perhaps land at last in something far more to be dreaded than what some call naturalism, in other words, a dead, cold, hard materialism, which makes matter the older thing, and force, and law, and life, nothing but results of the way in which it is put together. In the other view, there is, indeed, something required higher than sense, or the reflex imagings of sense which we call *conceiving*. We are beyond the *φαινόμενα*, and in the region of the *νοούμενα*, (Heb. xi, 3,) where it is difficult to retain our hold, but where, nevertheless, we have a good scriptural anchor to hold us. Not by sense, or by our power of conceiving, but "by faith do we understand (*νοοῦμεν*) that the worlds were framed by the word of God." And how framed? "So that from the unseen things were made the things that are seen." The answer is ascribed to the same faith that is defined, (v. i.) above, as the *ἐλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων*, "the conviction of things unseen." In the common version the text reads, "so that the things which are seen were not made of things that do appear." The Vulgate has it, *ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent*, "so that the visible things were made (or became) from the things invisible."

The Syriac (Peshito) gives it in the same way, and can have no other rendering. So the other ancient versions. All that thus render it evidently present "the invisible things" as something from which the visible things become, (*fiunt*) come into manifestation, or are made, not certainly as material, or as material cause, (*ex quo*), for that would be inconsistent with their *invisibility*, which is to be taken in the widest extent, as denoting what is beyond all sense. The τὰ μὴ βλέπομενα here, "the unseen things" which faith "understands," are not merely such as are unseen or unfelt because now, or at any time, absent, but such as are, in their very essence, invisible, that is, beyond the possible sense of any possible sentient, until, through the word of God, they are made manifest in a sensible or phenomenal world. Still they are spoken of as causes, if not as *material* causes, yet as *formal* and *efficient* causes, which the Word employs in "framing the worlds." Calvin gets this same rendering from the Greek by connecting μὴ with ἐκ-φαινόμενων, taking these as forming one compound participle; and so he translates it, "from the non-appearing (non-apparentibus) came the appearing." This will not do; since there is to be a preposition understood, and for other reasons the Greek language will not allow such a construction. A careful examination, however, shows that the sense of the Vulgate and of the Syriac, as well as that arrived at by Calvin, is substantially the sense of the Greek text as it now stands, only expressed in a negative way. "Were not made of things that are seen," or that "do appear," is only another and a more Greek mode of saying (the Greek language being fond of negatives and negative expressions) that they were made from things that do not appear. We think that one who thoughtfully studies the passage will come to the same conclusion from considering the unnatural force that is to be put upon the language, and the idea, in the interpretation that is most commonly given by those who will not allow the sense for which we are contending. The "unseen things," they say, mean nothing at all; the "not being made from things that do appear" is, to them, only another mode of saying that the world, or the things that are seen, were made out of nothing. We do not intend here to discuss the question how far this is true, or in what sense true, of creation in the start, or

the *principium principiorum*, before which there was a non-existence of everything but God; but this we say, and with much confidence, that the Greek terms here employed are not at all the ones that would be naturally used to express such an idea. The Greek words for not being would be τὸ μὴ ὄν, or τὰ μὴ ὄντα, to which the τὰ μὴ βλέπομενα, or μὴ φαινόμενα, "the unseen," or "the non-appearing," are by no means equivalent. Besides, although τὰ ὄντα, "the things being," is used in the plural, yet τὰ μὴ ὄντα is not commonly so employed, "*not being*" being expressed by τὸ μὴ ὄν, for a very obvious reason, since not being can have no plurality. Much less would such a phrase as τὰ μὴ βλέπομενα, "the things unseen," be used in the plural to express non-existence, or mere nothingness.

These "things unseen" are realities, if being is reality; they are plural, they are many, they have varieties. Whatever difficulties may surround the question of their existence *in time*, before the things in which they are manifested, (like the truth in the diagram,) they must be regarded as before them in the *order of nature*, so as to be causes instead of the effects, the powers organizing instead of the results of organization. Let no one think here of a pre-existent world of empty images of all things that may afterward exist. That is but the caricature of the thought. Powers, causes, or whatever else we may call them, they are individualized only when exhibited outwardly in the forms and motions of matter; but this does not prevent us from *believing*, even if we cannot easily *conceive it*, that God, "whose thoughts are higher than our thoughts, whose ways are not as our ways," and whose *working* is not as our working, may give being to forces, natures, laws, as entities antecedent in the order of working, invisible, immaterial, causal, life-giving, that are to have their individual manifestations in matter, though not properties of matter as such, nor any mere effects arising from any possible disposition of matter in itself.

A meaning altogether too recondite and metaphysical, some might say, to be put upon a plain scriptural passage, especially when the other idea of creation out of nothingness is so much more simple and obvious. We take issue here on the fact. The rendering which would make "the unseen things" a mere term for nothingness, or the negative declaration that "the

things seen were not made of things that do appear" to be but another mode of saying that "they were made out of nothing," we have already shown, is not in harmony with the verbal spirit of the passage. There was another and a clearer mode of saying that. Neither was it more in harmony with the most prevalent ancient thinking. Quite the other way. We impose a modern notion on an ancient writing. We need not go back to the doctrine of archetypal ideas, which is lost in a remote Greek and Oriental antiquity, but the general notions prevalent both in the East and in the West, (whether as taking the poetical and mythological, or the earliest philosophical form,) were more favorable to what some would now call the metaphysical interpretation. If we judge Paul by the thinking of his age, the Vulgate and Syriac were right in giving to the Greek the meaning which they have so distinctly brought out. There was, indeed, something like the hard-matterism of our own times in the atomical and corpuscular doctrine of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius; but speculation, vulgar as well as philosophical, generally tended in a different direction, and there is evidence that some of the early Christian fathers were imbued with the same style of thinking. This, indeed, does not settle the truth, but it relieves the interpretation from any charge of being historically uncritical.

The forces and laws of nature are not properties of matter; that would be sheer materialism. They are not the offspring of matter, born of it, but the seminal powers themselves, mysteriously working *in* matter, controlling matter, making the earth and the waters bring forth the living forms. They were *sown* when "the Spirit brooded on the waters," in that first mysterious night of creation. They were there as potentialities when the Word went forth on the fifth day, and the command was given for life to *appear*. How long the process of their appearing, how many the gradations, who shall tell?

They worked not from without, but outwardly. And this is the great difference between the divine operation in nature, and that human mechanical operation to which the more easy conception would assimilate it. The latter is admirably, though rather oddly and quaintly expressed by Cudworth, in his Intellectual System of the Universe. "Human art cannot



act upon the matter otherwise than from the outside, nor communicate itself to it otherwise than by a great deal of tumult and hurly-burly, noise and clatter, it using hands and axes, saws and hammers, and after this manner, and with much ado, by knockings and thrustings, moliminously introducing its form or idea (as, for example, of a ship or a house) *into* the material." Chapter iii, section xxxvii, 9. Not so gross as this, perhaps, but still essentially the same, is the conception that many have of God's working in the making of things. He stands on the outside; he makes the matter first as simple mass though the human artist has to borrow it; he fashions that matter into the form of a tree, an animal, or a man; he puts movement into it, and makes it act in a certain way which becomes its nature, and the constant action of which the scientific man records and generalizes into what he calls laws. Another difference, though an unessential one, is that the human workman, if he uses tools, has to borrow them. The divine workman makes his tools as he makes his matter, or he does it all directly, by sheer strength. There is no law or idea, working from within, as the very seminal power of the process. In this respect the work is as outward in the one case as in the other. The law and the idea (or species) are both mere generalizations from outward facts. They are the result, or the expression, or at the highest, the *effect* of the organization, and not its *cause*, its informing life and power.

Such we cannot believe to have been the working of the Logos in nature (John i, 3; Col. i, 16; Heb. i, 2, and xi, 3) when "the worlds were framed (or out-built) by the word of God, so that from unseen things were made the things that do appear."

Our leading idea, throughout, is that of process, law, or nature, in creation. The subject cannot be fully discussed in one number, and we would, therefore, hope for the patience of our readers in some further attempt at its proof and elucidation.

## ART. IV.—THE APOCALYPSE AND ITS EXPOSITION.

## [FIRST ARTICLE.]

*Versuch einer Vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung des Johannes ; oder, Allgemeine Untersuchungen über die apokalyptische Litteratur überhaupt und die Apokalypse des Johannes insbesondere.* Von DR. FRIEDRICH LÜCKE. Zweite Vermehrte und Verbesserte Auflage. Bonn. 1852.

*A Commentary on the Apocalypse.* By MOSES STUART, Prof. Sac. Lit. Andover. London. 1845.

*Die Offenbarung des heiligen Johannes für Solche die in der Schrift forschen erläutert.* Von E. W. HENGSTENBERG, Prof. Theol. Berlin. Berlin. 1861, 1862.

"THE Revelation of John," says Lücke, "stands like a sphinx on the lofty, closing summit of holy Scripture." More difficult, indeed, to explain than the riddles of the Sphinx, it has defied the sagacity of the most sharp-sighted and penetrating theorists, and baffled the skill of the soundest expositors. It has been commented upon by men of all grades of intellect, from the great Newton down to the feeblest scribbler. Almost every conceivable theory has been formed at some time or other to explain the book. Fanciful and ingenious expositors have found in it the past, present, and future history not only of the Church, but of the world.

But in spite of this conflict of opinion, in spite of the dark and mysterious character of the book, its author must have had an object in view, and he must have intended that object to be understood. Even the proposers of riddles usually give us data sufficient for their solution. Could we expect less than this of the author of the Apocalypse? But as the book is inspired and prophetic, we should expect to find in it both the clearness and obscurity of prophecy; God himself is both a revealing and concealing God; we should expect to find a great intelligible outline in the midst of much darkness and apparent confusion; and if we are not greatly mistaken, this can be found.

But the *exposition* of the book is not the only subject of difficulty and dispute; its author and the time of its composi-

tion are still critically discussed with very different results. In Germany the current of opinion is in favor of its composition under Nero or Galba, but seems decidedly against its apostolic origin. The ablest of the English and American writers, on the other hand, favor its apostolic origin, but nearly coincide with the Germans respecting the time of its composition.

#### THE CHARACTER OF THE APOCALYPSE.

No book of the Bible is so highly symbolical; it abounds in the most striking and awful imagery. Nothing can be more sublime than the description of our Saviour in the opening chapter, and the mighty events that follow are set forth in language and symbols of almost equal sublimity. Even the addresses to the seven Churches, which are of course didactic, assume an earnest and lofty tone. John reaches the sublimest heights without effort; he borrows, it is true, a part of his imagery from the Hebrew prophets, but he by no means slavishly copies them. In some respects he surpasses them; his descriptions are more lifelike and more terrible. He carries us to the throne of God, shows us the ETERNAL, the magnificent court of heaven, the glorified saints, and the forces and weapons which the Almighty employs in the destruction of his foes. But amid all the storms of divine wrath, amid thunderings and earthquakes, he never loses sight of God's people; he represents them as secure. This divine panorama, beginning with the appearance of Christ in a glorified state, addressing the Asiatic Churches, unfolds the mighty conflict waged for centuries between Christianity and Paganism, resulting in the complete overthrow of the latter, and closes with the resurrection of the dead, eternal judgment, and the creation of a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.

Two reasons may be assigned for the use of the symbolic style: first, for the sake of making a strong impression by a vivid presentation of the truth by means of striking pictures; secondly, because the truths pertaining to the higher spiritual life and to the kingdom of Christ can be adequately set forth only by symbols drawn from the natural world.

There is a peculiarity of the Apocalypse, its use of the numbers seven, four, and three, which Prof. Stuart calls its *num-*

osity, that deserves attention. *Seven Churches* are addressed; the "Son of man," in the midst of the *seven* golden candlesticks, holds *seven* stars; *seven* spirits are before the throne of God; *seven* vials of wrath are poured out, *seven* seals are opened, and *seven* thunders utter their voices. The Lamb is declared worthy to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing, *seven* in number. The numbers *three* and *four*, however, are not used so conspicuously. It may be difficult for us to assign a reason for this preference of the number *seven*. Seven, we know, was a sacred number among the Hebrews; yet this would hardly account for its frequent use in the Apocalypse.

The *linguistic* character of the book is remarkable. It is well known that all the books of the New Testament, with the exception of Matthew's Gospel, were originally written in Greek,\* yet every scholar knows that it is not classic Greek, but abounds in Hebraisms. But the Apocalypse has more Hebraisms than any other book of the New Testament. Nor is this all. There are great irregularities in construction, and more or less solecisms. The following are examples of Hebraisms: οἷς ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς ἀδικῆσαι τὴν γῆν, literally, to *whom* it was given to *them* to hurt the earth, the relative and personal pronoun both used for the relative simply; ἣν οὐδεὶς δύναται κλειῖσαι αὐτήν, *which* no one was able to shut *it*, ii, 8; ὃν ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἠδύνατο, *which* no one was able to number *it*, vii, 9; ὃν ἀριθμὸς αὐτῶν, of *which* the number of *them*, xx, 8. That these constructions are Hebraistic, no Hebrew scholar can doubt; compare for example the language of Genesis: זָרַע וְיָרַע, *which* in *it* was its seed, for *wherein* was seed. Ὅπου ἡ γυνὴ κάθηται ἐπ' αὐτῶν, *where* the woman sitteth upon *them*, xvii, 9, is Hebraistic for *whereon* the woman sitteth. As Hebraistic is to be explained the following passage: καὶ ὅταν δώσουσι . . . πεσοῦνται . . . προσκυνήσουσι . . . βαλοῦσι . . .

\* The extensive use of the Greek language in the Roman empire about the time of Christ may be shown from the Latin writers. Cicero, about B. C. 50, in an oration for Archias, says: "If any one supposes that less glory is derived from Grecian than from Latin verses, he is greatly mistaken; for Greek literature is read in nearly all nations; Latin literature within their own narrow limits." Juvenal, cotemporary with the apostles, says: "In this language (the Greek) they fear; in this pour forth their wrath, joys, cares; in this they utter every secret of their breast." Satire vi, lines 188, 189.

And when the living creatures *will give* glory and honor and thanks to Him that sitteth upon the throne, to Him that liveth for ever and ever, the four and twenty elders *will fall down* before Him that sitteth upon the throne, and they *will worship* Him that liveth for ever and ever, and they *will* cast their crowns before him, iv, 9, 10. To indicate what is customary, the Hebrew language uses the future tense, meaning that the state or action is so not only now but for time to come. Hence the passage indicates what is *continually* done in heaven.

The use of the participle is peculiar: instead of its being construed with a finite verb, it frequently stands *absolute* in a *nominative* form; ἔχων, *holding* in his right hand; ἐκπορευομένη, a sword *proceeding* from his mouth, chap. i; ἡ καταβαίνουσα, which *descending*; ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου καθήμενος, one *sitting* upon the throne. These are but a few of the instances. We are strongly inclined to think that this construction is Hebraistic. For a similar use of the participle, compare Ecclesiastes i, 4: דָּוָר וְדָוָר יֵלֵךְ דָּוָר, one generation *goes*, another *comes*. In some of the later books of the Hebrew Bible, the verb הָיָה, *to be*, is joined with the participles; and perhaps in these passages in the Apocalypse some form of εἶναι, *to be*, should be joined to the participles. Anomalous is the connecting of the present and future tenses by καὶ: ἐρχομαί σοι ταχὺ καὶ κινήσω τὴν λυχνίαν σου, *I am coming* to thee quickly and *will remove* thy candlestick, ii, 5. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ ἀστέρος λέγεται ἄφρωνος, καὶ γίνεται . . . ἀπέθανον . . . ἐπικράνθησαν. And the name of the star *is called* Wormwood, and the third part of the waters *becomes* wormwood; and many men *died* on account of the waters because they *were made bitter*, viii, 11. Here we have, quite anomalously, the present tense and the two aorists. Yet the construction may be explained by reflecting that the name of the star and the turning of the waters into wormwood are *permanent* states, while the dying of the men was *momentary*; and the first aorist, ἐπικράνθησαν, *were made bitter*, was used, most probably, to correspond in tense with the second aorist, ἀπέθανον, *died*.

Καὶ ἔχουσιν οὐράς ὅμοιας σκορπίοις, καὶ κέντρα ἦν ἐν ταῖς οὐραῖς αὐτῶν, and they *have* tails like scorpions, and stings *were* in their tails, ix, 10. It is very difficult to explain this connec-

tion of the present and imperfect tenses. Exceedingly harsh and irregular is the following passage: *καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις αἷς Ἀντίπας ὁ μάρτυς μου ὁ πιστὸς, ὃς ἀπεκτάνθη παρ' ὑμῖν, ὅπου κατοικεῖ ὁ Σατανᾶς*, even in those days in which Antipas my faithful martyr, who was slain among you where Satan dwelleth, ii, 13. Here we are compelled to supply a verb of existence after "martyr," as the easiest way to dispose of the difficulty. 'Ο νικῶν, δώσω αὐτῷ καθίσαι μετ' ἐμοῦ, he that overcometh I will give to him to sit with me, etc., iii, 21, is obviously an anacolouthon. Ἀπὸ ὧν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, i, 4, etc. Here we would expect the genitive after ἀπό; it is, however, probable that the phrase was regarded as indeclinable. The following reading has been adopted into the text by Griesbach; Ὁ Μιχαὴλ καὶ οἱ ἄγγελοι αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολεμῆσαι κατὰ δράκοντος, Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, xii, 7, the infinitive, τοῦ πολεμῆσαι, construed with a nominative case, would seem to be unparalleled. If this reading is to be received, we think that it should be explained Hebraistically. There was war in heaven, Michael and his angels *were to fight*, by supplying some form of εἶναι, or γίνεσθαι; compare the Hebrew מִיָּמֵינוּ שָׁמַשׁ הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ הָיָה לָרֶדֶת the sun was about to go down (infinitive construct). In Griesbach's Testament we have the following reading, ληνὸν τὸν μέγαν, great winepress, xiv, 19; but it must be observed that ληνός is common gender, so that μέγαν is as correct as μέγαλην. There are some other irregularities, but not of so striking a character. But after all, the most of the Greek is as regular in its construction as it is in the other books of the New Testament.

#### THE TIME OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE APOCALYPSE.

Until recently it was a very common opinion that the Apocalypse was written in the reign of the Emperor Domitian, A. D. 95 or 96. The most eminent of modern biblical scholars, with few exceptions, place it under Nero or Galba, A. D. 68 or 69.

Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, (A. D. 177-202,) is the first writer that bears testimony to the time of its composition: "For had it been necessary," says he, "that his name (the name of the apocalyptic beast) should be clearly made known at the present time, it would have been proclaimed by him who saw the reve-



lation; for it was not seen a long while ago, but almost in our own generation, toward the end of the reign of Domitian.\* Domitian reigned from A. D. 81 to 96. What makes the testimony of Irenæus valuable is the fact that he spent the early part of his life in Asia Minor, and was acquainted with Polycarp, a disciple of John, and would, therefore, be likely to know the time of the composition of the book. Yet Irenæus may have obtained no traditional knowledge upon the subject, and may have determined the time by critical conjecture.

Clemens of Alexandria (191-202) remarks that "John returned from the Island of Patmos to Ephesus when the *tyrant* was dead."† But what tyrant he means is not clear; for it is very obvious that the epithet suits Nero at least as well as Domitian. Origen (220-254) in commenting on Matthew's Gospel remarks: "The sons of Zebedee drank of this cup, and were baptized with this baptism, since Herod slew James the brother of John with the sword. The king of the Romans, as tradition teaches, banished John, who bore witness on account of the word of truth, to the Island of Patmos. These things John says concerning his own testimony, not telling us who condemned him."‡ He appears not to have regarded the testimony of Irenæus as decisive. Eusebius, (died 340,) in his Ecclesiastical History, relates that during the persecution of Domitian, "tradition says (*κατέχει λόγος*, the story goes) that the apostle and evangelist John, who was still alive, was condemned, on account of his testimony to the divine word, to dwell in the Isle of Patmos."§

According to Tertullian (about 200) the apostle John was thrown into boiling oil, (he appears to mean by Nero; a fiction doubtless,) but escaping unhurt, he was banished to Pat-

\* Εἰ γὰρ ἔδει ἀναφανδὸν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ κηρύττεσθαι τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ δι' ἐκείνων ἀν' ἐρρέθη τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν ἐωράκοτος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἐωράθη, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας γενεᾶς, πρὸς πῶ τέλει τῆς Δομετιανοῦ ἀρχῆς.

† Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τοῦ τυράννου τελευτήσαντος ἀπὸ τῆς Πάτμου τῆς νήσου μετῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Ἐφεσον.

‡ . . . Ὁ δὲ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς, ὡς ἡ παράδοσις διδάσκει, κατεδίκασε τὸν Ἰωάννην μαρτυροῦν τα διὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον εἰς Πάτμον τὴν νήσον διδάσκει δὲ τὰ περὶ τοῦ μαρτυρίου αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννης, μὴ λέγων τίς αὐτὸν Κατεδίκασε. . . .

§ Ἐν τούτῳ κατέχει λόγος τὸν ἀπόστολον καὶ Εὐαγγελιστὴν Ἰωάννην ἐπὶ τῷ βίῳ ἐνδιατρίβοντα, τῆς εἰς τὸν θεῖον λόγον ἔνεκεν μαρτυρίας, Πάτμον οἰκεῖν Καταδικασθῆναι τὴν νήσον. Book iii, chapter 18.

mos. He would, therefore, seem to have placed the composition of the Apocalypse under Nero.

Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, (died 403,) states that John wrote his gospel when he was over ninety years of age, after his return from Patmos, which took place in the time of Claudius Cæsar.\* In another place he says, John prophesied in the time of Claudius Cæsar. Claudius reigned A. D. 41-54. Epiphanius would seem, then, to place the Apocalypse during this period.

Jerome (about 400) says that "John wrote the Apocalypse when banished to the island Patmos by Domitian, who, after Nero, stirred up a second persecution in the fourteenth year of his reign."† Andreas, Bishop of Cæsarea, in Cappadocia, (probably near the beginning of the sixth century,) says in his commentary on the Apocalypse, vi, 12, "There are not wanting those who apply this passage to the siege and destruction of Jerusalem by Titus." This shows that one class of interpreters referred the book to a period before the destruction of Jerusalem; his own opinion he does not clearly give. Arethas, in the middle of the sixth century, in his commentary on the Apocalypse, places it before the destruction of Jerusalem.

The title-page of the Apocalypse, in the Syriac version, says that the book was written in Nero's time.‡ The value of this testimony, however, is diminished by the fact that the present version of the Apocalypse in Syriac does not belong to the original Peshito version, but to the Philoxenian version, which was made about A. D. 500; yet it would seem that this version of the Apocalypse was really made earlier, so that the superscription may give the judgment of the Syriac Church, of the translator at least, at a very early period.

This is about all the testimony of any value that is to be found, in the earliest centuries of the Church, respecting the time of the composition of the book. It is quite meager

\* Μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς Πάτμου ἐπάνοδον, τὴν ἐπὶ Κλαυδίου γενομένην Καίσαρος.

† Johannes quarto decimo anno secundam post Neronem persecutionem movente Domitiano in Patmos insulam relegatus Scripsit Apocalypsin.

‡ In Bagster's edition of the Peshito-Syriac New Testament, which lies before me, the superscription is as follows: "The Revelation which was made to the Evangelist John from God in the Isle of Patmos, to which he was banished by Nero Cæsar."

and unsatisfactory, but at the same time, the most of it points to the age of Domitian as the time of its composition. If internal evidence coincided with this external testimony, we should with confidence refer the book to the age of Domitian. But internal evidence of a strong character, as we will proceed to show, forces us to place it under Nero, about A. D. 68. The author himself states that he was in the island that is called Patmos for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ, (*διὰ τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ διὰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.*) The inference to be drawn from this is, that he either took refuge there to avoid his persecutors, or that he was banished there. It is true, that if Patmos had been a populous island, we might have supposed that he went there to preach the Gospel; but it is incredible that John would leave the populous cities of the Roman Empire to visit a desert island. From this text we infer that the book was written during a persecution of the Christians, and the spirit of the whole book clearly indicates the same thing.

During the first century there were but two persecutions of any note, those of Nero and Domitian. Under the reign of one of these Cæsars, our book must have had its origin. Respecting the persecution of Nero, Neander remarks: "This persecution was not, indeed, in its immediate effects, a general one; but fell exclusively on the Christians in Rome, accused as the incendiaries of the city. Yet what had occurred in the capital could not fail of being attended with serious consequences, affecting the situation of the Christians—whose religion, moreover, was an unlawful one—throughout all the provinces."\* In reference to Domitian's reign, he remarks: "The charge of embracing Christianity would, in this reign, be the most common one after that of high treason, (*crimen majestatis.*) In consequence of such accusations, many were condemned to death, or to the confiscation of their property and banishment to an island."† Hengstenberg, who bends all his strength to show that the Apocalypse was written in the time of Domitian, asserts that the punishment inflicted upon the Christians by Nero was not principally because they were Christians. "The Christians," says he, "according to the reliable statement of Tacitus, were not punished especially

\* General History of the Church, p. 95.

† Ibid, 96.

as Christians, but upon the charge of burning Rome."\* But the language of Tacitus refutes Hengstenberg; for, speaking of a great multitude of Christians that suffered, the historian adds: "Convicted not so much on the charge of burning Rome as on account of their hatred of the human race."† This "hatred of the human race" was their contempt of Paganism, which so exasperated the Roman people.

"Rise, and measure the temple of God, and the altar, and them that worship therein, but the court which is without the temple, leave out and measure it not; for it is given unto the Gentiles: and the holy city shall they tread under foot forty and two months." xii, 2. It is clear from this passage that the Jewish temple was standing when the book was written; but the temple perished when Jerusalem was taken by Titus, A. D. 70. With this passage compare Luke xxi, 24: "And Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled."

In the description that is given of the great whore that had corrupted the earth, sitting upon a beast with seven heads, the angel declares: "The seven heads are seven mountains [the seven hills on which Rome stood] on which the woman sitteth. And there are seven kings: five are fallen, and one is, and the other is not yet come; and when he cometh, he must continue a short space. And the beast that was, and is not, even he is the eighth, and is of the seven, and goeth into perdition." xvii, 9-11. We cannot refrain from expressing here our conviction that Pagan Rome is represented as the great foe of Christianity, and that there is no pope in the Apocalypse. With the data here furnished, we are enabled to determine approximately the time of the composition of the book. Five kings of Rome are fallen; these kings would be, Julius Cæsar, Augustus, Tiberius, Caius Caligula, and Claudius. "One is," that is, Nero, "the other has not yet come; and when he cometh he must continue a short space;" that is, Galba, who reigned but seven months. "And the beast that was, and is not, even he is the eighth, and is of the seven, and goeth into perdition." This seems to refer to Nero, who was expected to reappear

\* Volume i, p. 27.

† *Haud perinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis, convicti sunt. Annalium, lib. xv, c. 44.*

upon the stage of the Roman world. Tacitus remarks: "About the same time (A. D. 70) Achaia and Asia were troubled by a false alarm, as if Nero [who had been dead about two years] was about to make his appearance. Various were the reports concerning his death, and for this reason many pretended that he was alive, and not a few really believed it."\* "Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast; for it is the number of a man; and his number is six hundred and three score and six." xiii, 18. Professor Stuart states that Professor Benary, of Berlin, remarks, "that in the Talmud and other Rabbinical writings the name of Nero, נֶרֹן קֶסָר, (*Néron Kēsar*), often occurs. This amounts numerically to the number of the beast; *q. d.* 50, 200, 6, 50, 100, 60, 200, added together equal 666. Nor is this all. There was another method of writing and pronouncing the name of Nero, נֶרֹן קֶסָר, Nero Cæsar, which amounts numerically to just 616, and thus gives us a good ground of the diverse reading which Irenæus found in some codices." This seems highly probable, and would furnish additional proof that the book was written in the age of Nero. But if we begin the list of Roman kings with Augustus Cæsar, as some writers do, the five fallen kings would include Nero, and the book would have been written under Galba, but the difference of time would not be material, as Galba reigned but seven months; yet we think the bitter persecution of the Church which the book was intended to meet, with its promises of success to the Christian cause, forbids the supposition that it was written under Galba.

But Hengstenberg insists that the state of the seven Churches in Asia, which are addressed in the revelation, indicates a period later than the apostolic age. He says that the coldness of the Churches and the heresies that had sprung up are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the book was written under Nero. If the argument of Hengstenberg is valid it will prove more than he intends; it will prove that the book was written long after the Apostle John left the world. For was not John the great center of apostolic influence in the very midst of the seven Churches in Asia Minor during the reign of

\* Sub idem tempus Achaia atque Asia falso exterritæ velut Nero adventaret; vario super exitu ejus rumore, eoque pluribus vivere eum flagentibus credentibusque. Hist., lib. ii, cap. 8.

Domitian? Is it credible that under his very eyes heresies would spring up, and that under the powerful, warming influence of his love the Churches would grow cold? Is it not more credible that upon settling down at Ephesus at the close of Nero's reign he found the Churches generally growing cold? The recently discovered work of Hippolytus, a "Refutation of all Heresies," has thrown new light upon the early history of the Church. Bunsen remarks: "It is now clear we have to deal with sects which were coeval with Peter and Paul, as Simon was. But they started from foreign Judaism, mixed up with the pantheistic mysticism of Asia Minor."\*

Before leaving this part of our subject, we must inquire how the linguistic character of the book bears upon the time of its composition. The Greek of John's Gospel is more regular and freer from Hebraisms than is that of the Apocalypse. To the hypothesis, which we hold, that both books proceeded from the same author, this difference of style offers no objection, but is easily explained if we suppose the book to have been composed under Nero's reign. The Apocalypse, the earlier work, gives us a style and language in which the Hebrew idiom still cleaves to the author while the Gospel, written probably twenty-five or thirty years later, exhibits a higher degree of Grecian culture, the result of a long abode at Ephesus. But on the hypothesis that both books were written by the same author about the same time, there is difficulty in explaining this difference of style.

#### THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE APOCALYPSE.

The authorship of the Apocalypse is more difficult to determine with certainty than the date of its composition. For while external evidence is very strong in favor of its apostolic origin, internal evidence, in the judgment of a considerable number of biblical scholars, is decidedly against the apostolic origin of the book, and outweighs the external evidence. We shall first produce the ancient testimonies concerning the book.

Hengstenberg finds in the epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians several allusions to the Apocalypse. But we confess our inability to see them, and the passages that he cites are far from being clear in their allusion to the Apocalypse. From

\* Hippolytus, vol. i, p. 39.



the letter of the Church of Smyrna respecting the martyrdom of Polycarp, Hengstenberg quotes several passages as alluding to the Apocalypse. *One* of these, we think, may possibly refer to it. According to Andreas and Arethas, Papias, who lived at the close of the first century, held the Apocalypse to be an *inspired* book.

Justin Martyr of Syria, who lived about the middle of the second century, delivers a clear and valuable testimony to the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. After attempting to support his chiliasm from the Old Testament, he adds: "And since also a man among us, whose name was John, one of the apostles of Christ, in the revelation made to him, prophesied that those who believe in our Christ shall spend a thousand years in Jerusalem," etc.\* Justin had traveled extensively over the Christian world; and according to Eusebius, the Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, from which the foregoing testimony is taken, was held at Ephesus. He must, therefore, have known who was the author of the Apocalypse.

Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who lived during the latter part of the second century, a man of great learning, wrote a work "concerning the devil and the Revelation of John." Eusebius, speaking of Theophilus, Bishop of Antioch, (A. D. 170-180,) says he wrote a work with the title, "Against the Heresy of Hermogenes," in which he *makes use of testimony from the Revelation of John*. That Theophilus should quote the Apocalypse in writing against a heretic shows that the book was extensively known and authoritative, and perhaps acknowledged by the heretic himself to be an apostolic work. It is highly probable, that if either Melito or Theophilus had ascribed the Apocalypse to any other than the Apostle John that Eusebius would have noticed it.

Apollonius, who flourished A. D. 190, in refuting a Phrygian heresy, "quotes," says Eusebius, "the Revelation of John as testimony; and relates, also, that a dead man was raised by the divine power, through the same John at Ephesus."† It is in the highest degree probable that Apollonius speaks of

\* Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνὴρ τις, ὃ ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, εἰς τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀποκαλύπτει γενομένη αὐτῷ . . . προεφήτευσε. *Dialogus cum Trypho*, cap. 8.

† Ecclesiastical History, b. v, cap. 18.

the *Apostle* John. He would hardly have attributed the power to raise the dead to any other person at Ephesus.

Irenæus, Bishop of Lyons, who lived during the latter part of the second century, in his five books against heresies, everywhere speaks of the Apocalypse as the work of John, the disciple of the Lord, evidently meaning no other than the apostle. For example, he says: "Whatever John the disciple of the Lord saw in the Apocalypse," etc.; "John the disciple of the Lord saw in the Apocalypse the glorious coming of his kingdom," etc.\* In the fifth book, he says in reference to the calculation of Antichrist's name: "As matters are thus, and the number 666 is thus found in all the genuine and ancient copies, and as *they who* saw John attest," etc. The testimony of Irenæus is important from the fact that he spent the early part of his life in Asia Minor, in the very midst of the seven Churches addressed in the Apocalypse, surrounded at the same time by the disciples of John. It is true that Irenæus also says that the Apocalypse was seen toward the end of the reign of Domitian, which we have already remarked is inconsistent with the internal evidence offered by the book itself. But his error respecting the time of the composition of the Apocalypse cannot destroy his testimony concerning its author. The genuineness of a book professing to be divine, the credibility of which depended in a great measure upon its apostolic authority, could not fail to excite the highest interest. The time of its composition is not of so much importance, and hence less would be likely to be known about it. How few there are, comparatively, that know the time of the composition of most of the ancient and modern works! Indeed, the time when many of the ancient works were written cannot be determined with any accuracy.

All the witnesses that we have hitherto produced in favor of the apostolical origin of the book lived either in the very midst of the scenes of John's labors, or at least at no remote distance from them. This makes their testimony so valuable.

Tertullian, of northern Africa, the first ecclesiastical Latin writer of any note, makes great use of the Apocalypse in his Montanistic writings (A. D. 220) and in those composed before that period. He appears to know of no opposition to the Apoca-

\* Book iv, cap. 20.

lyse in the Church. Hippolytus, Bishop of Portus Romanus, in the first quarter of the third century, regarded the Apocalypse as a very early work of the Apostle John.\*

Clemens of Alexandria, in the beginning of the third century, frequently cites the Apocalypse as a genuine work of the Apostle John; and in reference to the heavenly elders and the twenty-four thrones in the Apocalypse, he remarks: "As John says in the Apocalypse."

The great Origen, who lived in the first half of the third century, delivers his testimony in his Commentary on Matthew in the following words: "What ought I to say concerning John, who leaned upon the bosom of Jesus? He left one Gospel, confessing that he was able to write so many that not even the world could contain them. *He also wrote the Apocalypse*, having been commanded to conceal and not to write the voices of the seven thunders."†

The testimony we have cited belonging to the second and third centuries of the Christian Era is of the highest importance, and, we think, it should be considered as quite conclusive respecting the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. We meet with no opposition to the Apocalypse until Montanism began to develop itself fully, about the year 200. This sect, which had its origin in Phrygia about the middle of the second century, based its fanatical pretensions to new revelations on the promise of Christ to send the Paraclete, (comforter.) This seems to have been the principal reason that led the Alogoi, who opposed the Montanists, to reject John's Gospel. Montanus taught that Christ would reign a thousand years upon the earth, and that Pepuza in Phrygia would be the capital of his millennial kingdom. The great support of the millenarian views of the Montanists was the Apocalypse. This led some of the more reckless opponents of the system to reject the book, while others sought to weaken its authority by denying its apostolical origin, admitting it, however, to be a holy book.

The first great opponent of the apostolic origin of the Apoca-

\* Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. ii, p. 141.

† Τι δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀναπεσόντος λέγειν ἐπὶ τὸ στήθος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Ἰωάννου; δε εὐαγγέλιον ἐν καταλείπειν, ὁμολογῶν δύνασθαι τοὺς αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι, ἃ οὐδε ὁ κόσμος χωρῆσαι ἰδίαντο. Ἐγραψε δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἀποκαλύψιν, κελευσθεὶς σιωπῆσαι καὶ μὴ γράφαι τὰς τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ βροντῶν φωνάς.

lypse was Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, who flourished in the first half of the third century, a man of great learning, who inquired diligently into everything that pertained either to canonical or apocryphal writings. A sensual chiliasm was prevailing in the nome of Arsinoe, the bishop of which was Nepos. So far did they carry their fanatical views, that whole Churches separated themselves from communion with the mother Church at Alexandria. Dionysius refuted these Chiliasts. It would be very natural for him to degrade as much as possible the book which was the principal support of the Chiliastic sect that had given him so much trouble. On the Apocalypse he remarks: "Some, indeed, before us, have set aside, and have attempted to refute the whole book, criticising every chapter, and pronouncing it without sense and without reason. They say that it has a false title, for it is not of John. Nay, that it is not even a revelation, as it is covered with such a dense and thick veil of ignorance that not one of the apostles, and not one of the holy men, or those of the Church, could be its author; but that Cerinthus, the founder of the sect of the Cerinthians, so called from him, wishing to have reputable authority for his own fiction, prefixed the title. For my part, I would not venture to set this book aside, as there are many brethren that value it much; but having formed a conception of its subject as exceeding my capacity, I consider it also containing a certain concealed and wonderful intimation in each particular. For, though I do not understand, yet I suspect that some deeper sense is enveloped in the words, and these I do not measure and judge by my private reason; but allowing more to faith, I have regarded them as too lofty to be comprehended by me, and those things which I do not understand I do not reject, but I wonder the more that I cannot comprehend."\* He objects to the book as a work of the Apostle John, on the ground that the apostle prefixes his name neither to the Gospel nor to the first Epistle, and that he never speaks as of himself (in the first person) nor as of another (in the third), but he that wrote the Apocalypse declares himself immediately in the beginning; that it is a John that wrote these things he must believe, as he says it, but what John it is is uncertain; that the author does not call himself the beloved

\* Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History, book vii, chap. xxv.

disciple of the Lord; that there was also another John whose surname was Mark. He then proceeds to show a similarity of style between the Gospel of John and his first Epistle, and that the whole style of the Apocalypse is different from them in every particular. The objections of this acute critic have furnished the basis of all the subsequent attacks that have been made on the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. Dionysius, however, acknowledged the book to be the work of a holy and inspired man.\*

It must be observed that he alleges no want of external evidence as the ground of objection to the book. He produces not a single preceding writer of eminence that rejected its apostolic origin. It is evident that he knew of none to whom he could appeal as furnishing a precedent.

Eusebius of Cæsarea, the Church historian, who flourished during the first part of the fourth century, doubts the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse. The criticism of Dionysius seems to have perplexed him. In speaking of the canon of Scripture, he remarks: "The opinions respecting the Revelation are still greatly divided." Again: "After these [canonical books] is to be placed, if proper, the Revelation of John."†

Methodius and Pamphilus, about the beginning of the fourth century, following the tradition of the Church, received the Apocalypse as the work of John, the apostle, without doubt. So did Lactantius and Victorinus, who lived about the same period. The great Athanasius, who flourished during the middle of the fourth century, held the Apocalypse to be the work of John, and frequently cites it as such.

Didymus, president of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, in the latter half of the fourth century, speaks of the Apocalypse as the work of the Apostle John. So, about the same period, does Gregory of Nyssa. In the same age, it is cited as canonical by Basil the Great. Cyril of Jerusalem, however, in the latter half of the fourth century, omits the Apocalypse in his canon of Scripture. The celebrated Chrysostom of Constantinople, who lived during the latter part of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth centuries, received the Apocalypse. Suidas says of him, under the title *Ἰωάννης*:

\* Eusebius's *Ecl. Hist.*, book vii, chap. xxv.

† Book iii, chap. xxv.

"Chrysostom also receives his [John's] three epistles and the Apocalypse."

Epiphanius, who lived near the close of the fourth century, speaking of John as of one of the apostles, says, "He has imparted of his holy gift in presenting us with his Gospel, epistles, and Apocalypse." Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, (395-430,) received the Apocalypse as canonical. He cites it as follows: "The Apostle John in the Apocalypse;" "John the Evangelist in the book which is called Apocalypse." Ambrose of Milan, near the close of the fourth century, received the Apocalypse.

Jerome, who was the greatest biblical scholar of the early Church, a cotemporary of Augustine, received the Apocalypse without hesitancy. He says: "John was an apostle, an evangelist, and a prophet; he was an apostle, because he wrote to the Church as a master; an evangelist, because he prepared the book of the Gospel; a prophet, for he saw in the Isle of Patmos—to which he had been banished by the emperor Domitian, on account of the testimony he bore to the truth—the Apocalypse." Hilarius, Bishop of Poitiers, in Aquitania, in the middle of the fourth century, received the Apocalypse as the work of the Apostle John.

The Apocalypse was recognized as a canonical book by the two councils of Northern Africa, held near the close of the fourth century. The judgment of these councils respecting the Apocalypse was reaffirmed by the Council of Carthage in the year 419. In the canons of the Council of Laodicea, held near the middle of the fourth century, the Apocalypse is omitted. This was, however, a small council.

Cyrl, Bishop of Alexandria, in the first half of the fifth century, speaking of the Apocalypse, says: "The wise John composed for us the book of Revelation, which has also been honored by the suffrages of the fathers." By the phrase σοφὸς Ἰωάννης, *wise John*, he could mean the Apostle John only.

It is a well established fact that the first Syriac version of the New Testament, the Peshito, did not contain the Apocalypse. This version was most probably made in the latter part of the second century, or in the beginning of the third, and it may seem strange that it did not include the Apocalypse, especially as we know that this book was almost universally received when the version was made. It is possible



that the translation was made by a violent opponent of Montanism and the Chiliasts in general, and he may have feared that the translation of the book would introduce the fanaticism of these people into the Syrian Churches ; just as Ulphilas, the Bishop of the Goths, omitted from his translation the Book of Kings, that he might not infuse into his people a warlike spirit.

Hengstenberg contends that the Peshito version could not have been made until after the middle of the third century, when the doubts of Dionysius of Alexandria, respecting the Apocalypse, had begun to produce their fruits. He thinks, also, that the version is too elegant\* to have been produced so early, and that the most flourishing period of Syrian literature begins in the fourth century. But Ephraem of Edessa, the prophet of the Syrians, who died 376, speaks of the Syriac version as "our translation," and he explains some words in it that had already become obsolete, which shows the version must have been made a considerable length of time before his age. And why may not the Syriac version have been made during the last part of the second century, if Bardesanes could at that time compose hymns in Syriac?

But the Apocalypse appears to have obtained an authority in the Syrian Church in the fourth century, since Ephraem of Edessa quotes it ; and as it is generally supposed that he did not understand Greek, it would seem that he had a version in Syriac. Assemani says in his *Biblioth. Orient.*, p. 141 : "In this language [Syriac] the holy doctor [Ephraem] quotes the Apocalypse of John as canonical Scripture,† to which I have called attention for this purpose, that the judgment of the most ancient Syrians concerning the authority of this book might be known."

Let us in the next place examine the book itself to ascertain what testimony it furnishes respecting its author. "The

\* It is by no means certain that the original Peshito version was an elegant one. A few years ago, Cureton brought from the East a manuscript containing in Syriac, in the Estrangelo character, fragments of the Gospels more ancient than any manuscript hitherto known. We borrowed a copy of these fragments from our friend Dr. McCulloh, and began a comparison between them and Bagster's edition of the Peshito, and soon became convinced that the latter is a more elegant version than the fragments, though substantially the same.

† In hoc sermone citat S. Doctor Apocalypsin Joannistan quam canonicam Scripturam, etc.

Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to show unto his servants things which must shortly come to pass; and he sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John, who bare record of the word of God and of the testimony of Jesus Christ, of all things that he saw. John to the seven Churches," etc. In verse 9 of first chapter John's abode in Patmos is said to be, "for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ," which certainly refers to the witness he bore to the truth of Christianity, as an eye-witness of the sufferings and glory of Christ. In the words, "his servant John, who bare testimony to the word of God," etc., we think there is a designation of the Apostle John. And who but an apostle would take it upon himself to address the Churches in Asia in such an authoritative tone, to chasten and rebuke them? Could John the Presbyter of Ephesus, to whom some have been pleased to ascribe the book, be expected during the lifetime of John to do this? But little, indeed, is known of this John; certainly nothing to indicate such a position as the author of this book must have held. In x, 11, John says: "And he said unto me, Thou must prophesy again before many people, and nations, and tongues, and kings." This language seems to us to indicate the sphere of an apostle, not that of such an insignificant man as John the Presbyter, whose very existence some have doubted. Nor would these words be so appropriate, if addressed to John four or five years before the close of his life, as they would be in the time of Nero, when John had thirty years or more to live.

It is true that the name of the Apostle John is not found either in the Gospel or in the Epistles as their author. Yet in the Gospel, John xxi, 24, we have the remark: "This is the disciple that testifieth of these things and wrote these things; and we know that his testimony is true." This passage, in the connection in which it stands, asserts the author of the fourth Gospel to be John. Prophets and the writers of epistles insert their names in their works; the writers of history, both in the Old and in the New Testament, do not; the apparent exceptions being John in his Gospel, to which we have just referred, and the absence of his name in his epistles. The Epistle to the Hebrews, being anonymous, is another exception. We should, therefore, look for the name of the author

in the Apocalypse because it is both epistolary and prophetic.

We have already remarked, in our observations upon the linguistic character of the Apocalypse, that its Greek is more Hebraistic, and the construction more irregular than in the other books of the New Testament. Its style differs greatly from that of the Gospel and Epistles of John. On these grounds the apostolic origin of the book has been denied by a number of very able critics. "The difference of language," says Lücke, "in the Apocalypse and in the other writings of John in the New Testament is so great, of such an individual and mental character, in short, a difference of original genius of language in the similar use of the New Testament Greek, so that even if we could grant that John's stock of words was not foreign to the author of the Apocalypse, nevertheless the identity of its author with that of the Gospel and Epistles, especially of the first Epistle, can in no way be maintained, but the contrary is in the highest degree probable."—Page 680. Again: "If all critical experience and rules in such questions do not deceive us, then it is as firmly established that the evangelist and the author of the Apocalypse are two different Johns, as it is established in a very similar problem of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that the Apostle Paul did not write it."—Page 745.

Neander remarks: "We cannot acknowledge the Apocalypse as the work of the apostle," (John,) and after discussing the question, whether it was not written by John the Presbyter of Ephesus, he says: "It is, then, more probable that the author, a disciple of John, by some circumstance unknown to us, having devoted himself to write on a subject which he had received mediately or immediately from the apostle, thought himself justified [!] in introducing John as the speaker."\*

On the other hand, Gieseler, who is inferior to neither of these men in learning and critical ability, remarks: "I cannot, however, bring myself to refuse to the Apostle John the authorship of this book. The author designates himself as the apostle; the oldest witnesses declare him to be so. Had the book been forged in his name thirty years before his death, he would certainly have contradicted it, and this contradiction

\* Hist. of Plant. and Train. Chr. Ch., vol. i, pp. 396, 397.

would have reached us through Irenæus from the school of John's disciples. On the contrary, the later contradictions of the apostolic origin proceed from doctrinal prepossessions alone. The internal difference in language and mode of thought between the Apocalypse which John, whose education was essentially Hebrew, and his Christianity Jewish Christian of the Palestinian character, wrote, and the Gospel and epistles which he had composed after an abode of from twenty to thirty years among the Greeks, is a necessary consequence of the different relations in which the writer was placed, so that the opposite would excite suspicion. There is much at the same time that is cognate, proving continuousness of culture in the same author."\* Hengstenberg and Stuart likewise adhere to the apostolic origin of the book.

To determine the time of the composition of a work can frequently be done with certainty, but to determine the authorship from the style is frequently impossible. We think, however, that similarity of style is a stronger proof of identity than a difference of style is of diversity of authorship. The same man does not always write in the same style. It is true we expect from the same man a similarity of style when writing on the same or similar subjects. But when the subjects are different, and when many years have intervened between the times of the respective compositions, and when the surroundings of the writer have changed, we would naturally expect a change of style. Between the times of the composition of the Apocalypse and of the Gospel and the Epistles of John, as we have already seen, twenty or thirty years intervened.

But this is not all. The Apocalypse is a prophetic book. The visions are of the grandest and of the most terrible character. It is impossible in this ecstatic state not to speak and write in a lofty and symbolic style. The human spirit labors to give utterance to its magnificent conceptions, language is taxed to its utmost, and the mind, excited to the highest degree of tension, spurns the ordinary rules of grammar and seizes upon whatever will express its deep emotions. In this way, perhaps, we may account for the fact that the prophet Ezekiel is careless in his grammatical forms. He had more vis-

\* Church History, page 97.

ions than any other prophet, and was more in the ecstatic state. And it must be borne in mind that John wrote in the very midst of his awful visions. Had years elapsed before he wrote them down, the style and language would perhaps have been different.

But notwithstanding the difference of style between the Apocalypse and the Gospel and Epistles of John, we shall find upon a close scrutiny of the Apocalypse a great deal that is decidedly Johannean, and which may, after all, render the apostolic origin of the book highly probable from internal evidence. The verb *νικᾶν*,\* *to conquer, to overcome*, occurs in the Apocalypse *sixteen* times; in the first Epistle of John *six* times; in the Gospel of John *once*; in all the rest of the New Testament but *four* times. This is remarkable. The word *ἀρνίον*, *lamb*, occurs *twenty-eight* times in the Apocalypse; it is found *once* in John's Gospel, and nowhere else; but the word *ἀρνός*, *lamb*, occurs *twice* in John's Gospel, and *twice* in all the rest of the New Testament, and one of these is a quotation from the Old Testament which the Ethiopian Eunuch was reading. *Μαρτυρία*, *testimony*, occurs *fourteen* times in John's Gospel, *eight* times in his epistles, and *nine* times in the Apocalypse; in all the rest of the New Testament *seven* times. The verb *διψᾶν*, *to thirst*, is used in a spiritual sense, *once* in Matthew's Gospel, *three* times in John's Gospel, and *twice* in the Apocalypse. In a physical sense, but twice in all the epistles. Compare John vii, 37, "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink," with Rev. xxii, 17: "And let him that is athirst come and take the water of life freely." There is no other passage in the New Testament like these two. Compare the following passage, in which the author of the Apocalypse speaks of himself, "Who bare record of the word of God, and of the testimony of Jesus Christ," etc., i, 2, with John xxi, 24, where the author also speaks of himself: "This is the disciple which testifieth of these things and wrote these things." "And he was clothed with a garment dipped in blood, and his name is called, *The Word of God*." Christ is nowhere in the New Testament called the *Word of God*, except in the writings of John. In Hebrews iv, 12, "For the word of God is quick and powerful," etc., the reference is not

\* In this examination we use the Greek Concordance of Schmid.

to the *personal* word Christ, but to divine truth in its all-searching power.

"Behold I stand at the door and knock: if any man hear my voice and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." Rev. iii, 20. With this compare John xiv, 24: "If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him." "Unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood." Rev. i, 5. There is no passage in the New Testament that so strikingly resembles this as 1 John i, 7: "The blood of Jesus Christ his son cleanseth us from all sin."

Nor can it be urged with any force against the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse that its tone is not of that mild type which we should expect from the loving John who dwells in the Gospel so much upon the love of Christ, rarely upon his sterner attributes. The occasion of his writing was different. In the Gospel he discusses the profound internal relations existing between Christ and his Father and between Christ and his followers. All the discourses of our Lord that bear upon this subject he gives in their fullness. These were the rays of divine truth that he perfectly reflected, while the other evangelists reflected different rays.

When John wrote the Apocalypse it was a time of bitter persecution. The world in its most destructive form was arrayed against Christianity. The sword was drawn against it. To meet this terrible enemy, Christ is represented as a mighty conqueror, before whom every foe is prostrated and the power of the world brought to naught. Nor let it be said that this last description of Christ's character is inconsistent with the first, nor that John in these different circumstances is inconsistent with himself; for souls the most amiable and the most loving are frequently the most severe when once aroused. The divine goodness itself when it has been repeatedly spurned becomes implacable; and our Saviour in the very midst of discourses full of benevolence and goodness declares, "Upon whomsoever this stone [himself] shall fall, it will grind him to powder." Is there anything at variance with John's character in the terrible descriptions of the divine judgments which he gives in the Apocalypse? In the Gospel of John it is said: "The



hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth: they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." v, 28, 29.

But if the addresses to the seven Churches are the real words of Christ, if the visions are not the offspring of John's imagination, then we should expect in the Apocalypse a different presentation of divine truth from what John himself might have given. Very different was the case when he wrote the Gospel; from the multitude of Christ's discourses and acts he could select those that best suited his taste, and fill up what had been left incomplete in Christ's character by the other evangelists. In the Apocalypse he delivers *all* the messages to the Churches; he is ordered. to write what he sees. But little room is here left for the display of his subjectivity.

In conclusion, who but an apostle could have written the sublime book? We cannot suppose that the *presbyter* John was capable of it. John the apostle, if we are to judge from the Gospel he wrote, was competent to the task. His appreciation and appropriation of the profound discourses of Christ shows his mental power. Minds that make use of symbols and imagery are often incapable of deep and philosophical reflection; but profound intellects can, if they wish, employ bold imagery and striking symbols.

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#### ART. V.—THE GREAT ELECTION.

THE greatest battle ever fought among men was waged in this country, in the Presidential contest of eighteen hundred and sixty-four. Over millions of square miles the combatants contended. Three thousand miles, from ocean to ocean, the line of battle stretched. Three millions of soldiers were in the field. The gage of battle was equally grand. Not only the life of a nation, but the life of humanity, hung trembling in the balance of the hour. Milton's imagination is of the sublimest order; yet his description of the war in heaven excels not the plain statements of the actual events that have transpired in America to-day. Were he living at this hour and in this land,

in his moments of repose from the duties to which his patriot soul would devote itself, his pen would revel in the grandeur of the scenes that have moved forward under our half-apprehensive eyes. It will assume its place in history as one of the last turning points, may we hope, in that divine highway which is being cast up among men, and which ends in the

"Shining table-lands

To which our God himself is moon and sun."

To the consideration of its character and consequences this paper is devoted.

I. Its importance will be the more clearly recognized by contrasting it with its predecessor—the election of eighteen hundred and sixty. In every respect will it be found greatly superior.

1. It is superior in the circumstances under which they were fought. Then the land was in apparent peace. Quiet possessed its borders. No tramp of armed men resounded through our streets. No cannon shook the skies. No groans of wounded multitudes made the heavens mourn. No maimed thousands limped about our doors. No weeds of hopeless sorrow shadowed the souls of mothers, wives, and children, "grieving over the unreturning brave." No dreams of war, horrid war, affrighted men's hearts: Here and there a fevered vision might fancy it discerned it. Here and there, possibly, a clearer eye did behold it. But none imagined that it would assume such a fearful magnitude. The wildest dreamer did not so fill the land with blood. Among peaceful fields from the Rio Grande to the St. Johns, the discussion went forward and the decision was made. Shotless cannon announced the victory, and tearless eyes overflowed with joy.

This battle was fought in the midst of gloom and anguish. Blood, and fire, and vapor of cannon-smoke filled all the air. Hundreds of thousands of our bravest and best had entered untimely graves. Hundreds of thousands breathed painful breath, eating the bread of affliction in Southern prisons, lying torn and shattered on the nation's couches, or wandering among us, with riven frames and pallid faces, fragments of their then vigorous and manly selves. Grief covered many a heart that then was bright with bridal bloom. Children cried for fathers whose bones unburied looked up to the pitying and

avenging eyes of God. Mothers by scores of thousands had become Naomis and Rachels. Wives by tens of thousands were going down in sorrow to the grave. What a land! lamentation and mourning, the screaming ball and the wailing household joining in doleful miserere. Starvation over hundreds of miles that then flourished in plenty; and worse than all, brothers aiming the rifle at each others' hearts that then were dwelling together in unity.

Can we say that an election proceeding under such circumstances is superior to its peaceful predecessor? Yes, even in these very elements is it superior. Look beneath the calm exterior of the former campaign. Over all that vast domain where now war rolls its bloody surges rested the gloom of hell. Millions of delicate women wrought daily in the field without reward except the lash of the master, and were nightly scourged to most horrible service. Millions of men were subject to like unmitigated toil, and to hardly less agony unutterable as they were compelled helplessly to behold their dearest selves the dreadful victims of their oppressors' lust. Everywhere the auction-block was mounted by Christians, while demons in human guise discussed their points as they would those of beasts, but with a ferocity of passion such as no legitimate and lower merchandise awakens. The husband and wife, whom God had joined together, man rent asunder. The babe was torn from its mother's breast. The saintly maiden was cast into the lecherous clutch of a fiendish buyer; and all this was sanctioned by the professed Church of Jesus Christ. Deacons, vestrymen, and class-leaders, ministers and bishops, vied with the rumseller, the gambler, and the avowed libertine in this traffic of hell. Not of the Father's house, but of the Father's sons and daughters, did they make merchandise. All Churches ran together to see which should soonest reach this goal of Satan. They all alike threw off the impediments of Northern conscience and communion that they might the more easily surpass their rivals in their diabolic race. Bishop Polk and Bishop Pierce, Dr. Palmer and Dr. Manly led their several hosts down the steep places of sin into this gulf of perdition. They yet retained the form and likeness of sacramental hosts of God's elect, though with no divine presence within them and only divine justice overhanging them. As we saw their

seemingly sacred forms, Abdiel's exclamation at Satan's yet undimmed glory leaped from our lips :

"O heaven! that such resemblance of the highest  
Should yet remain, where faith and fealty  
Remain not! Wherefore should not strength and might  
There fail where virtue fails, or weakest prove  
Where boldest, though to sight unconquerable."

They have thus proved. Their brightness, their strength, their good name is gone. Those then puissant congregations and commanders have sunk into as complete infamy, and will into as complete destruction, as the less apostate Churches of Ephraim and Jerusalem.

Is not this election preferable? The auction-block has rarely exhibited its atrocities since the fires of heaven fell upon this hideous Sodom, whose very Lots had become partakers of its vilest sins. Rare have been the forced separations, then so frequent; rare the lash, then so constant; rare the unspeakable shames, then so universal and so awful. God has suspended these atrocities even where he has not yet led them into liberty. Their Pharaohs have paused in their career of abominations where they have not yet let them go. Baleful as were the attendant miseries of the last election, they were blessed as the smile of heaven in comparison with the agonies that then rolled up from half the land in a wail that made the angels weep.

2. In another respect it may be said this last election is inferior to its predecessor. "That was held freely over the whole country, this only over a fraction." But this statement is not true. This was a freer and fuller expression of the people's sentiments than was that.

In one half of the land four years ago, no man could have deposited a ballot for Mr. Lincoln without the sacrifice of his life. Freedom of the ballot was as much precluded from the states below the Ohio as freedom of men. There was immeasurably greater liberty of voting at this election in Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and Maryland, than was ever known there before. A friend in Baltimore told me that it was at the risk of his life that he gave his vote for Mr. Lincoln in 1860. Now that city rolls up a heavier vote for him than even Boston. The alarm cry of our regiments at the Relay, fearing midnight

assault, was "Baltimore;" the midnight shout of joy to-day is "Baltimore;" so swift tread time and truth.

3. The two campaigns are vividly contrary, though also vividly alike in their relation to the great evil against which they fought. Both are but parts of one stupendous whole. Both are steps of God in his march through the earth. Each involves more than it formally asserts. Their declarations of policy and purpose show how great has been our progress in this brief hour of time.

Four years ago the highest we could reach was the non-extension of slavery. To touch it where it was was declared impossible. To lift the fetter from a single neck, to even express sympathy for those who wore them, was forbidden. Our unpeopled territories should be free. So said only a minority of the people, and they not its representatives of fashion, wealth, or influence. To-day by a great majority the people say, "No more slavery. If the Constitution does not forbid it, amend the Constitution. Not territories alone but states, not wilds but cities, shall be cleansed of this plague. The nation shall be pure." How vast that stride! Then defensive, almost in a posture of entreaty, now aggressive and defiant, liberty wraps her starry robe about her and marches forth to the sovereignty of the continent.

Though this culmination was involved in that victory, but few beheld it at all, none saw it so near. Nay, I should not say, none. The slave saw it. He felt that his redemption drew nigh. He knew how full, how pressed together and running over was the cup of his calamity and the cup of his master's iniquity. He knew, for God had told him, in his secret groanings and writhings, that the day of vengeance was at hand. The little cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, as it seemed to all common gazers, appeared to his prophetic eye in its true proportions, and he saw that there was to be speedily abundance of rain. "Father, I thank thee that thou didst hide these things from the wise and prudent, and didst reveal them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

We saw the gradual approach of the sun of liberty. We knew that it was the first blow slavery had received from the arm of the people, and that from it she could not recover.

Though it might fight long and die hard, die it must; yet we could not believe it would die so soon.

The first word spoken against it doomed it. Though Church and nation subsided into silence and submission, still that word lived. It broke forth with new power through the pen of Mr. Garrison. For thirty years it had grown amid storms such as never beat upon God's truth in this land before. It had compelled to its service ministers, lawyers, statesmen, Christians of every creed, Christians with no Christian creed, until it had become an exceeding great army. Yet it never got beyond the simple principle first enunciated: liberty is the immediate and unconditional right of all men. It had never, till this campaign, reached the height of that great argument, and for the first time since he leaped into this conflict with all the power and populace of the land, could the great revivalist of this reform approve the nomination and aid in the election of a chief magistrate. He ought to have been on the electoral ticket of Massachusetts with Edward Everett. The dullest eye would then have seen the mighty change. The two antagonists of Mr. Lincoln, each from an opposite side, the one the conservative candidate for the vice-presidency, the other the most radical denouncer of any presidency upon such a Constitution, the extreme lover of the Union and the extreme lover of liberty, unite together, to uphold both of these great pillars of our national temple.

4. This contrast of these conflicts is yet more marked in their relation to foreign nations. The former election was local and unknown. It was not seen across the Atlantic save by a few discerning eyes. The masses, whether titled or without a surname, whether in robes or rags, saw nothing. To-day they saw nothing else. The quarrels of Europe were unseen. Their international politics, once so grand to their unwidened vision, appear as the battles or diplomacies of pigmies. What matters it if Denmark is disparted, or Italy united, or Poland subjugated? They are baubles of an hour, tiny eddies of the great current whose gulf stream sweeps across America. Even the pregnant movements of this continent, the imperializing of Mexico, and nationalizing of British America, are alike unnoticed. Europe pays no regard to them. What is that rent and bleeding Democracy going to do? cry these pallid kings. "Will



she assert her purpose to fight it out on that line, if it takes a century, or will she succumb to her foes and her wounds, and, sinking amid the waves her blood has reddened, leave the ocean of the future free to our monarchic sails?"

"Will she," cry their half-despairing subjects, "will she abandon the struggle for our rights no less than for her own? Will she be slain in her own home by her own children, the most horrible matricide in history? And shall we weep in unutterable sorrow the death of her who might have been the mother of free empires wide as the earth, enduring as time?" How they gathered to their shores! How they fastened greedy eyes upon our great controversy! How they prayed for our salvation! How they leaped for joy at the glorious result! We were exultant, but with no such happiness as beat in every peasant breast of Europe.

As the first election awoke the greatest exultation in the cabins of southern slaves, so has this in the hardly less degraded cabins of England, and Scotland, and France, and Germany. It carries dismay and death to kings and their minions, life and light to their downtrodden brethren. Never before did such a message cut the skies.

II. But the greatness of this election is better seen by a more direct contemplation of its actual results. Not alone in the questionable superiority of war over slavery, or publicity over privacy, does it deserve its title of great, but by the principles which, through it, have become the unalterable masters of the nation, the certain masters of the world.

Three ideas essential to the consummation of the divine desire in Christ with respect to man have been established by this decree of America.

1. The first is that of Union. The debate on that topic is closed. Till this year it has always been questionable whether the Union would endure. It was effected with great difficulty. It was imperiled at the start by the wrongful demands of some of the states, by the wrongful pride of others.

When effected by the partial, and as we have too painfully learned, by the fatal surrender of principle, it was still expected to survive but for a season. In 1798, within ten years after its organization, the Virginia Democrats set state sovereignty above the Union. The resolutions of Kentucky, which were

written by Thomas Jefferson, became the serpent that the Satan of slavery entered and seduced the new-born nation from its rectitude. To what depths of weakness and disgrace it brought her, the closing hours of Mr. Buchanan's administration have written with the point of the diamond. Under their formulary the nation saw her forts and armaments seized, her power triumphantly defied in her own domain, and herself the scorn and derision of every petty principedom.

Not only did resolutions thus early foreshadow this struggle; the purpose to sever the Union was itself avowed in the same century that witnessed its birth. It assumed many forms, and was never formally passed upon by the people, unless the re-election of Andrew Jackson, by a great majority after his suppression of South Carolina nullification, was an expression of their hostility to it. If so the determination still lived. It flourished more and more. The reawakening of the national conscience to the great evil of slavery gave its supporters the pretext they desired. For thirty years they waged the ceaseless strife. At last, when the people had mildly said to this iniquity, "Thus far shalt thou go but no further," they sprang to arms. "The United States," cries Keitt, of South Carolina, in a jubilant voice to his rebellious associates, "are scattered unto a thousand fragments." "Disunion forever!" re-echo the leagued traitors, as they hold by the throat eleven states, more than a third of her commonwealths, more than a half of her domain.

To this shout of disruption the nation with a universal voice responded, "Not yet!"

"Not yet the hour is nigh, when they  
Who deep in Eld's dim twilight sit,  
Earth's valiant kings, shall rise and say,  
'Proud country, welcome to the pit!  
So soon art thou like us, brought low?  
No, sullen group of shadows, no!"

The first cry for the Union was an inspiration. It sprang unconsciously from every lip. They said "a picnic excursion to the Potomac will settle the business. Seventy-five thousand men, in holiday costume, lounging in Baltimore and Washington hotels, and easily moving down upon Richmond, will recement the Union in its old and immaculate perfection." They knew not with how great a price this treasure was to be

bought. One army after another must perish. The pleasure excursion must become funereal. "Death must come up into all our windows, and enter into our palaces to cut off the young men from the streets." After three years and over of such a price paid for the Union, the people reaffirmed their solemn vow, not as at first, in thoughtless exultation and enthusiasm, but in a tearful, an humble, yet most resolute purpose to carry out that divine inspiration, at whatever expense of money or of life.

So intense was this feeling, that no one presumed to ask our suffrages who would not publicly consecrate himself to the Union. But some held out the olive branch to the rebellion; complained of the war and the sacrifices of purse, of life, of liberty that were essential to secure its perpetuation; and the people decided, with an agreement that has since been made unanimous by the willing co-operation of all, "the Union shall be preserved; at whatever cost, at whatever hazard, at whatever suffering, we will be still one people." From the Calais of our continent to its Golden Gate, a space larger than that which Europe spans between her Calais and her Golden Horn, with a depth, a solemnity, an enthusiasm that was unutterable, the heart, the voice, the vote said, "We are, we will be one." That debate has closed; 1864, it will be said by the future historian, settled the question of America's nationality. No longer will state rights resolutions vex and frighten the people. No longer will we foolishly say, "our system is an experiment." It has ceased to occupy that place in human affairs. Once the press was an experiment; so was the railroad, so the steam-ship, so ocean steam-navigation, so the telegraph, so Protestantism, so Christianity. But they have ceased to hold such positions. The American Union has likewise; it stands forth before the world the most tried, the most triumphant form of government that exists among men.

2. The election settled the greater and more doubtful question of liberty. The President had proclaimed emancipation, but would the nation proclaim it? It was his act before, his alone. Congress had not confirmed it. The Supreme Court had not constitutionalized it. The people, "the masters," as the President happily says, "of Congress and the courts," sat in judgment upon it. They heard the appeals of

the contending attorneys. They carefully deliberated. They enthusiastically affirmed it. Henceforth it stands as enduring and sublime as the Declaration and the Constitution.

Already has it brought forth its perfect fruit. Congress, the servant of the people, has uttered their decree, and the nation is redeemed forever from the yoke of bondage. At the risk of seeming repetition of what has been referred to under another head, let us mark the steps of this reform. Four years ago we only dared to stay the progress of this deluge of death. We promised to preserve it inviolate where it was. We would have passed an amendment to the Constitution pledging ourselves to secure it national protection in the states where it existed, if that would have appeased our enraged masters. Charles Francis Adams offered such an amendment, and only the hopelessness of its acceptance by the slaveholders prevented its passage; and now another amendment has passed, not to preserve it intact but to sweep it from the land. Then the President, under his inaugural oath, promised it the support of his official arm; now the same President, before the campaign opens, and when policy requires those declarations that are the least offensive and the most popular, announced his purpose to labor for its universal extirpation.

No such reform was ever so speedily effected. Never before has a great nation so suddenly swept away an iniquity which was so inwoven into its whole fabric of social as well as civil life as to have received the familiar title of "the *domestic* institution." Till within four years it governed the land. It had elected our presidents, appointed our judges, sent abroad our ambassadors, chosen our Congresses, enacted our laws, controlled our commerce, dictated our fashions, tyrannized over society; had been the only constant, the supreme power in the land.

It had grown from a feeble handful, at the organization of the government, till it claimed the ownership of four millions of souls. It had spread itself from the Atlantic coast half across the continent. It had injected its poison into the whole community, so that there was a most unchristian and inhuman, but universal shrinking from all however lightly touched with the degraded blood, as if they were infected with pestilent disease.

Thus stood the system then. The people after years of exhortation gained courage to look the monster in the face; they dared to say to it in its onward march, Halt! It raged on them with supercilious scorn. "If war comes," says its arch-leader, "it shall be on northern soil. They shall smell southern powder and feel southern steel." Little did its myrmidons fancy its future. They were assured of unquestioned dominion.

How are the mighty fallen! Three fifths of their territory is wrested from them. One half of their slaves are national freemen. One half of their states have broken from their allegiance and have adopted constitutions forbidding slavery. And now we are on the verge of universal emancipation. Ere this year shall close, liberty will be proclaimed by the agreement of the ratifying states throughout all the land to all the inhabitants thereof. Halleluiah! the Lord God omnipotent reigneth! His right arm hath gotten him the victory!

Wise men, even when believing in abolitionism, counted those foolish who said when the former election occurred, that under peaceable movements slavery would cease before 1876, but if war came it would not last five years. War came and where is it? You may diligently consider its place, but it is not. As the antediluvian world in forty days was washed out of the earth, with all its wealth and pride, with its solid temples and palaces, so that the keenest antiquarian can find no trace of its existence, so has this system, wicked as any the antediluvian sinners imagined, much less did, been buried under the deluge of God's indignation through the myriad arms and votes of his obedient people.

3. This election was the victory of Democracy. Union might have been maintained and true democracy destroyed. So was it well-nigh in the "save-the-Union" victories of 1852 and 1856. So is it utterly in the strong league of the slaveholders to-day. But our victory was the triumph of the equal rights of all men, without distinction of color or origin. "I vote the white man's ticket," said one on depositing his ballot for the unsuccessful candidate. "I vote all men's ticket," might have been the just response to his antidemocratic democracy. This question, deeper far than that of Union, deeper even than that of liberty, was also in the thickest of the great

conflict. It was the unspoken word louder than any that was uttered. It was the undertow, stronger than any which agitated the surface, that moved the ship of state on its God-appointed course.

This victory has already achieved great results. Its greatest we have mentioned. It alone produced the amendment and purged the land of its ancestral curse. Another result, hardly inferior, deserves a record. It caused the elevation of Mr. Chase to the chief justiceship. Had his principles not triumphed in that campaign, he would not sit, to-day, on the throne of national justice, their most permanent and, with one exception, most exalted embodiment.

For a generation the people had been made to err in judgment. One who occupied that bench had begun his career as an abolitionist, but abandoned it under the temptations of ambition.\* That seat became the fountain of injustice. The whole bench became corrupt. Every judge became a partaker of the sins of his chief. If one died who kept his ermine spotless amid the great defilement, his place was supplied with one fouler than the rest, until at the last the whole was a unit of sin and shame. The circuit judges, and even the commissioners, were infected with the same poison, so that no human being pleading for his liberty found favor in the eyes of these unjust judges. The fact that they sought it was made the ground of its refusal. The more they wearied them the less they obtained justice. In Boston as well as in Charleston did this iniquity sit in the throne of judgment.

At last their chief spoke, and, like his master in Eden, gave the lie to all the principles in which we were created. America, the child of equal rights, gives no rights to one sixth

\* Will not the Methodist Church and ministry of Maryland be called to answer for that dereliction and its fatal results? When Mr. Taney defended Mr. Gruber for denouncing slavery, he found no supporters among the Methodist preachers of his native state. They palliated, they did not uphold their brother, as Dr. Strickland's life of Mr. Gruber amply and painfully shows. When the most numerous and powerful Church was silent, why should he speak? That clerical dumbness was broken in the utterance of the Dred Scott decree. This was the hideous birth of that sinful dalliance. May the present ministry of that now free state show their sorrow for their fathers' error, by most ardent service in the cause of God and man; especially in the abolishing of all outward and inward separations of the brethren of a common faith and common country.



of her population. Free or slave, they are all without the pale of law. They cannot plead at her bar for property, liberty, or life. They cannot testify for themselves or others. They cannot defend themselves, their wives, or their children. They have no rights which this nation is bound to respect.

God heard that hiss of hell, and he too entered this Eden and walked among a fallen people, who sought to hide themselves from him by impudently denying his authority and his law. He said, "If my children have no rights, you shall have no peace. If they cannot hold their property, I will take yours away. If they are deprived of their liberty, your sons shall pine in a more loathsome prison-house, beside which the hut and the fare of my negro child are princely. If their lives are not protected, yours shall be wasted." How fearfully has he avenged his own elect who cried day and night unto him! We have heard and heeded, and through this election brought forth a great work, meet for our great repentance. For that God-vacated office the national voice nominated their candidate. It was God's appointment, not theirs. He had identified himself with the oppressed from the beginning. He had been a consistent, humble, faithful lover of God and his fellow-man. He had plead their rights unheard at the very bar where now he sits supreme. Greatest of all our victories is this. More than the triumphs of Grant, and Sherman, and Farragut; more than the re-election of Mr. Lincoln and the assertion of our unity and abolitionism, is the elevation of Salmon P. Chase to the chief-justiceship of America. Those were wrested from our foes, this from ourselves. Those were the expressions of pride, this of principle. Those sought to save the national life, this the national soul. Those insured our existence, this our glory.

No more will Congress frame iniquity by a law. No more will petty circuit judges, and pettier commissioners, play their hideous tricks of authority before the indignant heavens. His subordinates shall imbibe his spirit, his associates shall utter his will, and national justice shall find expression in the national judge.

His was more than the appointment of Jay or Marshall. Upright as they were, they were not selected especially in view of the relation of their uprightness to existing wrong. Justice Chase was. He will uproot with his judicial ax not

slavery alone, but its worse roots, caste and prejudice, and all the undemocratic and unjust treatment of our fellow-citizens and fellow-men, and complete the work that is so gloriously begun.\*

III. The consequences of this decision are twofold: those that concern foreign states, those that will affect our own.

First. This election will be an important step in the liberation of Europe. As the "bubble democracy" has not "burst," that of aristocracy must. The two systems are wrestling for the mastery of the world. Three millions of bayonets support a half dozen thrones on the necks of a hundred millions of men. Those hundred millions have heard this great decision; their half a score of masters have heard it also. Victoria sees in it the hand of America, her nation's first born, writing the doom of her family on the walls of her palace. Napoleon beholds in it his dream dissolving, of Mexican domination and California acquisition. The breakwater he had hoped to have set across our Southern line to the deluge of democracy is swept away, and the reflux waves will not only drown his American pretensions but his central throne.

Already the *Times* confesses its influence on the rising demands of the disfranchised masses of Britain. Already the secretary of her treasury declares that manhood is the only right basis for suffrage. Already the peasants and patriots of the continent are uniting together for the common weal.

The suddenness and completeness of our emancipation is but a type of that which will yet renew the face of the earth. In a day has this nation been born. In one shall those of England, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Russia; not in their pres-

\* In the light of the present position of Mr. Chase, his private words, written to Theodore Parker, are worthy of our attention. They are found in the appendix to his *Life*, pp. 519-521. Thus writes this humble-hearted yet strong-hearted man of God: "My conscience tells me that you overrate me greatly. I am only fit to do the common work that lies right before me from day to day, and in truth, I have no aspiration to do any other. I never could fancy myself a great man, or ever realize that I occupied a great position, and I suppose both of these ideas are necessary to great achievement, especially political achievement." Again, p. 520, he says, "I don't pretend to be a very wise or expert statesman, or anything of that sort; but a roughly-trained practical man, who wishes to do something for truth, justice, and human progress, and who would prefer that what little he does or says should be so spoken of, that nothing in his example of word or deed shall even seem to contribute to the upholding of wrong." How perfect is this portrait of a true judge!

ent disintegrated and hostile condition, but like ours, a unity of life, of liberty, of name; one nation, free, fraternal, Christian.

Second. But more important duties invite our service. We too have a future as well as a present and a past; and it would ill become us in our rejoicings over what we have attained to be unmindful of what yet remains to be accomplished.

This battle has settled two great questions that have been in fierce debate and in perilous position throughout our history. It has shown that the nation is rooted and grounded in the doctrine of Union and the doctrine of liberty. These pillars of its common weal it will stand by so long as its nationality endures. There is yet one step it must take, fraternity. The French democrats wisely put this as the climax of their creed. It is there and everywhere the highest grace, and the last attained. We have decided for democracy. We must carry out the principles of democracy. That principle is no distinction of man from man by any accidents of color or clime. "All ye are brethren" is its sole creed. We have yet failed to embrace this truth. The Cleveland Platform declared the right of all men to suffrage. Congress in its territorial constitutions, Maryland and Missouri in their new free constitutions, limit that right to white men. They are not yet wholly free. Only by consistently obeying this call of God can we preserve that whereto we have attained. Cromwell and Napoleon both failed in the great revolutions they achieved; and why? Because they were false to the fundamental principle of those revolutions. The Pilgrims of Plymouth gave Cromwell the model of a free commonwealth. Equality and fraternity were the foci of its orbit. He created himself lord, and the Lord of lords cast him down headlong, and his work fell with him into a grave, where it has lain for more than two centuries. Napoleon was the child of democracy. He denied the mother that bore him, and was cast out and trodden under foot of his enemies. This grace he could not reach. The peasant Frenchman his equal and brother? never. Do not we feel like him? Would we not welcome to our tables to-day a rebellious slaveholder sooner than his loyal slave, even if the latter was as well mannered as the former? Would we place one of this class in our stores or shops, however capable? Would we accept the brightest scholar in the land, if of this race, as a professor in our schools,

or the most eloquent preacher, whose lips God has anointed with grace, as our pastor and guide?

This prejudice exists only in this fraction of our continent. It must be overcome here. Brazil, Mexico, the West Indies are without it. Europe and the East are without it. The conductor on the cars from Cairo to Alexandria was as black as ebony; while nearly all the passengers were either Europeans or Arabs; and the African was the easy master of the turbulent Asiatics and the haughty Caucasians.

To the removal of this prejudice every lover of Christ and his country should devote himself; and this because it is the only way of duty, the only way of salvation. If we pause now, we fall back into a deeper pit than that out of which God has most mercifully and most miraculously delivered us.

That such is our peril, the history of the great party whose career is just closing clearly shows. No party ever had a more glorious beginning. It sprang into life as the friend of man. Its name came from France, and was considered synonymous with the rights of man everywhere. Its great leaders, Jefferson, Monroe, Madison, Gallatin, were the ardent defenders of the French democrats, and organized their party on the basis of fighting their battles with and for them on every sea and against every foe, Austrian, Russian, British and all.

They won the power, and war arose in consequence of their principles. For war never would have come with England had the Federalists kept the government. In the height of the war the Federalists assailed them and were annihilated. An era of good feeling arose. The Democrats refused to apply their principles to their own people. They rejected the head-stone of their corner, the equal rights of all men, and it has become the head-stone of their grave. Jefferson favored slavery, of which he had declared God had no attribute that did not make war upon it. He urged its extension beyond the Mississippi. The democracy passed the Missouri Compromise, and in that day dying it died. Never since has it breathed its natal air. Never since has it been the defender of the rights of man.

What then is the service to which the Master calls us? This, and this only: *to abolish from the national action and the national heart all distinctions arising from color or origin; all thought and feeling that such distinctions are divinely*

*intended to separate members of the same human family, who are and must ever be one in blood and in destiny, in sin and in salvation, in Adam and in Christ.*

1. In the discharge of this duty we must seek to abolish the unrighteous distinctions which are made in the composition and control of our armies. Two features therein are contrary to every national idea, their separation into regiments by themselves, their exclusion from the honors they have won. There should be no black regiments by the decree of the government. If persons of this hue should of themselves organize such a regiment, the government might accept them as they accept Irish or German regiments. But had it been announced to our foreign-born population: "You can only serve in regiments of your own nationality; you are forbidden to march in the same company with American troops;" how would they have scorned the summons of such a government! How justly would they have said, "Let Americans save America, if they persist in oppressing us with such invidious distinctions!" Equally just would it have been for colored Americans to have said: "You compel us to keep in regiments by ourselves; we will march in no regiments at all. You brand us with prejudicial infamy; we will not voluntarily accept the insult. If your government shall draft us and compel us to fight, we are powerless to resist; but not of ourselves will we rally to the flag, that is not fraternal."

This distinction must be abolished. A citizen if he volunteers should join what regiment he chooses; if he is drafted, those that most need his musket. The idea of color or origin should be as far from the mind of the provost marshal as is that of nationality or name. We shall then cease to read of the valor of white or colored troops as separate bodies, but of men and patriots, whose complexion may be various, but whose blood and bravery are one.

The second military iniquity we should abolish is the refusal to grant them commissions and commands. This glaring injustice will be patent to every eye, if we consider what would be the feelings and conduct of other privates should such a law degrade them. Were it announced to the army that only West Point graduates could hold commissions; that their valor, their skill, their experience can only elevate them to a sergeant's

bands, how long would they serve such a land? Yet there are a hundred thousand of our soldiers who fight under this insulting opprobrium. However valorous, however endowed with military genius, however prodigal of life, they are not only compelled to serve in the ranks, but to see less competent white men set over them, and that solely on the ground of their complexion. This great injustice, this democratic lie, must be abandoned. It is part and parcel of the system of aristocracy that we have formally decreed shall vanish away. The work has been initiated by the conferring of a lieutenant's commission on one of these soldiers. It should be hastened forward. Congress should abolish the unjust distinction, and the man, whatever his complexion or origin, who wins his shoulder straps, should wear them studded, if he deserves it, with the three stars of a lieutenant-general.

2. We must grant them civil equality and fraternity.

The question of negro suffrage is assuming an importance, not only to the true democrat and Christian, but to the most feeble or most false professor of democracy and Christianity. It will be found that here as in the army we must call on those we yet despise to come and save us. Professor Lieber shows that by abolishing slavery we have increased the basis of representation in the Southern states by the two fifths of the slaves who were before constitutionally excluded. If these are forbidden to vote it increases the power of the white man in those states against his fellow of the North, by that large addition to a census-counted but non-voting population. If the rebels should be allowed to return with any powers and privileges, such as would have been accorded them in the late peace conferences, they would avail themselves of this iniquity to re-establish themselves in more than their former power. Our only and sure cure for this peril, is for Congress to decree the right of suffrage for national officers to be without respect of color.

Again, the loyal white men of the South must call on their equally loyal brothers, often of more white than colored descent, to come and save them from the voting of their Secession neighbors. These once active rebels, when these states resume their forms of civil life, will outnumber their loyal neighbors, and snatch again the scepter after having thrown down the sword with which they had sought the murder of the very



government they will then represent. The loyal whites will be cast back into the pit out of which the national arm has dragged them, unless they will lift their like loyal colored fellow-citizens to equal honor.

But not as a measure of necessity should this be urged. It is one of duty. In many states of the Union this cruel disability exists. With proud rebellious hearts we say, "the foreigner may vote, the native shall not. The brutalized victim of papacy, whom priests and pope make hostile to our ideas and institutions, may oppose the government that protects him with ballot, almost with bullet, and yet lose no right of suffrage; while the most protestant of our protestants, the most godly of the godly, the most faithful of the faithful, shall not utter his voice at the ballot-box against these foreign foes." We should instantly annihilate every such barrier, and make suffrage and manhood identical. What Gladstone demands for England, Congress ought to bestow upon America.

"But," cries one timid of soul, "if this right is conferred so freely in states where the blacks have a majority, they will become its governors and representatives, and a black man may sit as a senator in our national capitol!" And why not? Ought not the larger fraction of the population of South Carolina, who are among the most loyal in the land, to have the administration of the affairs of that commonwealth? And if the most conservative citizens have for years contemplated with approval, and aided with their liberality, the rising glory of Liberia, can they object to a more truly named Liberia growing into majestic life on the ruins of Charleston, so long the seat of the beast? Will not Captain Robert Small be as good a governor of South Carolina as Michael Hahn, far less loyal, is of Louisiana? Is not his first office prophetic of his future, and is not the master of "The Planter" yet to be the master of the planters?

But not alone in the states where they are numerically superior, will they justly claim the position their merits shall secure for them. In every state the same privileges must be accorded. No more and no less in Carolina than New York should they rise higher than they merit. Here as there, whoever deserves the highest seats should sit there. Frederick Douglass, one of the first orators and clearest headed statesmen

of America, should be the representative in Congress from his district. He has no equal in the national estimation within its boundaries. He would soon show that he was worthy to follow his great Auburn neighbor into the senate chamber and the cabinet. He might win what the other has lost, because to his ability is joined more popularity if not more principle—the highest honor the nation can bestow. "*Palmam ferat qui meruit*" is the only motto for a democratic people. If he deserves the palm he should carry it, by the votes and with the applause of all the nation.

3. This work should be carried forward in the Church. Sad is the fact, but most true, that those who call themselves the disciples and representatives of Jesus Christ are in their body the most tenacious of this iniquity. Whatever the name of the Church, her spirit and act is the same. No professed Church of Jesus Christ here has reached the heights of fraternity which every other profession has allowed. The medical and the legal bodies have admitted them as equals; not so the clerical. They visit around the same couch, they act as attorneys for the same client, as their whiter fellows; they cannot belong to the same conference with us, travel the same circuit, or be settled over the same congregation. And yet the Church professes to represent and should represent the highest ideas that man can receive or entertain. It is the depository, the vehicle of God. His best truths he commits to her as a distributing reservoir to all the world. Her ministers he deigns to call his servants and ambassadors; her members, his sons and daughters; and yet when his Son, the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person, calls himself especially the Son of man—not of men, much less of a class of men, and that white men, but the Son of MAN—when his Spirit orders his servant to declare to the Churches that in Christ Jesus the middle wall of partition is broken down, that in him there is neither Greek nor Jew, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free, male nor female; when he forbids the setting off one portion of the Church by itself for any outward distinctions; against the words of Christ, the teachings of the apostles, the lessons of history, the testimony of every conscience in the sight of God, the Church in America gives itself earnestly to the support of this heaven-hated sin. She compels these her brethren and sisters to form

Churches of their own. She separates God's ministers of the least tinged with this complexion into conferences by themselves. If any of these Christians come into her brahmin assemblies, she hastens to commit the very sin that James rebukes, and has "the faith of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons," saying unto his brother, often of the very complexion of James and the Lord Jesus Christ, "stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool." How those holy words rebuke our haughty sin! "If ye fulfill the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, ye do well. But if you have respect of persons, ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors." Then comes that dreadful imprecation, so awfully fulfilled upon the apostate Churches of the South, so fearfully experienced in our own griefs and calamities: "For he shall have judgment without mercy that hath showed no mercy."

O that the Church would arise and wash herself of this abomination! She should instantly invite her despised brethren to sit in her exalted seats. She should abolish the iniquity known only to Protestant America, the colored Church. She should invite all those whom God has called to serve at her altars, which are not hers, but his. She should throw her mighty influence against this cruel and false prejudice, and drive it from the land. She should proclaim the great doctrine of the Bible, the central doctrine of the cross, the unity, the fraternity of man, and should declare that what God hath put together man shall not put asunder. Then and then only will God's smile and benediction rest upon her. Then shall she go forth, not as now, to feeble victories and frequent defeats, but to constant, glorious, and increasing triumphs. Scriptural holiness will spread rapidly over all the land, and the coming of Christ speedily redden the divine horizon.

To this high and heavenly work the great election calls us. This grand future opens its celestial vistas to our waiting eyes. Union, emancipation, democracy, the triad of triumphant principles, will insure the unification, the liberation, the fraternization of America. Her sons of whatever hue, shall wear her honors of whatever height. Sella Martin will be the popular

pastor of a popular Church, having no taint in its composition of the present bitterness of Christians against their better brethren, but composed indiscriminately of those who, though of many complexions, are of one Lord, one faith, one baptism. John S. Rock will sit as judge where now not one of his race can sit as a juror even when those of their own color are on trial for their life; and the perfection of justice will be consummated, and God the judge of all be satisfied then, and then only, when one of this blood whom our late chief-justice declared had no rights, shall occupy his seat\* as the administrator of equal rights to all the land. Such a one is the Queen's highest judicial representative in Jamaica to-day. Such will be America's in Washington to-morrow.

Such are some of the results and obligations which spring from that national decree. The work is not yet accomplished. Our brothers yet pine in prison-houses, and suffer unto death on the bloody field. The foe is yet stiff-necked and rebellious. It may be long ere the high lands of perpetual peace are reached. We may see days as dark as any which have covered us. Yet the end is sure. The grand uprising assures its coming. Does it also that higher, that diviner end to which the whole creation moves? Will the nation, will the Church, will every Christian, every minister, every man gird himself for this greater task? If so, that higher glory will speedily dawn. The sun will rise that knows no setting. The kingdom of Christ will be established. The whole earth, one family, will dwell in him, knit together in love, in labor, in faith, in joy; while over it all will bend the cloud of witnesses, with celestial faces, the martyred and sainted dead of every age and clime, not the least in honor and happiness those of our own

\* These particular results we presume our respected contributor hails, not as desirable in themselves, but as symbols of a great progress and a just reparation. We coincide with him so far as to hold that all *legal* disabilities precluding such results should cease to exist. Suffrage irrespective of complexion, but conditioned upon a degree of education, is both just in itself and essential to the well-being of our republic. A pariah caste in our free North will ever be a danger and a calamity; of which education and suffrage are the sole Christian, republican, and politic remedy. At the extreme south the ballot in the hands of the *Afric-American* is the best and most peaceful possible insurance of loyalty to the government. It is little less than practical treason to the perpetuity of the Union to place the disfranchised colored loyalty of the cotton states beneath an oppressive disloyal superstratum.—Ed.

age and clime, reliving happiest lives in their more saintly children, the inheritors of their sacrifices, their grace, their renown.

"For all they thought and loved and did,  
And hoped and suffered is but seed  
Of what in these is flower and fruit."

## ART. VI.—FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE.

### ROMAN CATHOLICISM.

**THE POPE'S BULL AGAINST MODERN CIVILIZATION—PARTIES WITHIN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.**—The Encyclical or apostolic letter addressed under date of December 8, 1864, by Pope Pius IX. to all Roman Catholic bishops, is one of the most remarkable documents which in modern times has emanated from the Papal See. The pope reminds the prelates that his predecessors have never failed to state and condemn the errors against the fundamental principles of religion spread throughout society, and in particular against the Roman Catholic Church. He adds that from the commencement of his pontificate he has invariably rebuked these errors in his allocutions delivered at the Consistories, and in his frequent Encyclical letters to the bishops. Seeing, therefore, that errors and false opinions are constantly upon the increase in religious and lay society, the pope declares that he addressed himself to the bishops upon the present occasion to excite their zeal to confute error, and to arrest the evil which false ideas of religion, philosophy, and politics inflict upon the modern world.

The Encyclical letter then proceeds to enunciate the gravest errors which must first be confuted. These are stated as the opinions of those who say, that civil progress requires society to be governed without reference to religion, or without any difference, being made between the true faith and heresy; that liberty of conscience and of public worship are essential in a well-organized government; that the will of the people, as displayed by public opinion, or by

other means, constitutes a supreme law and a true right, and that accomplished facts in political affairs are to be regarded as rightly in force; that religious orders are not entitled to exist, and ought, consequently, to be suppressed; that family society is dependent solely upon civil law, so that the government has the exclusive right of regulating the relations between parents and children, and of directing instruction and education; that the clergy should not be permitted to take part in public instruction, because they are opposed to progress. The pope further condemns the opinions of those who hold that the laws of the Church cannot have binding force unless they are promulgated by the civil authority; that excommunications pronounced against usurpers of the rights and property of the Church are an abuse; that the Church has not the right of punishing those who violate her laws; that the ecclesiastical power is not by divine right distinct from or independent of the civil power; that obedience may be conscientiously refused to those decrees and decisions of the Holy See which do not affect points of faith. All these opinions and several others are rebuked, proscribed, and condemned in the Encyclical letter, and the pope prohibits their being in future entertained by true believers.

The Apostolical letter is accompanied by an appendix ("syllabus") of eighty propositions, containing the principal modern errors inveighed against by the pope. Seven refer to Pantheism, naturalism, and absolute rationalism; seven to moderate rationalism, four to religious indifference, twenty to errors against the Church and her rights, seventeen to

errors current in civil society and their relations to the Church, nine to errors of philosophy, ten to errors connected with Christian marriage, and six to modern liberty and the temporal sovereignty of the pope.

The following are among the most important condemned errors:

15. Every man is free to embrace and profess the religion he shall believe true, guided by the light of reason.

17. At least the eternal salvation may be hoped for of all who have never been in the true Church of Christ.

23. The Church has not the power of availing herself of force, or any direct or indirect temporal power.

24. The Roman pontiffs and œcumenical councils have exceeded the limits of their power, have usurped the rights of princes, and have even committed errors in defining matters relating to dogma and morals.

32. The personal immunity exonerating the clergy from military law may be abrogated without violation either of natural right or of equity. This abrogation is called for by civil progress, especially in a society modeled upon principles of liberal government.

39. The state of a republic, as being the crigin and source of all rights, imposes itself by its rights, which is not circumscribed by any limit.

47. The most advantageous conditions of civil society require that popular schools open without distinction to all children of the people, and public establishments destined to teach young people letters and good discipline, and to impart to them education, should be freed from all ecclesiastical authority and interference, and should be fully subjected to the civil and political power for the teaching of masters and opinions common to the times.

55. The Church must be separated from the State and the State from the Church.

77. In the present day it is no longer necessary that the Catholic religion shall be held as the only religion of the state, to the exclusion of all other modes of worship.

78. Whence it has been wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that emigrants shall enjoy the free exercise of their own worship.

79. But it is false that the civil liberty of every mode of worship and the full power given to all of overtly and publicly displaying their opinions and their thoughts, conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people and to the propagation of the evil of indifference.

80. The Roman pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to and agree with

progress, liberalism, and modern civilization.

The Encyclical has not ceased since its publication to be a prominent topic of discussion for the entire press of the civilized world. The Catholic press are unanimous in accepting it. By Catholic press we understand solely those papers, whether ecclesiastical or political, which profess an unconditional attachment to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, and to the authority of the pope as its head. The number of these papers has considerably increased since 1848, and every country of Europe has now its Catholic organs, though their number, in comparison with the Protestant and liberal press, is everywhere insignificantly small. There were hitherto among the professedly Catholic papers two different parties as regards the relation of the Church to modern civilization, and, in particular, to that modern theory of society which demands the recognition of the separation of Church and State, the broadest religious toleration, control of public education by the state, abolition of all political privileges of the clergy, and other similar doctrines among the fundamental laws of every state. One party, the rigorous ultramontanists, reject this theory absolutely and uncompromisingly as false and contrary to true religion. The *Civiltà Cattolica*, the organ of the Jesuits at Rome, and the *Monde* of Paris, are the boldest and most gifted champions of this theory. Another party regards these views as one-sided and fanatical. It recognizes many good features in modern civilization, advocates a reconciliation and union between it and the Church, and demands in particular the enjoyment of equal political rights by members of different religious denominations. The ablest organ of this party is the *Correspondant* of Paris, among the editors of which are, or were, Count Montalembert, the late Father Lacordaire, Father Gratry, M. de Falloux, Augustin Cochin, and many other prominent Catholics of France. Montalembert and Lacordaire have frequently and severely criticised the fanaticism of *Le Monde*, and other ultramontane sheets; and Montalembert, at the Catholic congress of Belgium, in 1863, went further than any of his friends in the bold defense of the principle of religious toleration. The majority of the Catholic papers of the world have not directly taken



part in the controversy. The *Monde*, of Paris, is, on the whole, the chief and the favorite source from which the Catholic press of the entire world derives its information; yet occasionally the large majority of Catholic periodicals have expressed the same views on religious toleration and modern society as the *Correspondant*.

By the *Monde*, the *Civiltà Cattolica* and their partisans, the Encyclical was of course received as a great triumph. Henceforth, exclaimed the *Monde*, a liberal Catholicism will no longer be possible. Rome has expressly condemned, not only the false liberalism, but liberalism in general, and all good Catholics will now respect this decision of the Holy See. The editors of the *Correspondant* seem to have at first been doubtful as to what course to pursue. It was rumored that they would discontinue their organ, but this proves to have been unfounded. The *Correspondant* has at length published the Encyclical, but with the remarkable reservation that it accepts it in the sense of those bishops who do not regard it as conflicting with modern civilization. Many Catholic papers undoubtedly entertain the same sentiments as the *Correspondant*; but, as far as we know, not one avowedly Catholic paper of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, or any other country of Europe, has uttered an open word of dissent.

The same may be said of the bishops. Some of the recently appointed bishops of France, especially the Archbishop of Paris, are generally supposed to be Gallicans, and not to share all the views of the pope, yet all of them observe a respectful silence.

It is, therefore, all the more remarkable, that a cardinal should be found openly to disapprove the language of the Encyclical. Yet such is the fact. Cardinal d'Andrea has had the more than ordinary courage to declare himself opposed to the views of the pope, and it is reported that six other cardinals agree with him.

A point of great practical importance is the question whether Catholic citizens of states which have liberal constitutions can reconcile a sincere submission to the pope's Encyclical with a sincere loyalty to their state constitutions. Belgium, France, Italy, Austria, Bavaria, are states predominantly Catholic, but the constitutions of which recognize the

equal civil rights of members of non-Catholic religions. Thousands of Catholics, including priests, bishops, and cardinals, are every year taking the oath of respecting, maintaining, defending these constitutions. Will they deem it compatible with their duty as Catholics to remain loyally devoted to the liberal constitutions of their states?

The most liberal among the Catholic countries of Europe is Belgium, whose constitution guarantees to every citizen personal freedom and liberty of conscience. Hitherto the "Catholic" party of that country has professed an equal attachment to the constitution as the Liberal party. The *Monde*, of Paris, has always represented the fundamental principles of the Belgian constitution as irreconcilably opposed to the spirit of the Catholic Church. The "Catholic" party of Belgium have generally avoided a discussion of the principles of their constitution, but regarding it as an accomplished fact, professed a determination to adhere to it. Most of them, in accepting the Encyclical, contend that it does not in the least alter their relation to their constitution. Thus, according to "*La Paix*," of Brussels, one of the leading Catholic papers of Belgium, the pope only declares that truth is solely to be found in the Catholic Church, that error cannot claim the same rights as truth, nor vice the same rights as virtue. In this sense it fully adopts the bull, and maintains that dogmatically the pope must be intolerant. But the Catholic legislators, it further argues, are not challenged by the bull to punish the abuses of liberty of the press any more than they are commanded to punish blasphemers or other offenders against the precepts of the catechism. Other Catholic papers of Belgium apologize for their constitution by remarking, that at the time of the adoption of the constitution Belgium was not a purely Catholic country, and had to make concessions to the anticatholic liberalism. All these arguments admit, that in the opinion of Roman Catholics the doctrines condemned by the Encyclical are not desirable in themselves, and ought only to be conceded when the Catholics find themselves in a minority. On the other hand, however, the conduct of the Catholics of Belgium, and most of the other countries, clearly indicates that they lack the courage to carry the pope's view into execution. In our own country the

Archbishop of Baltimore has made the singular discovery, that the papal anathemas are not at all intended against constitutions like that of the United States, but merely against the infidels of Europe. Such an assertion is not at all creditable to the candor and the intellect of the American prelate, but it shows that the representatives of the pope in this country do not dare to make a practical application of the views of Rome to our institutions.

The papal party itself, as we have seen, acknowledges but timidly the papal manifesto, and refuses to carry it out. But the papal party is now in a minority in probably every country of Europe. In Paris there are only four daily papers, which claim to be regarded as Catholic papers, against more than a dozen which respect neither the ecclesiastical nor the temporal authority of the pope. In Vienna, a single Catholic daily is with difficulty sustained by the high aristocracy; and in Austria, in general, more than five sixths of all the political papers are decidedly anticatholic. The same is the case with the press of Turin, Florence, Milan, Madrid, Lisbon, Cologne, and the other large Catholic cities of Europe. Everywhere one or two Catholic papers are with difficulty sustained, while all the leading papers are decidedly liberal. Of the Catholic governments of Europe there is not a single one which has expressed its concurrence with the views of the pope. Italy and Austria have allowed its publication, but expressly reserved the rights of the state, and carefully guarded against indorsing it. France and Spain have prohibited its official promulgation by the bishops, and new conflicts between Church and State seem to be the inevitable consequence.

Thus Europe has repelled the last attack of the papacy upon the progressive spirit of the age; and according to all signs of the times, Rome will now have enough to do to keep herself on the defensive.

## THE GREEK CHURCH.

### RUSSIA.

INTERCOMMUNION BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND THE ANGLICAN CHURCHES—RUSSIAN MISSIONS—THE BIBLE IN RUSSIA.—The movement toward establishing intercommunion between the Anglican and the Oriental Churches, is

beginning to enlist considerable interest among the Russians. An interesting account of the disposition of the heads of the Russian Church with regard to this subject was published last year by the Rev. Mr. Young, the secretary of the Russo-Greek Committee, appointed by the last General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church of this country, who in the first months of the year had visited Russia, and conversed with some of the prominent men of the Church. In St. Petersburg he had an interview with the Procureur General and the Vice-Procureur General, who are the emperor's representatives in the Holy Synod. They referred him to the Metropolitan of Moscow, Philaret. Mr. Young had two interviews with the Metropolitan Philaret of some three hours each, the Vicars of the Metropolitan, (Bishop Labas and Bishop Leonide), together with the rector of the Spiritual Academy of Moscow, two interpreters being present on each occasion. The conversation consisted chiefly in the asking and answering of questions as to the doctrines and ecclesiastical position of the Anglican and the Russian Churches. It was arranged that the chief portions of the Anglican prayer-book should be translated into the Russian language. The Metropolitan expressed his gratification at the interview, and at the prospects of more friendly and intimate relations of the two communions. The Russians are especially beginning to acquaint themselves better with the literature of the Anglican Churches. An association of ladies has been formed for the dissemination of theological and general reading matter. The association has been in operation about a year, and has its depository at Moscow. The books kept at the depository and destined for circulation are:

1. Church books, (all the books indispensable for the service of the Church,) Bibles, Testaments, Prayer-books, etc.

2. The writings of the fathers of the Church, popular sermons, explanations of the Bible, and in general, books relating to the history, doctrine, and the rites of the Church.

3. Books concerning the history and geography of Russia, travels, descriptions of the country, biographies, popular songs, and standard works of our most eminent writers.

4. Juvenile literature, books for instruction, and entertaining books for children, carefully selected.

5. Books on various subjects, but particularly adapted for popular reading, tales, stories, descriptions of foreign countries, engravings, etc.

This society, through the Rev. Mr. Young, expressed a desire to the Church Book Society of the Protestant Episcopal Church of New York for material to help on their work, and in compliance with this request, the Book Society, on June 13, 1864, passed a resolution authorizing Mr. Young to forward to the Russian association, at his discretion, copies of any of the publications of the society, or of any books on its approved list, and to convey to the association assurances of fraternal and cordial sympathies, bidding them most heartily "God speed" in their labors of love.

An important report on the progress of the union movement was made February 15, 1865, to the convocation of Canterbury, by Chancellor Massingberd, in the name of the committee appointed by the convocation in 1863, in order "to communicate with the committee appointed at a recent synod of the bishops and clergy of the United States of America, as to intercommunion with the Russo-Greek Church, and to communicate the result to convocation at a future session." After having referred to their communication with the American committee, the report continues:

It is an instance of the increasing interest that is taken in this question at home that your committee are enabled to state to the house that there has been formed in England an association called "The Eastern Church Association," which already numbers among its patrons the Most Rev. the Archbishop of Belgrade, the Most Rev. the Archbishop of Dublin, with several more of our English bishops, the principal objects of which are to inform the English public as to the state of the Eastern Churches, and to make known the doctrines and principles of the Anglican Church to the Christians of the East. Your committee have been favored, at their last meeting, with the presence of the Very Rev. Archpriests Popoff and Wassilief, chaplains to the Imperial Embassies of Russia at London and Paris, from both of whom they have received the most cordial assurances of personal co-operation. It would be premature to lay down any principles or conditions on which it may seem to your committee that such intercommunion as is contemplated may be brought about, further than this: to establish such relations between the two communions as shall enable the laity and clergy of either

to join in the sacraments and offices of the other without forfeiting the communion of their own Church; that any overtures toward such an object should be made, if possible, in co-operation with those Churches with which the Church of England is in communion; and that such overtures, whenever made, should be extended to the other Eastern Patriarchates, and not confined to the Russo-Greek Church. With this view your committee ask leave to sit again, and suggest that, if the Convocation of York should think fit to delegate any of its members to sit with them, they should be authorized to confer with them, and also to co-operate with any committees of other branches of the Anglican Communion. Your committee, citing the words of the Venerable Patriarch and Synod of Constantinople, that "the Orthodox Church of the East has never ceased to offer with tears fervent prayers to her God and Saviour, who maketh of two one, breaking down the middle wall of separation between them, that he may bring all Churches into one unity, giving them sameness of faith and communion of the Holy Ghost," conclude with the words of the prayer familiar to us all, "That as there is but one body and one spirit and one hope of our calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all, so we may henceforth be all of one heart and one soul, united in one holy bond of truth and peace, of faith and charity, and may with one mind and one mouth glorify God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

The interest taken in Russia in the progress of the union movement led to the sending of a Russian priest, Father Agapius, to New York, to organize the resident members of the Greek communion into a regular Church. Father Agapius was received by the clergy of the Protestant Episcopal Church with great cordiality. The rector of Trinity Church, and the bishop of the diocese, being asked for the use of one of the chapels of Trinity Church for the provisional celebration of the Greek service, not only gave unhesitatingly their consent, but expressed a profound interest in the success of the mission, and an ardent hope that it might promote the union movement between the two communions. As the Greek Church holds to transubstantiation, it would seem that this service was essentially a performance of Mass. In that case it is rather singular that the performance should have been admitted into an American Protestant Church.

In a former number of the *Method-*

ist Quarterly Review we gave an account of the missions of the Russian Church in Asia. Outside of Russia, the Church had hitherto sustained only one mission, in Pekin, China, which was established in the reign of Peter the Great, more than one hundred and fifty years ago. Its objects were strictly limited to the welfare of a colony of Russian subjects who had been captured on the Amoor, and planted near Pekin. A treaty between China and Russia authorized the Russian Government to keep six Russian missionaries at Pekin, being changed once in ten years, with the right of having a few students to learn the Chinese and Manchoo language, with a knowledge of Chinese affairs. Hitherto the character and the fruits of this mission have not been well spoken of by the Protestant missionaries in China. But we now find, in the "Missionary Herald" for February, 1865, a letter from Mr. Blodgett, missionary of the American Board at Pekin, who writes, September 8, 1864, that "the Russian missionaries in Pekin now labor directly for the Chinese" in the country, as well as in the city. And he adds in behalf of the Russians this testimony:

It is an interesting fact, and one which marks a difference between them and the Roman Catholics, that they translate and use the sacred Scriptures. Their version of the New Testament into Chinese is now in print in this city. They have obtained, also, from the English missionaries, the version of the Bible by Messrs. Swan and Stallybrass, and published by the British and Foreign Bible Society, for the use of their ministers to the Mongolians, and the version of the New Testament, published by the same society, for the use of their missions in Russian Manchuria. It is hopeful to see this regard for the Word of God. Their terms and usages coincide mostly with those of the Roman Catholics.

Other interesting statements on the missionary work going on in the Russian Church we derive from the report of the Rev. J. Long, an English clergyman, who recently spent several months in traveling in Russia, for the special purpose of studying the religious and social condition of the country. Mr. Long was informed by the Bishop of Viborg, who is at the head of the academy of St. Petersburg, for training priests, that the Russian Church has about a hundred missionaries and missionary agents at

work in Siberia and the adjacent districts. A Russian noble, who is one of the emperor's chamberlains, and favorable to missions, gave him much information on what the Russian Church is doing for the missionary cause: they have missionaries located in the Altai Mountains, at Kamtschatka and the Caucasus, near Lake Baikal, and have also a number who labor among the Bariats, who are Buddhists. The Russians intend shortly to found a missionary seminary, to be located either at Kasan or Irkutsk, as St. Petersburg is unsuited for it, and they wish to have it in a place where the Oriental languages can be taught to the students. Another nobleman, member of the council of state, much interested in missions, wished to introduce Mr. Long to the emperor's physician, who is a pious man, and for this purpose took him to the palace of Tsarko Celo, twenty miles from Petersburg, when the physician promised to speak to the emperor in favor of the proposal to form a general Russian missionary society to remove obstacles and secure the support of the imperial family. He afterward spent several days at the monastery of Troitz, near Moscow, in company with a Greek monk, who is going out as a missionary to the Caucasus, where the Russian Church is prosecuting its missions vigorously in Siberia and Eastern Asia. The principal of the Russian Academy, at Moscow, gave him an interesting work on the "*History of the Missions of the Russian Church*." Mr. Long speaks of Mr. Yususoff as warmly in favor of missions. Also of Bishop Leontides as one who speaks English, and is the only bishop of the Russian Church who has not been brought up a monk, having formerly served as an officer in the Russian navy. He is a man of enlightened views, anxious for a reform, as is also Philaret, the Archbishop of Moscow.

The same Mr. Long also makes some interesting statements on the circulation of the Bible in Russia. The holy synod of the Greek Russian Church has itself put in circulation a new and improved version of the Gospel in Russ. The Russian clergy have never made, like the Council of Trent, a decree against Bible circulation among the people. Mr. Long was told by Kasim Beg, a professor of Persian at the University of St. Petersburg, that he had translated the New Testament into the Tartar language,

at the express request and with the aid of the Archbishop of Kasan, whom he described as a man ready for every good word and work. Russian friends at St. Petersburg resolved, last year, to send a colporteur to the fair of Nijnii Novgorod for the sale of Bibles; but before he got half way, there was such a demand that he sold all his stock, and had

to write back to St. Petersburg to get a fresh supply for the fair. The increase of schools among the peasantry is also rapidly increasing the circulation of the Bible. When Mr. Long was in Russia the Holy Synod was publishing a new edition of eighty thousand copies of the Testament, which will be sold at fifteen copeks a copy, or about sixpence.

## ART. VII.—FOREIGN LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

### GERMANY.

We have already noticed the appearance of a work on the reunion of the Roman and the Oriental Church, (*Geschichte der Kirchlichen Trennung Zwischen dem Orient und Occident von den ersten Anfängen bis Zur jüngsten Gegenwart*. Vol. i, Munich, 1864,) by Dr. Pichler, lecturer (Privatdocent) of Catholic Theology at the University of Munich. The work is highly recommended by the Protestant, still more than the Roman Catholic press, for the author belongs to that class of Catholic writers who seek to distinguish themselves more by the thoroughness of their learning than by the use of violent language against other religious denominations. The "Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung," of Berlin, the leading Church paper of the evangelical party of Protestant Germany, gives on the occasion of the publication of this work an interesting article on the recent literature concerning the reunion of the Roman and the Oriental Churches, from which we give a few extracts. The author had already made himself advantageously known by two other works on the relation of the Greek to other Christian Churches, one on the Patriarch Cyril Lukaris and his Times, (*Der Patriarch Lukaris und seine Zeit*, Munich, 1862,) and the other on "The Present Stage of the Oriental Church Question," (*Die Orientalische Kirchenfrage nach ihrem Gegenwärtigen Stande*, Munich, 1862,) in both of which he displays thorough scholarship, as well as a candor rarely to be found in Roman Catholic authors. Already in these two smaller works he had indicated what he more fully develops in

his larger work, that in his opinion both the Eastern Church and the papacy had an about equal share in the perpetuation of the schism. In the introduction and concluding paragraphs of his larger work, Dr. Pichler gives a very copious collection of the opinions of prominent men in both Churches respecting their reunion. From this it appears that the representatives of Rome generally demand the submission of the Greeks to the supremacy of the pope as the first condition of such a reunion, while the Greeks and Russians regard the papal supremacy as the greatest obstacle, and favor a federative co-existence and mutual recognition of the two Churches.

Among the chief representatives of the Roman view the author quotes Bishop Dupanloup, of Orleans, who made a brilliant speech on the subject at the great assembly of Roman Catholic bishops, held at Rome on June 3, 1862. Dupanloup regards as the sole course of the origin and perpetuation of the schism the arrogance of the patriarchs of Constantinople, who intended to rob the pope of the primacy. A similar opinion is expressed by an Austrian statesman, Baron J. A. Von Helfert, in an article on "Russia and the Catholic Church of Poland," published in the Vienna "Review," in 1864. Helfert says that the Greeks themselves do not deny that they had recognized the primacy of the pope long ago, and that, therefore, the schism is only due to their arrogance and pride. A Russian Catholic, Kirejewski, published in 1859 a pamphlet at Paris entitled, "*La Russie est-elle Schismatique*," ("Is Russia Schismatic?") in which he makes the paradox assertion, that since the council of Florence the Church of

Russia was *de facto* and *de jure* united with the Church of Rome; a boldness for which he was punished by the Russian Government with exile. This view of a reunion is advocated with special zeal and ardor by the Russian Jesuit, Prince Gagarin, who in his work *L'Avenir de l'Eglise Grecque unie*, regards as the best means to lead the Greeks over to Rome the establishment of a central seminary of the united Greeks of all nations, at Constantinople, which is to educate the missionaries for the "conversion" of the Greeks. "The heads and teachers of this seminary, he thinks, ought to be monks of Latin orders, who, however, should adopt and adhere to the Greek rite, as the Latin rite would always remain in the eyes of the Orientals something foreign, which could only produce distrust."

Those representatives of the Greek Church who are not altogether averse to the idea of a reunion make Rome responsible for the schism, and demand from her a return to the true form of Christianity, which, they say, the Oriental Church has preserved much more pure than the Church of Rome. Abbé Guettée, a learned priest of the Catholic Church of France, who has been excommunicated by the bishops and the pope on account of his strongly expressed antipapal opinions, declares in his work, *La Papauté Schismatique*, ("The Papacy Schismatic," Paris, 1863:) "Not the Orientals are schismatic, but the popes, who used the misfortunes of the East to arrogate to themselves, under the title of successors of Peter, a universal power in the Church." The Russian Privy Councillor, Yutchef, in a memorial concerning the union question which was presented to the Emperor Nicholas in 1850, made the admission that "the Christian principle had never entirely disappeared in the Roman Church; yea, that it was yet stronger than error and passion, and would once triumph over all its enemies;" but this triumph, he thought, would be obtained when Rome "on that day of the great union shall restore to the Orthodox Church inviolate the deposit of a Christian guidance of the western Church." The Byzantine theologian, Elias Tantalides, (in his review of De Maistre's work *du Pape*, and of Abbé Jager's *History of Photius*, Constantinople, 1847,) expresses the hope that "the time will yet come when the pope will also hear the voice of the good

shepherd, and following the lead of the ancient holy popes, will be honored as the father of all Christian nations, and as the highest although not infallible head of orthodoxy." Another Greek writer, in an article on the Orthodox Anatolian Church compared with the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Church, (in the religious journal, *Εβangelικός Κήρυξ*—*Evangelical Herald*—Athens, 1861, January number,) does not show the same readiness to concede to the pope an honorary primacy, in case he should be converted to the Orthodox Church, but he utters very tolerant views on the relation of the Greek to the Roman Catholic and the Protestant Churches, and hopes that all the differences will some day be amicably adjusted. He believes that both Churches have fallen into serious errors: Protestantism, by proclaiming the principle of free investigation; and the papal Church by adding new perverse doctrines, as that of the primacy of the pope, and of the immaculate conception to the old fundamental doctrines of revelation. But the members of both Churches, he says, can be saved if they overcome the dangers and obstacles of their way, and live in accordance with the doctrines of the orthodox Anatolian Church. Another writer in the same Athenian journal (February, 1861) says that men will be saved in every Church which believes that Jesus is the Son of God, God-man and Saviour. The Russian Turgeneff (*Les Russes et la Russie*, 1847) thinks that the educated classes of his country lean more toward Protestantism than toward Roman Catholicism, and expects that when religious liberty shall be proclaimed in Russia, Protestantism will receive from the Greek Church a great many members. The Greek Pitzipios, who was formerly one of the chief advocates of a union with Rome, (in his work *L'Eglise Orientale*, 3 vols., 1855,) and organized at Rome a "central committee of the Christian Oriental Society," has, since 1860, fallen out with Rome, and professed views which more approach Protestantism. In a work on Romanism, (*Le Romanisme*,) published at Paris in 1860, he declares that the substance of the Romish system is a despotism which employs every means of fraud and violence for attaining its purposes; that Christian Rome has inherited the domineering spirit of Pagan Rome; that the popes, as blind



tools of Romanism, have done violence to the doctrines and ceremonies of the Church; that the temporal power of the popes and their claim to infallibility are the two great obstacles to a removal of those discrepancies which now exist between the Eastern and Western Churches. Dr. Pichler regards the argumentation of Pitzipios as in many respects eccentric, paradoxical, and adventurous, yet he himself repeatedly declares, either directly or indirectly, against the papal claim to infallibility, and he also declares that "the union will not be effected until it will be seen that great real difficulties, especially on our side, prevent it, and until we unitedly labor for removing them." He recommends to the members of his own (the Roman Catholic) Church a more thorough study of the doctrine, the life, and the constitution of the Oriental Church than has hitherto been found among them. As far as the Orientals are concerned he expects much from the increase of civilization, especially among the lower classes of the population, from the growing influence of the light of science, from a thorough reform of the clergy, whose fanatical intolerance, spiritual degradation, hierarchical arrogance and avarice constitute the greatest obstacle to union on that side.

Rome is still very far from encouraging, or even tolerating, such views as those expressed by Dr. Pichler; still it pays a great deal of attention to the study of the history of the Greek Church. The propaganda has recently published, in order to promote the union movement among the Greeks, two works: a History of the Council of Florence, by a Benedictine monk, (*Ἡ ἀγία καὶ οἰκουμένη ἐν Φλωρεντία σύνοδος*), and a History of the Greek Church Law, by Cardinal Pitra, (*Juris Ecclesiastici Græcorum Historia et Monumenta*, jussu Pii IX., Pont. Max., curanti J. B. Pitra, S. R. E. Card. One vol. in fol., Greek and Latin.)

The "Life of Mahomet," by Dr. Sprenger, (*Das Leben und die Lehre Mahomets*, Berlin, 1865,) has just been completed by the publication of the third volume. The work is highly prized by scholars, and especially by Orientalists, on account of the vast erudition and the profound research of the author. His views on religion, however, in general, and on the Christian religion in particular,

are a feature which greatly diminishes the interest of Christian readers in his work. The introduction to the work embraces a comprehensive survey of everything pertinent to the origin of Mahometanism.

#### FRANCE.

A resuscitation of Saint Simonism as a theological system is attempted by Emile Barrault, (*Le Christ*.) The author distinguishes three phases in the progress of Saint Simonism. The first disciples of the school, and the master himself, did not go beyond the limits of metaphysical speculation; then came those who gave to their theories the form and character of a religious system, finally, the present adepts indorsing in all its consequences the doctrine of Saint Simon, and thoroughly understanding his thought, claim to be the successful apostles of transformed Christianity.

A new work in favor of the belief in a transmigration of souls has been published by André Pezzani, (*Pluralité des Existences de l'Ame*.) The author undertakes to show that the notion of immutability, either in reward or in punishment, is absurd; while, on the contrary, the opinion which admits of our final purification and beatitude after a series of probational existences is absolutely certain, both historically and dogmatically. In support of this view, M. Pezzani invokes the testimony of, 1. Profane Antiquity, (book i.) 2. Sacred Antiquity, including the Jewish and Christian theologies, the Kabbala, etc., (book ii.) 3. Cotemporary writers, (book iii.) The fourth book gives us the author's own conclusions.

A Jewish writer, J. Cohen, has undertaken to defend his race from the charge of being "deicides," (*Les "Deicides,"* Paris, 1865.) His argumentation is, that Christ neither said nor did anything to convince the Jews of his times of his divinity; that consequently, if the Jews were mistaken, they erred in good faith, believing only to have a man before them when they put him to death according to their laws.

An interesting contribution to the history of the papacy is the "Diplomatic History of the Conclaves," (*Histoire Diplomatique des Conclaves*, 2 vols., Paris, 1865,) by Petrucello della Gattina, a prominent member of the Italian

Parliament. The author is a decided opponent of the spiritual as well as the temporal power of the popes, and attacks popery without mercy. He could hardly have selected a fitter subject for

his work, for the Conclaves are prominent among those events in the history of the Church of Rome, which appear even to the eyes of her devoted partisans as anything but edifying.

#### ART. VIII.—SYNOPSIS OF THE QUARTERLIES, AND OTHERS OF THE HIGHER PERIODICALS.

##### *American Quarterly Reviews.*

EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY REVIEW, January, 1865. (Gettysburgh, Penn.)

1. The Reformation, the Work of God. 2. Darwin on the Origin of Species. 3. Lutheran Hymnology. 4. Exemplary Piety in the Ministry. 5. Condition of the Jews in the Days of Christ. 6. The Name Jehovah. 7. Pennsylvania College. 8. Repose as an Element of Christian Character. 9. The Israelites Borrowing from the Egyptians.

FREEWILL BAPTIST QUARTERLY, January, 1865. (Dover, Mass.)—1. Rénan's Life of Jesus. 2. Missions and the Schools. 3. The Presidential Election. 4. The Ground of Reward in Heaven. 5. Webster's New Dictionary.

AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, January, 1865. (New York.)—1. Christian Miracles and Physical Science. 2. Delivery in Preaching. 3. Origin of Homer's Purer Religious Ideas. 4. John Foster on Future Punishment. 5. Gibbon and Colenso. 6. Christianity and Civilization. 7. The Covenanters and the Stuarts. 8. Whedon on the Will.

Of the three extended opposing reviews of "Whedon on the Will," in the Princeton, the Danville, and the American Presbyterian, the last, by the editor, Dr. Smith, is undoubtedly the ablest, and we, therefore, select it for full reply. By subjecting the work to an unsparing hostile scrutiny, the Review has done it the invaluable service of really attesting the final validity of its argument and the indestructible truth of its great doctrine. After retrenching a large area of generalities and one-sided blank assertions, we have a residuum of manly attempts at severe logic, skillfully aimed at important positions; logic which it is a pleasure for us to meet and to demolish. We stand upon this singular vantage ground with Dr. Smith, that his every argument, so far as there is regular argument, has already been within our own mind, more clearly than in his pages, deliberately weighed and amply provided for. So that by an unfortunate (to him) anachronism, his argument was mostly refuted before it was written; like an infant reprobate, damned before it was born. In a large number of instances we may be obliged simply to refer him to the unanswered answers to his reasoning in the volume itself, and decline giving him any further

reply until he has dealt with what we have furnished. In this Synopsis we shall notice a few of his collaterals and incidentals, and, as we hope, place on record our answer to his main argument by a full article in a coming Quarterly. It is our earnest prayer and our joyous trust that the cause of truth will be advanced; and that a true, liberal, evangelical, compact, and symmetrical theodicy, based upon accurate views of human freedom, and furnishing exalted views of God's righteousness, will be increasingly established.

1. Dr. Smith opens, or rather prefaces the discussion by saying of the author of the work reviewed :

He brings all Calvinists, old school and new school, in New England and in all branches of the Presbyterian Church, under the same condemnation. It is rather amusing to see Princeton and Andover, Bangor and New Haven, swept into the same drag-net; all classed as "necessarians." . . . He will not admit them into the full Arminian fellowship unless they are prepared to say, that the "power to the contrary" has actually been exercised, or, that they do sometimes choose from the weaker inducement.—P. 125.

If we sweep them into the same "drag-net," it is precisely where they "sweep" themselves. With all their subordinate variances they all claim to be Calvinists; proclaiming Edwards their common standard, and ready for a brave and compact onset upon us frank, prompt, and exultant Arminians. Why should we "admit them into the full Arminian fellowship," when none of them ask admission? For one or two centuries their pulpits have resounded with demonstrations against something they called "Arminianism." Let them send Edwards's fatalism, with a *facilis descensus*, to its own place, and adopt the free, God-honoring theology of JAMES ARMINIUS, and, all protestant as we are, no Pope ever welcomed a returning heretic to his fold more heartily than we will "admit into the full Arminian fellowship" these unfortunate but wise refugees from the inharmonious "drag-net."

2. Dr. Smith (p.\* 127) imputes to us the "assumption," not the assertion, mark, "that Calvinism as a system stands or falls with the doctrine of 'philosophical necessity' as expounded by Edwards." We assumed this, we reply, just as much—and no more—as did both the Edwardses themselves assume it; and just as much as Dr. Smith himself assumes it in every paragraph but the one containing this unnecessary denial. The "elaborate essay" of Dr. Cunningham, so instructively quoted by our reviewer in disproof of our so-called "assumption," was quoted and discussed by us in our Quarterly at the time of its publication; and one of the series

\* The p. refers to the pages of the Review, the P., capital, to those of the work reviewed.

to which that "elaborate essay" belonged is quoted in our volume (P. 420). That philosophical necessity formed a part of the Calvinism of Calvin himself we have shown on P. 421. As to the relations of the philosophy to the theology we apprehend we needed no instructions from either Dr. Cunningham or Dr. Smith. Whether Calvinian predestination requires necessity from strongest motive force or not, our work (P. 268-276) furnishes ample proof, *as yet unanswered*, that it contradicts the freedom of the human will.

3. Dr. Smith (p. 129) criticizes our definition of Will: "The power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act." It will forestall most of his criticisms (all, in fact, but a retort of Edwards's logic upon himself) for us to say that it is necessary to a successful definition, not that it should specify *all* the attributes of the subject defined, but such attributes as will individualize and mark it off from any other actual or conceivable thing. The possibility of any other thing being included under the definition vitiates it; the possibility of there being specific attributes not included in the definition does not. The definition of a straight line as "the shortest distance between two points," omits its very main quality of straightness, and specifies a result of the straightness, namely, its maximum of brevity, as the isolating element. When, therefore, Dr. S. asks whether there is "no unconscious act of the Will;" and whether there are not "immanent preferences," or "permanent states," and "choices;" and whether the "Will is all act;" he leaves the validity of our definition untouched. Will and Will alone, of all actual or conceivable things, is still "the power of the soul by which it is the conscious author of an intentional act." What other attributes it possesses, of what other predicates it is the true subject, are matters that subsequent analysis must decide; and the development of any number of such, unless contradicting its statement or vitiating its exclusiveness, leaves the definition unharmed.

When Dr. Smith asks, "Is the Will all act?" we reply No, it is no *act* at all, but only faculty or power for an *act*. And when Dr. S. seems to imagine that we are caught napping in this omission of something besides *act*, will he please note that we had just given (P. 15) a previous definition in which was added to the word *act* the phrase *or state of being*. Dr. Smith, then, sees that this exclusion of everything additional to *act* was conscious and purposed. Cannot Dr. S. imagine why? Then we will tell him. The *state* is but a remoter consequence of the *act*; the position of mind brought about by it; and so is too remote for inclusion

in the definition. Or if it be an *immediate* product of Will, then it is properly a continuous or permanent act, or acting, or action; and so is nothing at last but *act*. When a man *sits down*, his subsequent sitting posture is either a state or an act. If a *state*, it is a consequent of the act; if an act, it is a continuous *act* of sitting. So far as its immediate product therefore is concerned, in Dr. Smith's sense of the words, the *Will* is *all act*.

4. Dr. Smith says that to distinguish *volitional* from *voluntary* is "*arbitrary*" and "to multiply vain distinctions." Now an "*arbitrary*" or "*vain distinction*" is a distinction founded in mere caprice and not in the nature of things. But will Dr. S. deny that the *will* and the *arm* that obeys the *will* are in nature two different things, and their acts two different acts, and that two different acts need to be distinguished by two different terms? The distinction between the *volitional* and the *voluntary* is valid unless Dr. S. can show that a mental faculty and a muscle are one and the same thing.

5. Dr. Smith, as a retort for the difficulties in which his side is graveled in their endeavors to rid themselves of the term necessity, etc., endeavors to be sarcastic on our disuse of the word *self-determine*; pretending that (contrary to our plain showing, P. 121) the disuse arises from the exposure by Edwards of its illogical character. The "*pluripotential cause*," he assures us, is nothing but the old self-determining power over again. Now this identity we not only admit but positively affirm. "*Pluripotential power*," "*contrary power*," are essentially what Samuel Clarke, Whitby, and Fletcher meant by "*self-determining power*." We fault the term not because it expresses the same thought, but because it expresses it with too little precision. And this *power* of diverse choice is just the very thing that Edwards professes to demonstrate to be impossible to exist or conceive, as involving the infinite series. So far from obscuring this fact, we wish to emphasize and bring it out into bold prominence. It, then, makes conspicuous the fact, shutting off all contrary pretense, that Edwards proves that the *power* of otherwise choosing in the given case *does not exist*; not, that *it exists but is never used*. That is, he demonstrates the non-existence, not the non-usance of contrary power; he annihilates all mere invariable sequence; he holds no certainty which differs from necessity; no necessity which differs from fatalism. Our disuse of the term self-determination arose (as Dr. S. knows, but ignores that we fully stated) from lexical, not from logical reason. In answering Edwards's logic based upon the term *we used the term*. We

declined any logical advantage by laying it aside, and faced his sophisms down in the full use of the term itself.

6. Edwards's definition of Necessity is this: "The full and fixed connection between the thing signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true." In this definition we said (P. 61) "Edwards does not say what he means." He really means, we said, that the necessity lies *in* the connection; that it is a necessary connection; not that the connection is necessity itself. And we may here add, by the way, that even if any one should imagine the necessity to be the connective, still the connective is not the connection. Against all this Dr. Smith maintains that Edwards nevertheless "does say just what he means;" namely, that the *necessity* and the *connection* are literally identical. The necessity does not "lie in" the connection; but *it is* the connection.

If Dr. Smith were here, what he is not, correct, if Edwards did really mean that the *necessity* and the *connection* were absolutely one and the same thing, it were so much the worse for Edwards; for what we indulgently supposed to be an error in expression then becomes an absurdity in thought. A connection is a *co-relation*, coherence, inherence, or some kind of junction between two or more things; and whether that junction, etc., be necessary or not, that is, whether the quality of *necessity* lies in it or not, becomes a further question. So that the *junction* and its *necessity* are two things. Thus taking Edwards's and Smith's example, "God is infinite;" we have here the connection of quality, "infinite," with its subject, "God." The *connection* is simply *inherence*; for the quality *inheres* to the subject. Whether this is a necessary "connection," is a matter of further analysis. But the connection and the necessity are two things. If we find the connection absolutely indissoluble, then we call it necessary. That is, it is a "full and fixed" connection because it has necessity in it. The connection is one thing; its necessity is another.

That Edwards simply made a *verbal* mistake, is clear from the fact that he, in a later paragraph, uses the very language we say he ought to use. Thus speaking of *consequential necessity* as existing between logical propositions, following consequently upon each other, he says: "This necessity lies *in* . . . the connection of two or more propositions one with another." That is, the necessity is not the connection itself, but "lies in" the connection of the two necessarily connected propositions. But if the *necessity* is the *connection* itself, then the "necessity lies in" the necessity. It is both quality and subject.



7. Dr. Smith shows, what is true, that Edwards framed this definition to secure the chance of playing between necessity and certainty; and he imputes habitual misrepresentation to us for attributing to Edwards the necessity he "repudiates." This imputation is itself a misrepresentation. Over and over we admit, in our work, that Edwards occasionally "repudiates" *necessity* and professes *certainty*; and over and over we show the logical untruth of both the repudiation and the profession. First, argument by argument, we show (and Dr. Smith furnishes no answer to the *showing*) that Edwards's each and every argument demonstrates not *certainty* but *necessity*; and we concentrated a summary of these *showings* upon P. 221 and sequents, with references to our pages upon which the various *showings* appear. To all this Dr. Smith's only answer is the dogged repetition of the cry of "misrepresentation." In this same logical falsification of his own profession, Dr. Smith is himself inextricably involved. He repudiates the *power of different choice* as being the old impossible and unthinkable *self-determining power*. But, surely if a *different choice* is an impossibility, a self-contradiction, and a causeless effect, *then the direct choice is not merely certain but NECESSARY*. For that whose opposite or different cannot be *must be*, and is necessary with an absolute necessity. When Dr. Smith then professes to believe only in the certainty of the direct choice as distinct from necessity, he ought to see that he utters a self-contradicted profession.

8. Our reviewer represents us (p. 139) as maintaining that a given Will in order to being free "must not only have, but *exercise* the power of contrary choice;" that (p. 141) "it is not and cannot be free unless it *sometimes exercises* a power to the contrary;" that "it is under the law of natural necessity if it *always chooses* what on the whole seems most desirable." Now these are not our positions. We have not affirmed that if an agent should, through his whole life, obey the so-called strongest motives, he might not do it freely. We say expressly, upon the very ground of the Will's freedom, (P. 164,) "If the Will can choose either way it can choose in a uniform way," etc. Our firm and broad position (P. 231 and sequent) is this: *The absolute law, as founded in the nature of things that ALL WILL, as Will, actual or possible, obeys the so-called strongest motive, merges into necessity*. This does not deny that a given Will may for an indefinite length of time obey a particular class of motives; or that one Will, the infinite, (P. 224-316,) may forever freely prefer a given class of motives.

9. To show what a monster our free-will is, Dr. Smith concen-

trates all its absurd features into a single paragraph, (p. 141); and on the other hand, to show how his picture is a caricature, and how not a real absurdity exists, we now proceed, sentence by sentence, to give it analysis.

(1.) "It brings forth ALL its acts out of nothing by its own uncaused and motiveless efficiency." On the contrary we say that the Will's acts, normally, are not "motiveless," but conditioned upon motives; and that the motive condition "*enables* but does not secure result." That we affirm *all* the Will's actions to be performed by "motiveless efficiency" is, therefore, a palpable inaccuracy. With equal inaccuracy are we charged with holding an "efficiency" that is "uncaused;" for we maintain that all finite "efficiency" even of "alternative Will" is derived and caused by a superior Power.\*

(2.) "It can at times act without motive, and even without emotion or feeling." That the Will is without "emotion" we suppose that even the followers of Edwards will grant at the present day. And that the Will can in the proper conditions act without motive we do promptly affirm; and Dr. Smith is welcome to all the advantage he can gain from it.

(3.) "It is able to make, by its bare power, the weaker motive strong and the stronger motive weak." Our position is (P. 129-131) that motives, being properly so called from their relation to Will, are not, antecedently to Will, properly, weak or strong, as motives. So that there is no strong for the Will to make weak, or weak for it to make strong. It is true that we have, in compliance with necessitarian nomenclature, often under protest, called the *most probably successful* previous motive the *strongest motive*; but then all the absurdity amounts to this: The Will by its own power often chooses contrary to the greatest apparent previous probability; and Dr. S. is welcome to that much.

(4.) "It is not and cannot be free unless it sometimes exercises a power to the contrary, without any sufficient inducement." We have about sufficiently refuted this in a former paragraph. But exercising "a power to the contrary *without sufficient inducement*" is our reviewer's own gratuitous absurdity. If the "power to the contrary" is "exerted" then the "inducement" is sufficient.

(5.) "It is under the law of natural necessity if it always

\* Dr. Smith again and again uses the term "uncaused cause" in quotation-marks. We wish he had told us exactly whence quoted.

chooses what on the whole seems most desirable." Of this, too, the inaccuracy has already been exposed.

(6.) "While it *determines everything* it is itself determined by nothing, and cannot be determined by anything without annulling its very nature." The Will "determines everything"? What have we ever said to justify that random language? "*Determine*" is indeed a word we seldom use. But inasmuch as Edwards defines "determining the Will" to be "causing that the choice should be thus and not otherwise," so we say that the Will in its proper conditions is a complete and adequate cause to "cause the choice to be thus and not otherwise." And if so, then it needs nothing to *determine* it; and then all Dr. Smith's outcry about it being "determined by nothing," etc., is a grandiloquent nothing.

(7.) "By its bare willfulness it can make any reason or motive to be "the last." Strike out the ad captandum phrase, "by its bare willfulness," (the "willfulness" of the Will is rather poor phraseology,) and insert "in its proper conditions;" and change "any" into "either present;" and then, what is the absurdity? It then amounts to this: The Will in its proper conditions can choose consequently upon or in accordance with either motive or alternative before it.

Dr. Smith, seeming conscious of having failed thus far of showing any absurdity, proceeds to make a last desperate effort at success by mere verbiage, which we could afford to leave unanswered. Thus,

(8.) "And, in fine, in view of any chance impulse afloat in consciousness, it can 'project itself' in the twinkling of an eye right athwart our habitual mental and moral states, and so change us, by its arbitrary 'alternativity,' that we become the opposite of what we are or wish to be, with no power to let or hinder." Doubtless that *is* absurd! It *is* exquisitely absurd for Dr. S., *first*, to impute to us (whose very doctrine is the power of contrary choice) his own necessitarian dogma that a given choice should be "with no power to let or hinder;" and *second*, that he should represent us as making the Will tyrannize over the man when our very doctrine is that the Will is the man himself volitionating.\* But how does our theory of Will even as thus caricatured and reversed compare with a necessitarian's Will; which has a "natural ability," "in the twinkling" of a

\* The same imputing of necessity to freedomists is exposed in our work. P. 119, 120.

fire-fly, to exercise a self-determining power which shuts itself out of the world; to put forth a causeless effect; and even to exert a volition as impossible as the non-existence of God; and which is always damned, if damned, for not so exerting such natural ability as to perform these prodigies?

10. Dr. Smith declares that an agent possessed of such a Will as he has thus described "is safe only while shut up" "in metaphysical treatises," and in real life would be sent to the lunatic asylum. All that is answered before written; damned before born. (See Will, P. 161, 162.) Should an agent act in all the absurdest ways possible to his freedom, he would no doubt out-do most lunatics. But does the fact that freedom is susceptible of irrational exercise prove that freedom does not exist? Would a necessitated agent never be a lunatic? Does not Dr. Smith maintain that necessitated agents act with a total depravity? Nay, does he not maintain that the very lunacy, wickedness, and depravity themselves are necessary? The difference between us is this, that Dr. Smith's theory deprives the wicked lunatic agent of all power of contrary choice and then damns him for his real choice; *damns him for not exercising the power of which it deprives him*; while ours shows that his lunatic absurdity and wickedness were avoidable and responsible, and therefore divine penalty is just.

11. Dr. Smith makes profuse charges of contradiction; sometimes with proof, which we are ready to answer; but oftener with blank assertions, which are worth so much blank paper. He has condensed a catalogue of our contradictions into a single paragraph, (p. 149,) and the validity of his proofs of those contradictions, which we now proceed to examine, will show the value of his assertions without proof:

(1.) "He asserts the certainty of events, and recognizes no ground of certainty." If by *ground of certainty* Dr. Smith means a fixing or necessitation of the so-called certain event in the future, we do deny that there is or is needed any such *ground*; and we do affirm that such *ground* causes the certainty to be necessity. We do assert the certainty of events; and that such certainty is simply the will-be of the event, needing no present securement of its future existence. And when Dr. Smith furnishes any showing of contradiction in that we are ready to consider it.

(2.) "Sometimes the Will is represented as the sole adequate cause of volition; and yet he concedes (P. 158) 'that without motives there is no adequate power for the volition to be!'" We not only "sometimes," but *always* represent that Will is the "sole adequate cause of volition;" and in strict harmony with this it is

that we say that without the motive as condition there would, normally, be no power in the Will to be such "sole adequate cause of volition." The motive condition we say "*enables* but does not secure the result." Does Dr. Smith deny that a "sole adequate cause" may derive from something else the power to be "sole adequate cause?" Do not all finite adequate causes receive power to be adequate?

(3.) "He contends strongly against the 'non-usance' of the power of contrary choice, and yet he says (P. 175) that, 'while there is power that each should not be, yet each and all will be, in its own one way and not another instead!'" Now so far from contending "against the non-usance of contrary choice" we highly recommend the non-usance of every contrary choice that is wicked or injurious. What, however, Dr. S., in order to be accurate here, should say, is this: he denies the dogma that *all Will, actual or possible, is under absolute law of non-usance of power of contrary choice*, contrary, that is, to the necessitarian's so-called strongest motive. And in full harmony with this our denial, we also affirm of each and every volition which a free agent will hereafter actually put forth, that "while there is a power that each should not be, yet each and all will be, in its own one way, and not another instead." For certainly that volition which a free agent *will put forth*, even though he possess power to not put forth, *will be*. And if it *will be*, then it will be *in its own one way*; for it cannot be at once both ways, and it will not be some other way instead. And how all this contradicts our denial of invariable non-usance of power to reject the necessitarian's so-called highest motive, let Dr. S. show.

(4.) "Freedom is declared (P. 38) to be contradicted by the law of invariability, while it is also conceded that God is free, though invariably holy; and that men are free in sinning, though they invariably sin." Why does Dr. S. ignore our complete solution (P. 224) of this imaginary contradiction? So far as "God" is herein concerned, we deny *that* invariability which axiomatically binds all Will, actual or possible; not that which is freely accepted by his single Will. So far as "men" are concerned, when Dr. S. shows where we have said that men "invariably sin," and never the "contrary," we engage to solve that imaginary contradiction.

(5.) "At one time it is asserted (P. 216) that to be 'able to predict which way a person will choose from knowing him *perfectly* is more than any one is able to affirm;' and contrarilywise (P. 272) it is argued, that 'God is certainly to be conceived as able to know just what acts the creature will put forth,' because he 'perfectly

knows the capacities of free agents.'" Dr. Smith here inadvertently strikes the true subject "we" from the verb "to predict," and so by mutilated quotation *makes* a contradiction. Our perfectly consistent antithesis was this: WE are not able to predict from perfectly knowing the agent, even though God may; for *we* must depend on reasoning from cause to effect, whereas God needs no such deductive process in order to the absolute perfection of his knowledge.

(6.) "The fact of the divine government of free agents is granted, and yet it is broadly laid down (P. 184) that 'government, just so far as it goes, implies limitation . . . non-existence of power, but to a fixation.'" None of the words here quoted are found upon P. 184. The words nearest like those professedly quoted, so far as we can recollect, are found on P. 118, and are these: "Government is limitation; and exactly so far as it extends is the exclusion of freedom."\* Just so, and if it extends so far as absolutely to fix *which* volition is projected, then freedom is excluded. And so that is a thing the divine government normally does not do. The free agent in that respect is not "governed" by the force of omnipotence; and yet the free agent is governed (in another respect) even in his freest action; namely, by being held (or limited) to a responsibility therefor. "The fact of a divine government of free agents" is, therefore, fully "granted;" that government is granted to be limitation; and it is granted that such governmental limitation extends completely to the minutest free act. But it is not granted that the government there limits the agent to the particular act, but limits the act to the responsibility.

(7.) "To insure the certainty of a free act is absurd, because contradictory, (P. 227;) and per contra, powerful temptation often insures that, sooner or later, the sin will be freely accepted." Dr. Smith is entitled to no solution of this imaginary contradiction until he deals with its elaborate solution given with an almost mathematical exactness and completeness upon P. 339 and sequent. But for our present readers we may say: Previously to insure a future *particular event* is one thing; to insure that *some one of a sort* will take place is another thing. The former peremptorily necessitates that particular event, and so is absolute necessity; the latter leaves an alternativity between the various particularities in the sort, and so involves only certainty. Yet inasmuch as the

\* Dr. Smith's last clause, "non-existence of power but to a fixation," is not visible on the same page.



territory of this certainty is remotely circumscribed by a distant boundary line of necessity; circumscribed, namely, within that *sort*; our reasoning in the place quoted adjusts with a beautiful precision the responsibility to the limits of necessity and certainty, so that our maxim of responsibility is with exquisite exactness preserved.

Such are the contradictions Dr. Smith imputes, and such the proofs, when he furnishes proof. We have not culled and picked such as were easiest of answer; we have driven our indiscriminate plowshare through his densest, most compact, concentration of them. The result is that a charge of contradiction from Dr. Smith's pen is good just so far as he furnishes the logic to demonstrate it. It is not in the range of Dr. Smith's capacity to *show* a single contradiction in our volume, for the simple reason that there is not a single contradiction to show.

12. Dr. Smith not only scatters the terms "contradictions" and "absurdity" with tropical luxuriance, and without proof, through his article, but talks much (p. 154) of the "opposite schools" and doctors from whom our "snatches of opinion" are borrowed. He seems to hold it an inconsistency to agree with a theologian or a theology in one point and not in all points; as if we must wholly coincide where we touch at all. Yet he very well knows, and as a historian of doctrines he ought to recognize, that if full agreement with some great doctor, or some school, be a merit or a requisite for doctrinal symmetry, the theology of the author of the book reviewed is very uniformly of the type of James Arminius, of John Wesley, of Richard Watson, of Wilbur Fisk, and their entire school. Dr. Smith's style on this subject may, perhaps, be made more intelligible to himself if he will suppose some writer to describe the conglomerate character of his own theology in the following parody: Dr. Smith comes so near to Methodism in some respects that we have been "tempted to think that he has an ironic, as well as polemic, intent." His scraps of opinion are taken from the most opposite schools, and patched together rather than reconciled with each other. With Hobbes, he holds firmly to philosophical necessity; but with Whitby he holds that wickedness of Will justly incurs eternal damnation. With Edwards, he denounces the power of contrary choice; and yet "he sometimes reminds us of the subtle speculations of" Hume touching "invariable sequence." He claims to be "Augustinian" on original sin, and yet rejects Augustine's doctrine that original sin consists in sexual concupiscence. He agrees with Toplady in the total depravity of man by the fall, and yet like Wesley he holds a

"gracious ability." He declares with Arminius that freedom of the Will is requisite to responsibility, and yet if he does not hold that infants and idiots, and men without power to accept salvation, are damned, he does hold that they justly may be. So that while he agrees with Hosea Ballou in being a Universalist, yet he differs in this, that while Hosea held to a universal salvation, Dr. S. holds to the rightfulness of universal damnation. We need not point out the gross contradictions between these different "snatches of opinion." All his methods of reconciliation are total failures. Such a catalogue of mutually repelling dogmas certainly cannot be called a theology; and we doubt whether even that barbarian, Dr. Whedon, can invent a word crooked enough to express its heterogeneous character.

13. Dr. Smith in a closing paragraph intended doubtless to be benevolent, but quite too patronizing to be acceptable, assures the Methodist Episcopal Church that when they learn Calvinism better, and state their own theology more consistently, there will be a greater mutual approximation. Condescension! Perhaps we may even be admitted into that celebrated "drag-net," where every man so "consistently" contradicts himself, and all so unanimously contradict each other that it is perfectly "amusing" to see even an outsider "sweep" them into one classification. If the production of a rich polyglottal theological Babel be the object of theological doctorship, we must concede Dr. Smith's grandiloquent boast that the leaders of New England Calvinism are far superior to any "that have as yet arisen in the ranks of Arminian divines." Now as Dr. Smith is a young man of not only large acquirements, but of large room for acquiring a great deal more, we suggest to him that he may, in his future life, experience many agreeable surprises at the much to be learned from very unexpected quarters. Even from so humble a quarter as Methodism, and from the following suggestions by our humble self, he may draw hints of instruction which may greatly aid to increase his amount of knowledge and improve his style of modesty.

Courteously invited by Dr. Park, the writer of these lines a year or two ago furnished a statement of the doctrines of Methodism filling nearly forty pages of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. In penning that article the writer had no misgivings that every line of it, which he himself would claim to be catholic Methodism, would be indorsed as such by every thoughtful Methodist minister or layman in the United States, Canada, England or Australia, without a respectable or audible minority. The article in full was published in nearly all our seven Church papers with hearty and

unbroken concurrence, and nothing but a threat of legal proceedings from the original publisher prevented its republication and broadcast diffusion through our Church, as a perfectly unchallenged statement of our theological system. Will Dr. S. please tell us how many articles in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* it took to state the various shades, and isms, and schools of Calvinism? Will he please consider the problem how it is that the self-contradictory, obscurely stated, mass of mere "snatches of opinion" called Methodism needs but one full statement in behalf of its unanimous universal Church; while the clear, precise, harmonious system of Calvinism, expounded by greater doctors than Arminianism ever produced, has to be put forth in contradictory statements, accepted and condemned by fragments and parties of professed believers?

Again, the same writer has now written a work on the *Will*, containing many argumentations which he would not claim to be part of universally recognized Methodism; but as to the parts which he would claim to be such, we do not suppose a division of opinion could be raised in the entire ranks of world-wide Methodism. With this tacit understanding the work has passed through several rapid editions, noticed with unbroken approval by the entire Methodist press. Will Dr. Smith, who holds Methodism to be a mass of contradictory "snatches of opinion," please explain the problem of this unanimity? And will he specially expound how it is that scientific, harmonious, systematic Calvinism cannot be stated in any form without raising loud and discordant shouts of dissent from its own ranks?

14. Dr. S. warns our Church not to allow her theology to be "shaped" by that work on the *Will*. "Shaped?" Will it never enter into the opaque perceptions of these gentlemen that our theology was "shaped" some centuries before they were born? Neither that nor any other production of the present day can "shape" our theology, any more than it can shape the substance of the moon. The book is shaped by the theology, not the theology by the book. And if its shape be so amorphous as those gentlemen imagine, how happens this freedom throughout the world from all opposing isms and schisms? Why have we no old schools and new schools; no highs and lows; no Fiskisms, and Bangsisms, and Olinisms; no Middletown theology, and Concord theology, and Evanston theology?

And the unanimity that now is universal among us has always been. Our *quod ubique* is a *quod semper*. A theodicic schism, or even general variance of opinion, is, so far as we know, entirely unknown in the entire history of universal Arminian Methodism.

Quarrels, and strifes, and separations we have had in plenty; but never one on a point of theodicy theology. There are divisions about slavery, episcopacy, lay delegation; differences in organization, measures, and religious temperament; but no jar or varying utterances in our Arminianism. English Methodism has her Old and New Connection, and her Primitives; and these differ fiercely, but never upon a point of theodicy. Organically they are divided; theologically they are one. How will our young *Cædipus* unriddle this Sphinx?

If he attempts to solve the singular problem on the assumption of our defective culture, leaving us incapable of raising or discussing questions so high and subtle, we would reply modestly to so modest an elucidation. We would suggest that in England, in Wesley's day, it was in the midst of a violent theological discussion that our Methodist theology took its Arminian type; that from the beginning, both there and here, books, tracts, and periodicals have been poured forth with most stupendous profusion. Systems of theology, hymn books, commentaries, have from the first been the order of the day. And yet these all, upon the characteristic points, speak a harmonious language. All claim to understand our distinctive theology, all assert it firmly and ardently, all profess to see it alike! Please, Dr. Smith, explain this more than papal unanimity with nothing of papal oppression.

We will now venture, gently and diffidently, to whisper into Dr. Smith's ear a private solution of our own, which, however, we suspect to be the last in the world he will incline to adopt. Contradiction in a doctrine does not beget harmony among its followers; consistency in a doctrine does not divide and distract its believers. We venture, therefore, to suggest to Dr. Smith, that the cause of the discords and "digladiations" in the Calvinistic ranks is the contradictions in the Calvinistic creed; and that the reason of our Arminian unanimity is that our Arminianism so harmonizes with itself, with the spirit and language of the word of God, and with our own common sense and spiritual intuitions and emotions, that when once appreciated it brings the believer to a state of conscious satisfaction and the whole body to peace and unity.

15. We can hardly agree with Dr. Smith that by "a more thorough study of Calvinistic theology" and a learning "to understand" its "doctrines more clearly," "we shall doubtless come nearer together." On the contrary, the more explicitly Calvinism unfolds itself, or rather its various antagonistic *selves*, the more decisive will be our rejection. That rejection is not because we do not

know it, but because we know it so well. In England our Methodism revolted from the Calvinism of Whitefield and Toplady because we thoroughly understood it. In New England, Methodism was largely a secession from the Calvinistic ranks to escape the pressure of its well-understood terrible dogmas. It is not our ignorance but our knowledge that produces the revolt. Our "traditional horror of Calvinism" arises from the same feeling as induced Calvin himself to confess his *decretum* to be *horribile*. No, Dr. Smith, the only mode of restoring doctrinal unity is the expulsion of that fatalistic heresy, the predestination of Augustine and Calvin, from Christian theology, and a return to the simpler theodicy of the primitive age.

BIBLICAL REPOSITORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW. January, 1865. (Philadelphia.)—1. Are James the son of Alphæus and James the Brother of the Lord Identical? 2. A Plea and a Plan for Presbyterian Unity. 3. The Nature and Ends of Prayer. 4. Mason and Dixon's Line. 5. Nature of Man. 6. What's the Use of Breathing?

We omitted to note in our last Quarterly that the Princeton devotes some fifteen pages of an article to "Whedon on the Will." It is in the general courteous; and for an opponent, even complimentary in its tone; although near its close the writer suddenly seems to recollect that some strokes of vituperation will be demandingly expected of him by his audience, and so does violence to a generous nature by giving them. We should answer it in full but that a refutation of Dr. Smith's article is quite enough to meet the wishes and, perhaps, exhaust the patience of our readers. We will note but one point.

The maxim of responsibility lying at the bottom of a Free Will or Arminian Theodicy (as we stated it in our article on that subject in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*) is this: *Inability to an act or state, not self-superinduced, excludes responsibility*. This maxim, both in its affirmative force and in its included negative clause, we lay down in our volume as fundamental, and fully elucidate (part iii, chapter v) at great length, devoting an entire chapter to its explication as a basal "maxim." And then pages 328-330 are expended upon the negative clause, which we there expand into "the broad maxim, *The superinduction by the sinner's own free act, or course of action, of necessity upon himself to sin, destroys the excuse from that necessity*." And having established this maxim, we state in various passages, cases and classes of necessity which is necessity of the strictest kind, and yet responsible, because coming under this maxim of self-superinduction; the responsibility of that self-superinduced necessity being entirely consistent with the

maxim otherwise universal that necessity and responsibility are incompatible.

And now what does our Princeton reviewer do? Entirely withholding from his readers all reference to this maxim of responsible self-superinduced necessity, he quotes those passages in which such necessity is described and pronounced responsible, and parades them at great length, as contradictions of our doctrine of the incompatibility of necessity and responsibility! We must leave it with our reader to judge whether on the whole a discussion conducted in so careless a manner would be likely to afford any just satisfaction to either side.

DANVILLE REVIEW, December, 1864. (Danville, Ky.)—1. A Christian College—Its Instruction and Government. 2. Whedon on the Will. 3. Slavery in the Church Courts. 4. Enormities and Barbarities of the Rebellion. 5. Abraham's Position in Sacred History. 6. Card respecting the Temporary Suspension of Publication.

The author of the second article, Dr. Junkin, was, we believe, prosecutor of Albert Barnes for heresy; and he was lately favorably noticed in our Quarterly as having abdicated a Virginia college presidency rather than share in Virginia treason. He has a propensity rather than a power for metaphysical and theological speculation. His article is rather a model of looseness of style, inconsequence of logic, wholesale assumption, and arrogant feebleness. What is worse, there are one or two personal implications like the following: "I may say with truth that these authors" (Tappan and Bledsoe) "contain most of the matter of this book before us, and it strikes me the acknowledgments are not quite as full and candid as they might be." When the Boston Review made the impersonal remark that the work contained little "particularly new," we returned a respectful and, we think, successful refutation of the statement. But when Dr. Junkin makes this kind of false personal insinuation, he places himself without the pale of courteous Christian debate. We rejoice that the thoroughness of this discussion requires no further allusion to Dr. Junkin.

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### *English Reviews.*

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, January, 1865. (London.) —1. St. Birgitta and the Northern Church. 2. Antichrist. 3. Twenty Years of the Free Church of Scotland. 4. Unexhausted Resources of Christian Evidence. 5. The Dogmatic Element in Ullmann's "Sinlessness of Jesus." 6. Recent German Discussions on the Atonement. 7. Pagan Rites and Romish Ceremonies. 8. Man's Mental Instincts. 9. The Works of John Knox. 10. Memorials of the Rev. William Bull. 11. The Rev. James D. Burns.



CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCE, January, 1865. (London.)—1. The Book of Daniel. 2. Rome of the Future. 3. Harford's Recollections of Wilberforce. 4. Female Liberalism—Miss Aikin and Miss Cobbe. 5. Fallacies on Progress; or, Sketches of the Early Church. 6. Sanders and Burnet. 7. Public Schools Commission. 8. Recent Researches in Palestine and Syria. 9. Church Politics and Church Prospects.

EDINBURGH REVIEW, January, 1865. (New York: Reprint.)—1. Sir F. Palgrave's History of England and Normandy. 2. Dictionaries of the Bible, (Smith and Kitto.) 3. Life of Sir William Napier. 4. Criminal Law Reform. 5. Lord Derby's Translation of the Iliad. 6. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the Crown. 7. The British American Federation. 8. Gairdner's Memorials of King Henry VII. 9. Seven per Cent. 10. The Last Campaign in America.

JOURNAL OF SACRED LITERATURE AND BIBLICAL RECORDER, January, 1865. (London.) 1. Of the Nature and Extent of Divine Inspiration: Illustrated by Extracts from Various Authors. 2. Tyndale's Translation of the New Testament, etc., and Mr. Fry's Facsimiles. 3. Capital Punishment and Genesis ix, 6. 4. Popular Infidelity in the Metropolis: an Unwritten Chapter in Cotemporary History. 5. Exegesis of Difficult Texts. 6. Metaphysical Schools among the Arabs. 7. The Revelation of the Blessed Apostle Paul. 8. The Metonic Cycle and Calippic Period. 9. The Departure of my Lady Mary from this World: in Syriac Text.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, (Wesleyan.) January, 1865. (London.)—1. The Congresses of the late Season. 2. The Cotton Famine. 3. Moral Aspects of the British Army. 4. Worms. 5. Lady Eastlake's History of our Lord in Art. 6. Abeokuta and Dahome. 7. Benjamin Franklin. 8. St. Mark's Contributions to the Gospel.

LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, January, 1865. (New York: Reprint.) 1. The Life of William Blake. 2. Aristotle's History of Animals. 3. Forster's Biography of Sir John Eliot. 4. Homer's Iliad. 5. Memoirs of Sir Robert Wilson. 6. Syriac Manuscripts. 7. Servia. 8. Epigrams. 9. The United States as an Example.

The closing article, as the very title shows, is an elaborate and libelous effort, written in behalf of the English aristocracy, to neutralize the effect of American example in behalf of republican government. As our national Union becomes completely re-established and our national greatness towers into a still loftier historic grandeur, demonstrating the power of a great republic to assert its unity and supremacy, such libels will become more and more necessary as well as more and more contemptible both in their substance and effect. In its entire character of falsehood blended with truth for falsehood's sake, it strongly reminds us of the style in which the cause of our Southern oligarchy has heretofore been maintained in the field of argument. The fact that both oligarchies, the English and our Southern, are sustained in a style so similar, strongly suggests the idea that their cases are generally like; that the destiny, so terrible and sudden of one, is but the type of the destiny of the other. No American war with England will be necessary to

hasten that destiny. We will proceed in our mission of reunion, peace, industry, and prosperity. And, sure as move the rolling years, the downfall of the English oligarch, gradual or sudden, will be the logical sequent of the destruction of his American brother.

BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW, January, 1865. (London.)—1. The Sepoy War, and what led to it. 2. Marie Antoinette. 3. Churchmen and the Church. 4. Passages from a Philosopher's Life—Babbage. 5. The Natural and Supernatural. 6. The Source of the Nile. 7. New Pharaonic Tablets of Memphis and Abydos. 8. Nonconformist Biography. 9. Italy Within and Without.

In the eighth article there is a train of thought singularly applicable to Methodism in our own country. We copy the closing paragraphs, and ask the attention of our ministry to their points. In the place of the terms "dissent" and "non-conformity" insert Methodism, with some corresponding changes.

There are many who think that our power as a denomination will be best advanced by the abnegation of our distinctive principles. Preach the Gospel in its simplicity, seek only the salvation of souls, care nothing for sects and parties, and be especially tender in the utterance of dissenting opinions, is the cry of many. The experience of Liverpool certainly does not show the wisdom of such a course. The result has certainly not been an extraordinary growth of dissent; and we do not well see how it could be, in the face of earnest evangelical preachers in the pulpits of the establishment. The *prestige* of rank and fashion is all on the side of the state Church; and if people can hear the Gospel faithfully proclaimed by its preachers, we cannot see how they are to become dissenters, unless they are convinced that with us there is some great principle for which it is right even to make sacrifices. Let us never surrender our Christianity for the sake of our dissent; but let us never suffer it to be supposed that we have not deep and settled convictions on behalf of which we are bound to utter our testimony. If the reasons which make us nonconformists are such as should have that influence upon us, then they are such as should be openly avowed.

Nonconformity has taken no mean part in the religious life of the passing generation. This age has its own special needs; and we rejoice, in looking at our ministers, to believe that they are fully conscious of the responsibilities resting upon them, and earnestly seeking to discharge them. May they, in the increase of learning, and the richer cultivation of intellectual strength, lose nothing of that simple evangelical earnestness which was the glory of their fathers!—P. 219.

WESTMINSTER REVIEW, January, 1865. (New York: Reprint.)—1. Taine's History of English Literature: Cotemporary Writers. 2. The Science of Language. 3. Hamlet. 4. The Intellectual Development of Europe. 5. Peace in Poland. 6. Circumstantial Evidence. 7. "Whatever is, is Right." 8. Railway Reform.

Of Bledsoe's Theodicy, which has just been republished in England by Saunders and Otley, we find the following notice in the Westminster Review.

One of the ablest treatises we have ever met with on the side of Free Will in the necessitarian controversy is that of Dr. Bledsoe. His argument is well built up and lucidly expressed; and his solution of the great problem of the existence of evil only halts when he feels himself constrained, apparently for dogmatic reasons, to maintain the eternity of future punishment as consistent with the goodness of God; for it is inconceivable, if men are to retain reason and will in a life to come, that they should not, in some new condition for which there is room enough in the

sequence of ages, recover that spring which has here been depressed by the circumstances of the present life. Otherwise the consequences would follow, 'against which the author all along contends, that God keeps some of his creatures in conditions wherein their faculty for good is overmatched.—P. 127.

It is not specially indicative of liberal enterprise in the English Methodist publishing Concern, that a work on Arminian Theology like Bledsoe's, first issued from our American Methodist press, should, in England, go to an outside house for a publisher, and to a skeptical Review for its first notice.

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*German Reviews.*

STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN. (Essays and Reviews. First Number, 1865.)—

1. RIEHM, Messianic Prophecies and their Fulfillment. 2. BECK, Review of the Life of Jesus, by Strauss. 3. PIPER, Representation of Revelation in Christian Art. 4. HOLLENBERG, Remarks on Christian Dogmatics, with special reference to Dr. Schenkel's work.

Second Number.—1. BEYSCHLAG, The Christ Party at Corinth. 2. WEISS, on Schenkel's Life of Jesus. 3. GURLITT, Remark on the Book of Koheleth. 4. The Imposition of Hands. 5. DRESSEL, The Vatican Correction of the Vulgate.

The prefatory remarks to the second number of the Studien und Kritiken apprise us of the death of Dr. Carl Ullmann, which took place on January 12, 1865. Dr. Ullmann is well known throughout the Protestant world as one of the greatest theologians of the evangelical Church of the nineteenth century. Among his works, that on the "Sinlessness of Christ," (*Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu*), which has recently appeared in Germany in a seventh edition, and which has also been translated into English, is especially prized. Dr. Ullmann established the Studien und Kritiken in 1829, together with his friend Dr. Umbreit, who died five years ago. Though a number of other quarterly periodicals have since been established, the Studien have always maintained their prominent position as the leading representative of the theological periodical press in Germany. Dr. Ullmann, at the time when he established the review, was professor of theology at the University of Heidelberg, from which place he was called to Carlsruhe as "Pre-late," or the head of the evangelical State Church of the Grand Duchy of Baden. This place he resigned a few years ago, as in the violent controversies which sprung up in Baden, between the rationalistic and the evangelical parties, the grand duke yielded to influences with which Dr. Ullman did not agree. The "Studien und Kritiken" will now be edited by Dr. Hundeshagen and Dr. Riehm, both professors of theology at the University of Heidelberg, and favorably known to the theological world by a number

of able works. Among the chief contributors the title-page mentions the venerable Dr. Nitzsch of Berlin, Dr. Julius Müller, and Dr. Beyschlag of Halle.

**DORPATER ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR THEOLOGIE UND KIRCHE.** (Dorpat Journal of Theology and Church. Fourth Number, 1864.)—1. HAHN, Remarks on Matthew vii, 15–23. 2. DR. CARLBLOM, The Position of the Church in our Times. 3. DR. KURTZ, Theology of the Psalms. 4. ANDREAE, Church Chandeliers. 5. The Thirtieth Provincial Synod of Livonia, held in 1864. 6. HANSEN, Proceedings of the Sixteenth General Assembly of the Catholic Associations of Germany.

From this periodical, which is published in the German language by the theological professors of the University of Dorpat, in Russia, we obtain occasionally, but by no means so often as we would wish, information on the condition of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Russian empire. The last number contains an account of the last annual synods of the Lutheran Church in one of the three Baltic provinces, Livonia. The proceedings are not of general interest. The reader feels that the proceedings took place and the account of it was printed under a strict censorship on the part of the police. The Synod occupied itself with the introduction of the lay element into their Church constitution, with the proposal of holding a "Baltic Church Diet," after the model of the German and Scandinavian Church Diets and the English Church Congresses, and with the state of the foreign and home missionary cause.

We also learn, from the same number of the Dorpat Journal, that a Lutheran pastor in Warsaw has established a Lutheran Church gazette in the Polish language, entitled, *Zwiastun Ewangeliczny*, (Evangelical Messenger.) This is the first attempt to establish a Protestant Slavic periodical in the Russian empire. In Prussia two Protestant papers had previously been established, but the one was soon discontinued, and the other is threatened with the same fate.

As the number of periodicals in Russia, secular as well as ecclesiastical, is rapidly increasing, the establishment of a Protestant Church gazette in a Slavic language is an item of some importance.

**JAHRBUCHER DER DEUTSCHER THEOLOGIE.** (Year-books of German Theology. Fourth Number, 1864.) 1. BAUMGARTEN, The National Jewish Background of the New Testament History, according to Flavius Josephus. 2. YEPP, Tertullian as Apologist. 3. ZÖCKLER, The Doctrine of Creation.

Professor Zöckler has deservedly won for himself the reputation of being one of the ablest opponents of the new materialistic school of German natural philosophers. He has already contributed

several articles of great merit to the "Year-books of German theology," and the article in the above number can only add to his reputation. It is a thorough review of the deep theories which the materialists, the pantheists, and the deists have developed to explain the origin of the universe. Zöckler shows an intimate acquaintance with the entire recent literature on natural sciences, and ably refutes the arguments of the materialists, pantheists, and deists. In conclusion he briefly gives an outline of a theory which, he thinks, the Christian philosophy of our times ought to develop more fully.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HISTORISCHE THEOLOGIE. (Journal of Historical Theology. First Number, 1865.)—1. YESS, Hegesippus, and His Importance for Church History. 2. KINS, The Stipendiaries of Wittenberg and Jena in the Sixteenth Century. 3. HERZOG, The Age of the Noble Leyazon, A Reply to Dr. Ebrard.

Second Number.—1. HOCHHUTH, History and Development of the Philadelphian Congregations. Jane Leade and the Philadelphians in England. 2. A Church Visitation in 1525. 3. The Catechisms of the Sixteenth Century.

The article on the Philadelphians and Jane Leade bids fair to become the most complete work on this mystical sect. The author gives at the head of his article a complete list of the writings of Jane Leade, of Dr. Pordage, and of Thomas Bromley, all of which were translated into German soon after their publication in England. The author was also enabled to use important manuscripts on the sect, which to former historians had remained unknown.

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*French Reviews.*

REVUE DES DEUX MONDES.—November 15.—1. AMEDEV THIERRY, Jerome, Pope Damasus, and the Convent of Mount Aventinus. 5. JAMIN, Spontaneous Generation.

December 1.—1. EMILE BURNOUF, The Science of the Religions, its Method and its Limits. 3. LEGEAN, Theodore II. and the New Empire of Abyssinia. 6. JULES SIMON, Moral Statistics. 8. RECLUS, Man and Nature, Human Action and Physical Geography.

December 15.—1. LANGEL, The Presidential Election in 1864. 2. TAINÉ, Italy and Italian Reminiscences. 3. BLERZY, Australia, its Physical History and its Colonization. (Fourth article.) 4. REMUSAT, Human Sadness. 6. REYBAUD, The Chairs of Political Economy in France. 7. EMILE BURNOUF, The Science of the Religions. (Second article.)

January 1, 1865.—5. TAINÉ, Italy and Italian Life. (Second article.)

January 15.—1. TAINÉ, Italy and Italian Life. (Third article.) 2. DORA D'ISTRIA, The Servian Nationality according to its Popular Chants. 3. The Last Days of Pagan Theology—Proclus and his God.

February 1.—1. DUPONT WHITE, The Positivism, on occasion of a Book of Littré. 6. MAZADE, The Biblical Reveries of Michelet. 7. JULES SIMON, Moral Statistics.

REVUE CHRETIENNE, November 15, 1864.—1. ROSSEEUW ST. HILAIRE, The Battle of Lepanto. 2. GERMOND, Sainte-Beuve's "Nouveaux Lundis," (New Mondays.) 3. DELMAS, Character in France.

December 15, 1864.—1. PRESSENSE, To the Readers of the Revue Chretienne. 2. WADDINGTON, Mignet's Eloges Historiques, (Historical Eulogies.) 3. RUPPET, Pietro Paolo Vergerio. 4. ARBONSSSE BASTIDE, The National Synods of the Reformed Church of France, according to the new work of M. de Felice.

January 5, 1865.—1. KUHN, The New Critical School. 2. J. DE SEGNES, Cotemporaneous Materialism. 3. COVARDA, Letter on Italy.

The letter on Italy in the January number of the *Revue Chretienne* gives a very clear and comprehensive view of the religious parties now existing among the Italian people. The author distinguishes four such parties: 1. *The Clerical or Papal Party*, the most numerous and strongest, which still rules over the ignorant mass, and which owes its political power to its alliance with despotism, to the mere force of habit, to the great ability with which it has known how to stifle opposition and to identify itself in the eyes of the masses with Christianity. 2. *The National Party*, comprising the great majority of the educated men which demands, without working for it, the reformation of the Church, but a reformation purely disciplinary, and by no means essential, for which the doctrines of the Church of Rome are always sacred, eternal, unassailable, which still entertains the great fallacy of a reconciliation between Catholicism and liberty, and which from all these reasons, as well as on account of its superficiality, is justly termed, by a gifted writer on Italian affairs, the "undefinable party." 3. *The Philosophical Party*, composed of the ardent champions of democracy, of those bold and ardent intellects which, passing from one extreme to the other, reject all positive religion. 4. *The Protestant Party*, little numerous, little acquainted with the language, the customs, the wants, the needs, the prejudices of the Italians, too dependent upon foreigners, too much subject to divisions, but strong by its zeal and by its open advocacy of the principle of a separation between Church and State. Such writers as Passaglia and Liverani are included by the writer in the Clerical party, because, though rejecting the demands of the ultramontanists, they continue to adhere to the fatal doctrine of a close alliance between the state and the papacy. Altogether the author distinguishes three schools within the clerical party: the ultramontane school, which wishes the absolute fusion of the two powers, and which is represented in Italy by the *Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome, the *Armonia* of Turin, and other papers; the moderate or orthodox school, comprising the majority of the Italian clergy, which distinguishes the two powers in their attributes, but unites



them on the same head ; and the liberal school, separating the two governments, but on condition that they be indissolubly united by concordats. Under the head of the National party the author treats of the views and the writings of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani, whom he regards as the representative men of three different schools in this party. The chief aim of all is the unity of the Italian nation, but they differ in their views about the relation of the Church to the State. One school would subject the Church to the State ; another would make the civil power the secular arm of the Church ; and the third, regarding both powers as being equally of divine origin, recommends the moral union of both.

While both the clerical and the national party are in favor of a greater or lesser union between the two powers, the philosophical (ultra-liberal, democratic) and the Protestant party are in favor of separation. The Italian democrats preach an open war against the Church of Rome. One of their prominent champions, Philip de Boni, the translator of Rénan, has published a work, entitled *Italy and the Roman Church*, in which he attempts to show that the existence of the Italian nation is not possible without the destruction of Popery, and in which he, therefore, demands that one of the chief aims of the Democratic party be a combat against the ruling Church. As the Roman Church alone among the religious denominations persists in denouncing civil and religious liberty, he would refuse to it the liberty which he concedes to every other form of religion. In this opinion de Boni is, however, not supported by all the leading men of his party. Thus one of the ablest democratic statesmen of Italy, Montanelli, in his work on "the Empire, the Papacy, and Democracy in Italy," says: "Whatever may be the conduct of the pope and the court of Rome, Italian democracy ought never to abandon its old principle, the separation of the two powers. Woe to us if we should not know how to respect the principle of the liberty of conscience. A pope imprisoned or exiled, a persecuted clergy, the believers frightened, all this charm of persecution would produce a terrible reaction against the most salutary reforms."

The Protestant party is as yet the smallest and weakest ; but by organizing everywhere evangelical congregations independent of the state, does more than any other party toward the actual introduction of the separation of Church and State.

## ART. IX.—QUARTERLY BOOK-TABLE.

*Religion, Theology, and Biblical Literature.*

*The Life of the Lord Jesus Christ:* A Complete Critical Examination of the Origin, Contents, and Connection of the Gospels. Translated from the German of J. P. LANGE, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Bonn. Edited, with additional notes, by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, A.M. In six volumes. 12mo. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. London: Hamilton & Co. Dublin: John Robertson & Co. 1864.

Dr. Lange, as a theological and biblical scholar, looms up into special eminence at the present time among German divines. He is a Prussian, born in 1802, finished his university course at Bonn in 1825, was appointed professor in the place of the noted Strauss in 1841, and to his present chair at Bonn in 1854. Of the great *Bibelwerk* now being published under his hand in Germany, and republished here by Dr. Schaff, we speak upon another page. The six volumes under our present notice form one of the most important works of the day. It goes over elaborately and with unlimited completeness the entire Gospel history, and so resolves all the objections of Straussian and other criticism, both destructively refuting their every utterance, and constructively demonstrating the sacred narratives to possess obligatory claims upon our most rational faith. What Neander's life of Christ proposed to do briefly, what the monographs of Tholuck and countless others proposed to aid partially, all that Dr. Lange here proposes to do exhaustively, completely, monumentally. The attacks made in a former day against Christianity upon historical grounds were met exhaustively in their day by the massy work of Lardner, of which the immortal manual of Paley was a most masterly compression. Against the philosophico-critical attacks made by the infidelity of the present day Dr. Lange opposes the great work under our notice. How complete and how conclusive it is, its readers must judge for themselves; how successful its final results, the future must show.

The following criticism from the Scottish "British and Foreign Evangelical Review," we adduce to show how others estimate the work and similar productions from German sources:

Two extremes have been adopted in this country with regard to the theological literature of Germany. Some have denounced it as altogether bad, and have congratulated themselves on being innocent of the least acquaintance with it. Others, again, have rushed into an excess of admiration, and have shown themselves ready to swallow everything, however crude or monstrous, that came to them bearing the impress of German scholarship. But, as usual, the truth lies between these two extremes. Only ignorance or prejudice of the most hopeless character will deny that much which is permanently valuable has issued from the ever-laboring theological press of Germany. On the other hand, it is equally certain that a vast

amount of learned rubbish has proceeded from the same source. In fact, the proportion of the vile to the precious is here exceedingly great. There is a large number of German theological writers whose works yield but the smallest percentage of what is solid, valuable, and true, and whose laborious tomes might, with no great disadvantage to the world, at once be consigned to the depths of the sea. And there is hardly one even of the best of them but mixes up some proportion of what is useless or mischievous with what is good and instructive. Mystical, speculative, capricious, prolix, and such like epithets, are largely applicable to many of their best writers; while such terms as daring, unscriptural, absurd, and even impious, may too justly be adopted as descriptive of others.

We think it of some importance that an accurate estimate of German theological literature should now begin to be diffused among us. Of the learning and research which it in general displays there can be but one opinion. But too often these qualities are unaccompanied either by soundness of judgment or soundness in the faith. We venture to say that from no department of literature could a larger amount of puerility and absurdity be gathered than from the writings of erudite German theologians. Yet there has prevailed among us for many years an almost superstitious reverence for all that came to us from this quarter. The silliest books have met with translators, and the most baseless and spurious have obtained currency and reputation, simply because they issued from the mint of some extravagant German divine. There has been such a flow of translations from the continent, that native original scholarship has been all but swamped. And our German friends themselves appear to have suffered from the idolatry which has thus been shown them. They seem very rarely to look beyond their own ranks, or to deem any theological literature which our country has produced worthy of the least consideration. "*Mehr Geld als Wissenschaft*" are the somewhat contemptuous terms in which the youth of Germany are accustomed to refer to England; and by the "voluntary humility" which we ourselves display, much is done to foster this spirit of contempt for the learning and labors of English theologians, which has in a degree altogether unmerited taken root in the minds of our continental cousins.

The work of Dr. Lange on the Life of Christ is undoubtedly a very favorable specimen of German criticism and research. Sound in all essential points of doctrine, its breadth of scholarship is also very imposing, and its discussions of most of the difficulties connected with the Gospels satisfactory and complete. But in the six volumes, and nearly three thousand pages, of which, in its English dress, the work consists, there is a sad waste of words. The *result* is small compared with the *process*; and the reader has often reason to complain of the long chase which the author leads him in pursuit of what at last proves of little value. There is much in these volumes which is totally beside the mark, and which no one but a German divine would have thought it worth while to write. Great must have been the trial to both translators and editor, in faithfully reproducing the frequently long-winded and all but resultless dissertations of the original. We think they have been needlessly punctilious in this respect, and that a well-executed condensation of the work would have been of more practical utility than the thousands of pages which they have given us.—P. 208.

There is some truth in the charge of prolixity. We object to no length necessary to the exhaustive treatment of the subject. Somewhere that fullness ought to exist. But it is unquestionably true that Dr. Lange might be profitably compressed. His whole might be said in two thirds his space, if not half. But have patience with his diffuseness, bear gently an occasional crotchet, accept a variety of novel terms, learn to glide your eye rapidly over his diffuse mysticisms, and you will on the whole find a grand comprehensive view of the Gospel history. You will feel that from its many-sided battlements the holy Record can fling defiance to its beleaguering assailants. "A strong fortress is our God."

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XVII.—20

*A Critical and Grammatical Commentary of the Pauline Epistles.* With a Revised Translation. By Right Rev. CHARLES J. ELLICOTT, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. 8vo., pp. 265. Andover: Warren F. Draper. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New York: Hurd & Houghton. Philadelphia: Smith, English, & Co. Cincinnati: G. S. Blanchard. 1865.

To Bishop Ellicott must be assigned the first rank, if not the first place in the first rank of English biblical scholarship. The series of commentaries on the Pauline Epistles are in the highest style of critical exegesis; so high, indeed, that rightly or wrongly he has felt constrained by friendly criticisms to compromise with the humble capacity of his audience, and make a more sparing use of those expressive old *technicals*, which enabled him to place his results in the most compact shape. Mr. Ellicott's genius is endowed with the most opposite qualities. His imagination and feeling are intense, yet his patience of analysis is unbounded. His exegesis is at once dry and glowing. It is microscopic; not because the critic is cold and mechanical, but because to his ardent soul the ultimate particle of sacred thought revealable by only the most perfect lens is infinitely more precious than gold. To appreciate and enjoy Cicero was with Quintilian a test of true intellectual taste; to study, enjoy, and fully appropriate Ellicott in these commentaries is the prerogative of a true biblical scholar. And yet to the popular preacher, who wishes to preach, as far as possible, from the text exactly as the apostle wrote, and from the inspired mind exactly as the apostle thought, these exegeses are a rare aid and insurance.

To the translations which serve as the English result of Ellicott's labors and the appendix to his volume, a special attention is due. To these a large body of notes is subjoined, consisting mainly of parallel passages of translation taken from the various old English versions. These, while valuable and suggestive in themselves, evince what resources the writer possesses, with what diligence he lays them under contribution, and of what careful collation his translation is the result.

It is highly appropriate that this product of rich Christian scholarship should be issued by the Andover press. Mr. Draper has given the work with a becoming neatness of externals, a beautiful type, and, we trust, with most sacred accuracy of text. A wide circulation of these commentaries will be creditable to the sacred scholarship of our country. We may add that Mr. Draper's catalogue of publications would receive a more enlarged patronage if it were better known within the limits of our denomination. We have already noticed Ellicott's previous notes on the Epistles, his

life of Christ, and Professor Stuart's Commentary on Ecclesiastes and Proverbs, as among the valuable issues of that press.

*A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with Special Reference to Ministers and Students.* By JOHN PETER LANGE, D.D. In connection with a number of eminent European divines; Translated from the German, and edited, with additions original and selected, by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D., in connection with American Divines of various Evangelical Denominations. Vol. I of the New Testament: containing a general introduction, and the Gospel according to St. Matthew. 8vo. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1865.

*The Gospel according to Matthew, together with a General Theological and Homiletical Introduction to the New Testament,* by JOHN PETER LANGE, Professor of Theology at the University of Bonn. Translated from the third German edition, with additions original and selected, by PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. 8vo., pp. 568. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1865.

This noble octavo comes with a double title, a generic and a specific. The first title announces the commencement of the publication in our United States of the greatest biblical work yet projected in our country; "the greatest literary enterprise of the kind undertaken during the present century," perhaps the most extensive entire commentary ever published in our language. It proposes to constitute "a complete exegetical library for constant reference." The New Testament will consist of twelve octavo volumes; the Old Testament of twice as many. It aims to be a complete standard, furnishing the main body of exegetical matter extant, calculated for the scholar, the minister, the family. The original work is in process of publication under the supervision of Dr. Lange, by whom the different books of both Testaments have been assigned to different leading German scholars. It is the joint work, therefore, of many masters. The republication is in the hands of our valued contributor, Dr. Schaff, who prepares, with valuable additions of his own, some of the volumes, and assigns others to several eminent American scholars.

Of Dr. Lange's Matthew we have in a former Quarterly had occasion to speak in favorable terms. It strikes us as excellent, though not as an unsurpassable ultimate. It is learned, clear, comprehensive, and compact. It has not, perhaps, the genial flow, the "nutritious" mellowness, which renders Dr. Nestle so readable a classic. There is something of a dryness about it. Nor can we approve the "sermonical" scraps heaped in under the heading Homiletic. If in commentary we must have something that is not commentary, give us the old "Practical Remarks" of Dr. Scott, written in rich, connected, persuasive style, designed as direct pro-

motives of the personal piety of the reader, not mere crude material for professional consumption. The old "Sermon Sketches" have been nearly banished from use; but we prefer them to these miscellaneous scraps. If any body desires such matter, publish an exclusively Homiletic commentary for clerical use, and let commentary proper stand alone. Dr. Lange is a divine of the Reformed communion, and decidedly, though not offensively, Calvinistic. The preparation of the different volumes is exclusively placed in Calvinistic hands. Dr. Schaff adds occasional references to English and American commentators of different denominations, Methodist included. The volume on Mark will be prepared by Dr. Shedd; Luke by Dr. Schaff; Hebrews by Dr. Kendrick, the American editor of Olshausen. The external, material, and execution, are far inferior to those of *Nast's Commentary*, from our noble Western press, though sold at the same price. The use of the various types is skilfully managed.

Of the Old Testament, Genesis alone, by Dr. Lange, has as yet appeared, even in the German. Years must elapse before the complete appearance of the entire work in the English language. Meantime it is pressed forward by its many hands. The volumes may be expected to appear in seasonable succession. Each volume will be published in the order of completion by its author; and the single volume can be purchased apart from the others. With such an editor as Schaff, and such a publisher as Scribner, we may expect the work to be energetically and successfully completed. And when completed it will, doubtless, be an invaluable treasury of biblical exposition; a grand, we might say, stupendous, supply for the highest demand of our age in this department.

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*History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin.* By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D.D., Author of the "History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century," etc. Vol. III. France, Switzerland, Geneva. 12mo., pp. 463. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers.

This volume made its appearance in France last year, just three centuries after Calvin's death. It was offered to the public by its gifted and well-known author in commemoration of that event. The series of which it forms a part is not merely a memoir of the French Reformer, but, as a history of the Reformation in his times, it necessarily includes his memoir. The work is properly a sequel to the "History of the Great Reformation in the Sixteenth Century," or as the author himself styles it, "a Second Series, of which that was the first."

As a historical work its value is undoubted. Very much of



the material for it has been drawn from the original MSS., and has never before been presented to the public in any form. Many readers will probably demur to the high estimate here placed upon the character and teachings of Calvin, but of the general accuracy of Dr. D'Aubigné as a historian it is not necessary to speak to the American public. In style we think this an improvement on the former series; at all events it is an eminently readable book. The author seems to have accepted the hint of his revered friend, Guizot, and given us "THE DETAILS," touching, thrilling, inspiring incidents that show the Gospel of Jesus Christ the same everywhere, renovating the heart, purifying the life, sanctifying the affections.

The narrative of this volume is confined to France and Switzerland, and covers but little more than the period between 1531 and 1535. It will be perceived that much yet remains for the future volumes. We await them with impatience. C.

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*Counsels to Converts.* By AUGUSTUS C. GEORGE, of the East Genesee Conference. 12mo., pp. 357. Cincinnati: Poe & Hitchcock. 1864.

Reading for the young Christian, and especially the young convert! Are not *novels* the staple reading of but too many, even of those who become probationers in our revivals? Are not *novels*, sometimes, indeed, of a religious cast, but often the reverse, the ordinary mental aliment of many professing Christians young and old? We are drowned in a deluge of fiction. And when we reflect how enervating its influence upon the mind, how destructive of the zest for historic truth and living realities, we wonder whether the lunatic asylum is not to become a terribly prevalent institution. And yet how little does the pulpit utter on the important subject of shaping the mind to elevated and vigorous character by well selected reading!

All this is not for the want of books calculated to frame the character to the true model. We have an ample library of such works too often unread, because the *taste* of our age is effeminate and truly unconverted. To this library Mr. George has here made a valuable addition. His is a book that might well be placed in the hands of every intelligent young convert. Taken as a manual, next to the Bible, its careful, prayerful study would be no ordinary aid to the formation of a true style of piety both of heart and action. Mr. George is master of a fresh and vigorous style. He leads his willing reader through noble ranges of thought. He illustrates his topic with apt instances and examples. He shows the practi-

cal pastor in adjusting his counsels to the actual realities of our day. We have not the slightest fear that his book will or can have a spread too extensive for the public good.

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*Meditations on the Essence of Christianity, and on the Religious Questions of the Day.* By M. GUIZOT. Translated from the French under the superintendence of the Author. 12mo., pp. 356. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1865.

A book for our thoughtful laymen, by a great Christian layman. Great as is the skepticism of our times, Christianity is truth too pure, is a need of our nature too pressing, is a dispensation from God too merciful, to fail or falter. The darkness of ages may have gathered errors around her which progressive thought will disperse; but her essence is divine and indestructible. Time will show whether Guizot concedes too much. We think he does; but his defense of the main center is impregnable.

It may seem strange to some that such a work should go forth from our press. But few Methodist readers will go through it without smiling at the coincidence between the views of Guizot and the doctrines of Methodism. The note added by Professor Tayler Lewis, at the request of the editor, has received a very hearty commendation from various quarters. It supplies a strengthener where Guizot was most feeble.

We expect a full review of the work by an able hand.

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*The Earliest Churches of New York and its Vicinity.* By GABRIEL P. DISOSWAY, A. M., Corresponding Member of the New York Historical Society, etc. 12mo., pp. 416. New York: James G. Gregory. 1865.

The thanks of the Christian Churches of our city and country are due to Mr. Disosway for the researches and records contained in this beautiful volume. Consisting mainly of chapters originally contributed to the *New York Observer*, its publication was demanded by the wishes of leading Christian gentlemen of different denominations. It is written in a clear style and a most catholic spirit. Mr. Disosway is by descent, birth, residence, business, and social connections a New Yorker of the New Yorkers. To trace through various records of archeological lore, and furnish to our ministry and ecclesiastical bodies their own *origines sacrae*, dry as the task might seem to outsiders, was to him a labor of love. The volume is beautiful to the eye. Its antique engravings, plentiful in number and rich in interest, disclose to many of our magnificent structures their humble origin.

*Foreign Theological Publications.*

*Geschichte des Rationalismus.* Erste Abtheilung: Geschichte des Pietismus und des ersten Stadiums der Aufklärung. Von DR. A. THOLUCK. 8vo., pp. 182. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben. 1865.

At last the first installment of the long-awaited history of German Rationalism from Dr. Tholuck. A more welcome gift to the theological public has not recently appeared. The intrinsic interest of the theme, the widespread reputation of the author, the peculiar, natural, and acquired qualifications which he brings to the execution of his task, all conspire to heighten the anticipations of the reader as he takes the fresh, uncut issue in hand. At last we are to have a reliable history of the most remarkable and important theological movement of modern times.

It is widely known that Professor T. has made the study of the rationalistic movement for many years, if not during his whole academic career, a specialty. Called to Halle at a period when rationalism reigned with undisputed sway, providentially intrusted with the mission of revolutionizing the theological character of that important university, he was forced to make the personal acquaintance of the system, and to study it on every side with that concentrated attention with which an attacking general reconnoiters the positions of his foe. In later years after the recovery of the institution from the control of unbelief, he lectured upon the rise and development of the movement to crowded auditories year after year. Having formed the resolution to write the history of it, and finding this impossible without first describing the general state of theology and of the Church in Germany in the seventeenth century, he issued in 1853 the commencement of a "*Fore-history of Rationalism*," entitled "Academic Life in the Seventeenth Century," the completion of which followed in 1861 under the title, "Ecclesiastical Life in the Seventeenth Century." In the elaboration of this preliminary history our author expended an almost incredible amount of labor. Every university archive of Germany had to be ransacked, thousands of mouldy manuscripts woke in resurrection to give in their testimony, forgotten biographies, albums, journals, Church records, academical addresses, correspondence, magazines, family memorials, these were his scattered sources: his the task of collecting them, mastering their contents, classifying and arranging them. No wonder that on concluding his task at so advanced an age, the question should arise, as he tells us in the preface to this new work it did, whether having prepared the foundation he should not rather leave the erection of the superstructure to younger and fresher hands.

In consideration, however, of the fact that the treatment of a historical development by one who has made so extensive preliminary and detail studies is always "not without value," and in consideration further that it seemed scarcely right to remand to oblivion so much material laboriously gleaned from unpublished or almost inaccessible sources, he decided, as he further informs us, to proceed to the elaboration of the main work, "though in a less extended form than the 'Fore-history' would lead one to expect."

The work is to consist of three parts. The one before us contains the history of "Pietism and the first stadium of the *Aufklärung*;"\* the second is to give the continuation down to the commencement of the present century; the third the history of Rationalismus in the narrower sense from 1800 down to the reawakening of the Church, 1820-30. The part just issued falls into three sections: I. Church Orthodoxy in its expiration, pp. 3-9. II. Biblical Orthodoxy of Pietism till its extinction about the middle of the century, pp. 9-91. III. The *Aufklärung* in its first stadium from the beginning to the middle of the century, pp. 92-182. The first is very brief, and comparatively unimportant. The second contains the following chapters: 1. *Halle* Pietism treated in two periods, the first extending to 1724, the second to 1751. 2. *Württemberg* Pietism. 3. The Moravian Church. 4. Degeneracies of Pietism. 5. Extension and Influence of Pietism. The third treats of the "Influence from Abroad," and of "the inner Factors," to which he reckons: *a*, Thomasius; *b*, the Wolfian Philosophy; *c*, the Transitional Theologians, (Pfaff and Mosheim;) and *d*, the Ecclesiastical and Religious Life of the Time.

To many the section on the history of Pietism will prove the most interesting in the whole work. It is well known that the most opposite verdicts are passed by different parties in Germany upon the character and influence of this historical phenomenon. Some hold it accountable in no small measure for the rise and rapid extension of neology, because it had laid less stress on strict orthodoxy than the old divines had done; others think that the recent reawakening of the German Church is directly traceable to the good seed sown by Pietism a century ago and carefully guarded in the bosom of the "*Brüdergemeinde*" and other associations of humble Christians through the drear winter of rationalistic ascend-

\* This untranslatable word has become the classical denomination among Germans for that grand "clearing up" which commenced about a hundred and fifty years ago in the whole intellectual atmosphere of Europe, and of which German Rationalism was only a particular manifestation, namely, its manifestation in the sphere of theology.

ency. Many regard it as the highest bloom to which the Lutheran Church has ever attained; *Klieforth*, on the other hand, pronounces it "an exotic growth." *Hossbach* writes up *Spener*, and *Engelhardt* *Loescher*; *Gass* treats the period from a Union point of view, *Heinrich Schmid* from a stiffly Lutheran one. Perhaps none of them are as well qualified to pronounce an impartial judgment in the case as *Tholuck*. His acquaintance with it from its first rise to the present hour is most intimate. His own spiritual birth is almost directly traceable to its influence, his life has been spent in its birthplace and stronghold, his years have been devoted to studies of the period of its rise and development, its most voluminous archives have stood open before him, and have been faithfully used. An ardent lover of the Church, yet an equally ardent lover of genuine and vital religion wherever found; an eclectic in theology and a sage in experience; surely if any man is capable of impartially estimating the merits and the demerits, the excellences and the defects of Pietism, he would seem to be the one. And in point of fact, a more calm and just historic judgment has never been pronounced upon it than is found in this book. Many of its pages are full of solemn significance for our own branch of Zion, and should be thoughtfully perused on the one hand by those who dream that religion can dispense with learning, on the other by any who would limit the divine call of our Church to any class or condition of men. For both the phenomena of declining Pietism have lessons of sad and warning import.

The only thing in the book to which we take exception is our author's occasional incorrect and catachrestic use of the terms "Methodistic" and "Methodism," as, for instance, pp. 21, 26, 34, etc. No doubt it is wholly unintentional on his part, and in accordance with the *usus loquendi* of German theologians; but against all such unintentional falsifications of history, perversions of fact, and tacit defamations of a whole communion of Christian people, we must mildly but most firmly protest. May the honored professor live to substitute other and more suitable terms in a coming edition!

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*Die Lutherische Dogmatik historisch-genetisch dargestellt.* Von DR. KARL FRIED. AUG. KAHNIS. Bd. I, 1861; bd. II, 1864.

Within the past ten years several Lutheran works upon systematic theology have appeared which deserve the attention of all theological students. They are as follows: *H. Schmid*, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt*. 5te Aufl. 1863. *F. A. Philippi*, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*.

1 Theil, 1854, not yet complete. *G. Thomasius*, Christi Person und Werk; Darstellung der evang.-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus. 3 Bde., 1852-64. To the same class belongs the above-named work, by Dr. Kahnis. Schmid's work is a very convenient Repertorium for such as have not the old Lutheran divines at hand, consisting as it does of a skeleton of Lutheran doctrine supported under every head by numerous quotations from such old theologians as *Gerhard*, *Calov*, *Hutter*, *Quenstedt*, etc. *Philippi* is a pupil of Hengstenberg, a convert from Judaism, the Coryphæus of the "old Lutherans," stricter in his orthodoxy than Hengstenberg himself. In the department of systematic theology he stands alone. Will any one peruse an exposition of genuine old Lutheran theology, as incorporated in the *Formula Concordiæ*, let him get *Philippi*. Five parts have appeared, and the completion of the work may soon be expected. (By the way, it is high time that *Knapp* should cease to be regarded in America as standard exponent of Lutheran doctrine. He is as far from being such as Horace Bushnell is from being a fair representative of strict old fashioned Calvinism.) *Thomasius* of Erlangen is a strong man of the New Lutheran party, ardent in his attachment to the Lutheran Church, yet not insensible to the formal and material defects of the old orthodox theology of the seventeenth century. The method of his work would be intolerable to any but a Lutheran, but it is so profoundly learned, and yet at the same time so modest and candid, that its study is a treat. Despite all his qualifications on the point of the relation of grace to nature or to the will, before, during, and after conversion, he in fact abandons the Lutheran view and adopts the Methodist, though, of course, without "giving credit." In the doctrine of the sacraments, however, he is still essentially Lutheran. *Kahnis* belongs to a somewhat younger generation. A brilliant disciple of Tholuck, he soon rose to notice as a spirited combatant of rationalism, and distinguished himself by a mighty zeal for Lutheran orthodoxy by the pen, on platform and cathedra. The Lutherans set great hopes upon him. It was about this time that he wrote the work by which he is chiefly known among English readers, "Inner Development of German Theology," etc. Even this was found a little too liberal for many of his party, but the grand breach between him and the strict confessionalists came in 1861, on the publication of the first volume of the work mentioned at the head of this notice. In it he gives up portions of the canon as uninspired, abandons the orthodox form of the doctrine of the Trinity, and finds much fault with traditional Lutheranism.



*Diekhoff, Delitzsch, and Hengstenberg* published jeremiads of moving pathos, and solemnly excommunicated him from the ranks of their party. By virtue of his original method the two volumes now published contain properly nothing but *Prolegomena*; the renovated Kahn-Lutheran system is to be presented in the next and concluding volume. A critical notice of it may be expected as soon as it shall appear.

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*Das höhere Schulwesen in Preussen.* Historisch-statistische Darstellung im Auftrage des Ministers der geistlichen, Unterrichts und Medicinal-Angelegenheiten herausgegeben. Von DR. L. WIESE. Berlin. 1864.

We briefly notice this work for the benefit of American educators. The Prussian system of national education has for thirty years been the study of all civilized nations. And with good reason. Taken all in all it has no rival either in the Old or New World. The primary schools of New England and of some emulating western states may equal in effectiveness those of Prussia, individual institutions of a higher grade in France and England may accomplish as much as any similar German ones, but as a system for the education of the whole nation the Prussian is far ahead of all others. The elaborate reports of C. E. Stowe, A. D. Bache, Horace Mann, Joseph Kay, Henry Barnard, Cousin, and others, have done much to diffuse in our country accurate information touching the organization and working of its primary schools, while the letters of tourists and American students have rendered most readers more familiar with the German universities than they are with the English. Between these two grades of schools, however, lies another class of institutions answering to our colleges, and as yet comparatively little studied. It is with this class, embracing the *Gymnasium*, the *Progymnasium*, the *Realschule*, the higher *Bürgerschule*, and the *Alumnat*, that the above work has to do. It gives us in its first part (pp. 1-16) a full account of the administration of these institutions, their connection with the provincial and national government, and the present administrating *personnel*. Part II explains the different kinds of high schools and wherein they are distinguished, closing with a complete classified list of all, illustrated by a map showing the location of each. Part III contains a short description and history of each arranged according to provinces. This fills pp. 50-410, very closely printed. Part IV gives the statistics of attendance as far back as could be easily ascertained: pp. 410-476. Part V gives a sketch of the laws and regulations in force at different times touching the final examination and dismissal: pp. 478-524. Part VI is an exceed-

ingly interesting and instructive account of the teachers' preparation, appointment, duties, and rights: pp. 525-597. Four Appendices follow, the first exhibiting the expenses incurred in supporting these schools, the second the present regulations touching tuition, etc., the third the privileges of graduates, the fourth a very rich and extensive selection from the laws, ordinances, and instructions by which the Prussian system has been brought to its present state of perfection. This alone fills pp. 622-744. It would seem as if nothing which an educator would care to know about these schools had been omitted. You will find even the formula employed in dismissing a director, how long a teacher is allowed to be absent from his post in term-time, what he has to do before he can be allowed to marry, etc., etc. One might spend a year in the personal inspection of the schools here treated of without being able to collect half the information here offered. The charm of it is that it comes fresh from the State Department of Instruction at Berlin, and is, therefore, absolutely reliable. It also contains the very latest statistics, rules, etc., coming down to the close of 1864. Every college president should have the work.

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*History, Biography, and Topography.*

*History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles.* By DR. AUGUSTUS NEANDER. Translated from the German, by J. E. RYLAND. Translation revised and corrected, according to the fourth German edition, by E. G. ROBINSON, D.D., Professor in the Rochester Seminary. 8vo., pp. 539. New York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1865.

The general voice of the scholarly world seems to have placed Neander at the head of Church history in his day, and we suppose that the work before us would be placed at the head of his productions in that department. There is a rare blending of a lax gentleness with an iron independence in Neander. As Strauss and his fellows approach our Gospels from the stand-point of Pantheism, and so work like destructive giants to reduce the whole evangelic structure within the bounds of the ordinary and the natural, so with quiet firmness Neander, from an *à priori* Christian stand-point, Christian even in coming to Christ, animated by anticipation with the "theologia pectoris," simply examines the sacred documents in the light of their best cotemporaneous history, and in the true spirit of the best modern thought finds what is rationally to be held as the true character of the events, the actors, and the doctrines of that divine movement. The question he answers is: What can a true philosopher pronounce upon the pentecost,

the pentecostal Church, the apostolic college, the apostolic institutes, the establishment of the Churches, the character of individual founders, the distinctive views of the different New Testament writers, etc.?

The mild intrepidity with which Neander withstood the worst assaults of the great German apostasy, together with the negligent apostolic simplicity of his style of mind, has rendered our American orthodoxy tolerant of his individualisms. His lax views of inspiration, conceding secular mistake in the sacred documents; his rejection of any founded order of ministry under the assumption that all Christians are equally priests; his rejection of all proof of infant baptism in the sacred text, and acceptance of the institution as simply a want of the Church; his conclusion that Paul was rather probably a restorationist, and his exclusion of the Apocalypse from the sacred canon, are among the points in which he maintains, without any emphatic assertion of independence, a quiet peculiarity.

As commentary and as history, the present volume will as a whole be an acceptable present to our American Church. The Edinburgh translation of the work was one of the earliest issues of the *Clarkes*. In a nobler form, under an able revising hand, it has attained a "better resurrection."

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*Physical Geography of the Holy Land.* By EDWARD ROBINSON, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. A Supplement to the Author's late *Biblical Researches in the Holy Land*. 8vo., pp. 399. Boston: Crocker & Brewster. 1865.

We had occasion to say in our notice of the last edition of Dr. Robinson's *Biblical Researches*, that his purpose was to have shaped the whole into a scientific form as a *Geography of the Holy Land*. Such a work from his hand would have constituted a new period in sacred geography; but the author did not live to complete the task. According to the division which the modern science of geography adopts, its three parts would have embraced physical, topical, and historical geography. The present volume embraces the first of these parts, including only the Holy Land lying between the Mediterranean and the Jordan. The Trans-Jordanic region, had he lived, he would have included in his work. As it is, for the ground it covers, it is complete. It is not, happily, a mere fragment. It is a subordinate whole; the work worthy the hand of a great master.

The volume opens with an introduction, tracing the history of sacred geography. This sketch will possess some interest for the

sacred scholar. The divisions of the work are: Chapter i: The surface in its general features; embracing under three sections, The Mountains and Hills, The Valleys and The Plains. Chapter ii: The Waters; embracing under four sections, The Rivers and Minor Streams, The Lakes, The Fountains, The Wells, Cisterns, Reservoirs, and Aqueducts. Chapter iii: Climate; embracing Seasons, Temperature, Winds, Atmosphere. Chapter iv: Geological Features. An appendix is added, embracing the Physical Geography of the Syrian coast.

The work is done in handsome external style, printed at the Andover press, by W. F. Draper.

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#### *Educational.*

*A Hebrew Chrestomathy*; or, Lessons in Reading and Writing Hebrew. By WILLIAM HENRY GREEN, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. 8vo., pp. 261. New York: John Wiley. 1864.

In addition to his Hebrew Grammar, Professor Green here furnishes a Chrestomathy, the second gate to the treasures of the sacred tongue. Of the value in detail of such a work the practical professor engaged in teaching is experimentally the best judge. But Professor Green's plan seems to us excellent. Fifty-five pages are devoted to graduated reading lessons, suited to the capacity of the advancing scholar, constituting by its choice of passages an attractive anthology, in a type delightful for the eye to look upon. The remainder is devoted to notes, performing the part, first, of a genial teacher; afterward, as occasion offers, of an entertaining illustrator, or an instructive commentator. The pupil is thus led through a difficult yet interesting path. Such a work is well calculated both to guide the way, and to awaken the holy ambition of the scholar and the candidate for the ministry to master the riches of the oracles of God as given to ancient Israel. We recommend the volume to the attention of our Hebrew professors, and our ministers generally.

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*Science for the School and Family.* Part III. Mineralogy and Geology. By WORTHINGTON HOOKER, M. D., Professor in Yale College. Illustrated by nearly two hundred engravings. 12mo., pp. 325. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1865.

An excellent successor to Dr. Hooker's Physiology and other works. His books are not science in play, but science in grave earnest, expressed with as truly a popular simplicity of style as the subject admits. This is well aided by the abundance and clearness of the graphic illustrations. Schools and families will hardly find books better adjusted to their caliber.

*Belles-Lettres, Classical and Philological.*

*Essays, Historical and Biographical, Political, Social, Literary, and Scientific.*  
By HUGH MILLER. Edited, with a preface, by PETER BAYNE, author  
of "The Christian Life," etc. 12mo., pp. 501. Boston: Gould & Lin-  
coln. New York: Sheldon & Co. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard.  
1865.

These are choice selections from Mr. Miller's productions as editor  
of the *Witness*. They are not the least valuable, and are among  
the most fascinating, of the productions of that remarkable man.

*Miscellaneous.*

*Autobiography, Correspondence, etc., of Lyman Beecher, D. D.* Vol. II.  
12mo., pp. 587. Harper & Brothers. 1865.

*The Cedar Christian*, and other Practical Papers and Personal Sketches.  
By THEODORE L. CUYLER, Pastor of the Lafayette Avenue Church,  
Brooklyn. 12mo., pp. 215. New York: Carter & Brothers. 1864.

*Tony Butler.* A novel. 8vo., pp. 257. New York. 1865.

*Studies for Stories.* By JEAN INGELow. 12mo., pp. 404. Boston: Roberts  
& Brothers. 1865.

*Vanity Fair.* A Novel without a Hero. By WILLIAM MAKEPEACE  
THACKERAY. With Illustrations by the Author. 3 vols. New York.  
1865.

A very beautiful edition, in green and gilt, on tinted pages, with  
colored letters.

*The Observing Faculties in the Family and in the School.* By WARREN  
BUXTON. 12mo., pp. 171. Harper & Brothers. 1865.

*Lessons on the Subject of Right and Wrong.* For use in Families and  
Schools. 12mo., pp. 88. Boston: Crosby & Ainsworth. New York:  
Oliver S. Felt. 1865.

*O Mother Dear, Jerusalem.* The Old Hymn, its Origin and Genealogy.  
Edited by WILLIAM C. PRIME. 12mo., pp. 92. New York: Anson D.  
F. Randolph. 1865.

A beautiful little volume, tracing the sources of the delightful  
hymn, "Jerusalem, my happy home."

*Pamphlets.*

*State Rights:* A Photograph from the Ruins of Ancient Greece, with  
appended Dissertations on the Ideas of Nationality, of Sovereignty, and  
the Right of Revolution. By Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, Union College.  
8vo., pp. 97. Albany: Weed, Parsons, & Co. 1865.

This is an enlargement of a previous pamphlet from the same hand,  
in which monitory lessons are adduced from the past to guide our

country through the dangers of the present. The ruin of ancient Greece was the prevalence of the doctrine of State Rights over the sentiment of nationality. The cry of the demagogue, appealing to the local and the sectional, drowned the calm voice of the statesman and patriot pleading for Union. Hence arose secessions, convulsions, anarchies, destruction. Terrible and monitory, indeed, is the picture history draws of the universal chaos of passion and blood into which the most civilized spot on the globe was plunged by the fire-eaters and destructives of that day. Such an anarchy did the secessionists of 1860 anticipate when they drew upon our maps their programme of the various republics into which we were to break. The correspondent purpose of our northern Copperheads (for no epithet is too bad for such a "generation of vipers") is well illustrated by the Mayor's message of Fernando Wood, proposing that the city of New York should secede and declare herself independent.

Few minds in our country are able to bring the lessons of the classic ages and of Platonic philosophy to bear upon the practical affairs of our day with a subtler skill or profounder wisdom than Dr. Lewis. Mr. Greeley has said that his genius will be better appreciated by the future than by his cotemporaries. But we have cause to know that both in England and America there is an increasing number who realize the originality of his thought and the beauty of his style. We cannot, however, agree with him in naming Daniel Webster as the type of a true conservatism.

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ARTICLES DECLINED.—We are obliged to say that our editorial drawer contains nearly thrice as many articles as our pages can accommodate. Many must therefore be, to our regret, excluded, not from their own unfitness, but from an arithmetical impossibility of finding room. Writers must not, therefore, consider exclusion as synonymous with condemnation; nor must impatience be indulged by others at *delay* of insertion. The only remedy for the difficulty is the enlarging our Quarterly to *double its present size*, which we promise shall be done as soon as our subscription list can be doubled. The way to accomplish this is for its friends at the coming Annual Conferences to take measures for obtaining twice as many subscribers as each conference now affords. Shall it be done?